Novooeksandrivsk Direction
The adversary (Russian troops) in the zone of their 36th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the “Vostok” group of troops continues stabilization actions (conducting mobile/active defense) to prevent further advancement of the forward units and subunits of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) in several areas and directions within the tactical zone towards the road Hulyaipole — Velyka Novosilka. However, as of 24.07.2026, this task has not been fully accomplished. Apparently, after a pause caused by the need to consolidate their earlier gained positions and lines, the AFU resumed their offensive actions, achieving certain tactical results.
Attempts by the adversary to restore the positions of their forward units and subunits in the interfluve of the Yanchur and Vovcha rivers, which existed before the start of the AFU offensive in this direction about two months ago, were unsuccessful.
1. Composition of enemy forces and means.
The 36th CAA is likely operating in the Novoeeksandrivsk direction with the main forces:
– 37th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (omrbr);
– 5th Separate Tank Brigade (otbr);
– 30th Separate Artillery Brigade (oabr).
Additional forces and means of reinforcement:
– 120th Marine Division (mpd), former 336th Separate Marine Brigade (ombr) of the Baltic Fleet (BF), still in the formation stage — it is obvious that only part of its forces operates in the zone of the 36th CAA, as well as in the zone of the 29th CAA;
– 69th Separate Brigade Cover (obrpc) from the 35th CAA of the “Vostok” group — its units were also spotted in the zone of the 36th CAA;
– 34th omrbr from the 49th Army — possible presence of separate units;
– 38th omrbr from the 35th CAA — the presence of its separate units is also possible, although its main forces obviously act in the zone of the 5th CAA of the “Vostok” group, which is attempting to advance in the direction of Hulyaipole — Orikhiv.
Additionally, in the zone of the 36th CAA, there are likely several formations at the “separate motor rifle/rifle regiment” (omr/osp) and “separate motor rifle/rifle battalion” (omsb/osb) level from the “territorial troops” (Tt) of the Russian armed forces and their mobilization reserve (MR). It is likely that there may be 2-3 such formations here.
2. Current Situation on the Novooleksandrivka Front is characterized by intense counter-battles in the tactical zone, driven by both sides’ mutual desire to significantly improve the tactical positions of their forward units and detachments.
– The Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) are evidently attempting to advance southeast between the Yanchur and Vorona rivers, as well as along both their banks, to reach the Huliaipole — Velyka Novosilka road (a rather “sensitive” line for the Russian command in the sectors of the 36th and 5th AID) at several important tactical points: the area of the villages of Pavlivka — Novovasylivske — Novomykolaivka — Uspenivka (intersection of the aforementioned road with the Yanchur river), the area of the villages of Temyrivka and Novoivanivka, and under favorable conditions to reach the area northwest of Velyka Novosilka (approximately Shevchenko — Burlatske — Pryvilne — Vilne Pole).
– In turn, the Russian command seeks to prevent further advancement of Ukrainian units in the aforementioned directions, eliminating their existing tactical penetrations, and to achieve disruption of the interaction between UAF tactical groups advancing between the Yanchur and Vorona rivers through active counterattacks generally towards Novoivanivka — Verbove and to push the forward Ukrainian units from the line Novomykolaivka — Novohrigorivka north and northwest.
Furthermore, it is evident that the enemy is attempting to create conditions for the guaranteed retention of their positions along the Temyrivka – Zelene Pole, as well as Pavlivka – Novoivanivka lines. In practice, this has appeared as follows:
– The UAF, evidently, managed to advance from the line Berezove — Ternove towards Zaporizhzhia, initiating battles for its liberation. This has significantly complicated the enemy’s efforts to conduct counterattacks in the Zaporizhzhia — Kalynivske direction. However, it is likely that some small enemy infantry groups are still present north of Novomykolaivka and south of Kalynivske.
– Intense battles also continue along the Novomykolaivka — Novohrigorivka line. Russian forward units are attempting to hold Novohrigorivka at all costs (a key tactical point before the Huliaipole — Velyka Novosilka road), regularly attempting to advance their small infantry (assault) groups towards Verbove and Kalynivske.
The situation in this area remains quite unstable — likely, the enemy has managed to hold at least the northern part of Novohrigorivka and even infiltrate some of their infantry groups north of it. However, the UAF has likely achieved a similar result to the west and southwest of this village, complicating further Russian counterattacks towards Verbove and making them, so to speak, very problematic.
– In the Pryvilne — Krasnohirsk and Solodke — Rybne directions, during the reporting period, Russian troops repeatedly attempted counterattacks, trying to stop the advance of UAF forward units along the Yanchur river towards Uspenivka. But, it seems, they did not achieve success in this — Ukrainian units likely managed to block several small enemy infantry groups in the Rybne area and were close enough to liberate it and advance further towards Uspenivka. In the Krasnohirsk area, Russian units generally failed to advance north.
– It should also be noted that on the right flank of the Russian 36th ZVA (at its junction with the sector of the 29th ZVA), it appears that the units of the 120th DMP and the 69th OBRP operating there have not been able to halt the advance of the forward Ukrainian units, which have already reached the line of Novohorivka – Zaporizhzhia.
In the context of the fact that in the sector of the neighboring Russian 29th ZVA, Ukrainian Armed Forces have already managed to advance south from Maliyivka, the tactical situation for the adversary in this sector may become even more complicated — they might not hold Komyshuvakha if the Ukrainian Armed Forces initiate simultaneous attacks towards it from both Maliyivka and Novohorivka.
Thus, it can be stated that in the sector of its 36th ZVA, the Russian command has still not been able to completely stop the advance of the forward Ukrainian units across a number of tactical areas and directions, not to mention eliminating their tactical incursions that they had previously achieved. So, although slowly, the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to advance in this direction.
3. Regarding further development prospects in the entire Novooleksandrivsky direction, it is obviously directly related to the events occurring in the sectors of the Russian 29th and 5th ZVA.
If in the sector of the Russian 29th ZVA, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are also conducting offensive actions on a number of areas and directions where they have also achieved quite significant tactical results, then in its 5th ZVA sector, the Russian command likely still hopes to regain a more or less high pace of its offensive and still reach the Orihiv defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the east and northeast. However, at the moment, this is not going very well for them.
In my opinion, if further advancement of the Ukrainian Armed Forces occurs in the sector of the Russian 36th ZVA (and simultaneously in the sector of the 29th ZVA), all these “insignificant” tactical successes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces may well acquire operational significance. Moreover, in this case, the command of the Russian UV “Vostok” will somehow be forced to deploy at least part of its 5th ZVA forces not to the west toward Orihiv, but to the north and northeast. Especially if the Ukrainian Armed Forces manage to break through to the Uspenivka area and reach the area northwest of Velyka Novosilka.
So far, this “scenario” does not seem very realistic. After all, the Ukrainian Armed Forces are clearly conducting the offensive in the sectors of the Russian 36th and 29th ZVA with very limited forces and means, with goals limited exclusively to the tactical zone.
Moreover, the Russian command obviously knows and understands this, so it essentially does not feel particularly “concerned” about this. It probably assesses the plan (intent) of the Ukrainian command as merely a desire to force its 5th ZVA to shift from an “offensive” mode to a “defensive” mode. No more than that…
But, I think, the next month will clearly show whether the Russian command was correct in its assessment of the Ukrainian plan or not…
Photo: 127th Separate Heavy Mechanized Kharkiv Brigade
