Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 25.05.2026.
1. On May 24, Ukrainian drones attacked the “Vtorovo” oil pumping station in the Vladimir region, which belongs to Transneft.
– The fire area reached 800 square meters. The strike hit the NPS “Vtorovo” — an important node in the central part of Russia’s petroleum transportation system.
– The Security Service of Ukraine stated that the station supplies large oil depots around Moscow, as well as fuel supply for Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo, and Vnukovo airports.
– In addition, “Vtorovo” is the starting point of the main oil product pipeline Vtorovo — Yaroslavl — Kirishi — Primorsk. This route is used to transport Russian diesel fuel to the Baltic port of Primorsk for further export.
2. Ukraine is increasingly adopting asymmetric defense against Russian missiles and drones.
– The Ukrainian electronic warfare system Lima has begun to play an important role in this. Unlike classic air defense systems, Lima does not physically destroy targets but jams and substitutes satellite navigation signals.
– As a result, Russian Shahed, cruise, and even ballistic missiles lose their course and cannot accurately hit their targets. According to developers, in the past 18 months, the system has helped thwart attacks by more than 20,500 Shahed drones and divert dozens of Russian missiles from their routes.
– This significantly complicates Russia’s ability to carry out massive strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure.
– An additional advantage of Lima is its relatively low cost. Protecting a large city with such a system is estimated at about 5 million euros, comparable to the cost of a single Patriot PAC-3 missile. For Ukraine, which must economize expensive Western munitions, this provides a much cheaper way to deplete Russia’s missile potential.
– However, the system has its limitations: drones and missiles still fall after losing navigation and can cause destruction.
– But for Russia, this means mainly reduced effectiveness of costly missile attacks and decreased chances of accurately hitting planned targets.
3. Following another visit by Putin to China, the Russian government is preparing to delve even deeper into financial dependence on Beijing.
– The Russian Ministry of Finance announced a new issuance of government bonds in Chinese yuan, attempting to close the growing budget gap.
– In the first four months of 2026, Russia’s federal budget deficit nearly reached 6 trillion rubles—significantly higher than the annual plan of 3.8 trillion. The authorities plan to cover the shortfall with new debts, including in Chinese currency. The collection of applications for the new 10-year yuan-denominated OFZs will start at the end of May, with the placement scheduled for June 3.
– This is not the Kremlin’s first attempt to borrow in yuan: at the end of last year, the Russian Ministry of Finance already placed two issues of such bonds, but raised less money than expected.
– The shift to borrowing in yuan demonstrates how Russia has lost access to Western financial markets due to sanctions. Simultaneously, it increases Moscow’s dependence on China, which is gradually becoming not only the main buyer of Russian raw materials but also a key creditor of the Russian economy.
4. “External management” in Russia as a scheme to seize Western assets.
– After the start of the full-scale war, Russia introduced a mechanism of so-called “external management” for Western companies attempting to leave the Russian market.
– This effectively meant transferring assets under the control of entities close to the authorities, with subsequent sales at depressed prices. After management changes, some enterprises began to work directly or indirectly for the needs of the Russian army.
– For example, the brewing company “Baltika,” owned by Denmark’s Carlsberg Group, launched the production of the drink “For OURS” for Russian troops.
– As a result, the Kremlin converted part of Western business assets into a tool supporting Russia’s military economy, while foreign owners lost control over enterprises, suffered reputational damage, and were forced to sell assets at significant discounts.
5. The mortgage market in Russia is contracting. After the winding down of preferential programs and the tightening of lending conditions, housing loan issuance has more than halved.
– From January to April 2026, Russian banks issued 328.8 thousand mortgage loans totaling 1.4 trillion rubles. This is 56% less in number and 54% less in volume compared to the previous year. Even official statistics show a sharp cooling of demand for housing.
– The new construction market has dropped the most. If last year primary housing accounted for almost half of all mortgages, now it is only 27%. High rates effectively cut Russians off from buying apartments: the average total loan cost exceeds 19%, despite the reduction of the key rate. The average mortgage term has already exceeded 20 years, turning home purchases into a financial trap for millions of families.
– The crisis in the mortgage market is yet another signal of the weakening Russian economy.
– The construction sector, which was supported for a long time by state subsidies, is losing buyers, and along with it, risks of developer bankruptcies, construction reductions, and further declines in domestic demand are growing.
6. NATO intelligence suspects that Russia is working on a secret project to deploy nuclear missiles on the seabed.
– This refers to the “Skif” system, which, according to the German broadcasters WDR and NDR, the Kremlin may have been developing for several years. Missiles with nuclear warheads might be planned to be placed in special containers or silos at a depth of several hundred meters in the Arctic Ocean.
– The main threat of such a system is that it is difficult to detect and neutralize. In the event of war, such installations could provide the Kremlin with an additional covert component for nuclear deterrence and reduce dependence on the submarine fleet.
– The potential project contradicts the 1971 UN Treaty banning the placement of nuclear weapons on the seabed, which the USSR signed at the time. This is yet another signal that Moscow is increasingly focusing on escalation and seeking new ways to exert nuclear pressure on the West.
7. The surge in oil prices due to the conflict around Iran and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz unexpectedly gave Russia a significant financial respite.
– While the West tried to restrict Kremlin’s oil revenues with sanctions and a price cap, the global shortage of raw materials practically returned Russian oil to the center of the global market.
– From March to mid-May, Russian Urals prices more than doubled — from approximately $37 to $92 per barrel at the ports of Primorsk and Novorossiysk. The East Siberian ESPO, which primarily goes to China, increased from $57 to $95 per barrel.
– At one point, Urals even temporarily cost more than ESPO — a rare case for a grade that has been sold with substantial sanctions discounts in recent years.
– According to Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development, the average Urals price for calculating taxes rose from $44.59 in February to $94.87 in April. For the Russian budget, this means a sharp increase in oil revenues, additional tax inflows, and an opportunity to partially offset economic problems due to high energy prices.
– Against this backdrop, the West began to gradually retreat from its strict sanctioning stance. The US has already extended a temporary permit for marine transactions with Russian oil.
– India has increased purchases to almost 2 million barrels per day, Japan, after a long pause, has resumed buying Russian oil, and the UK has eased certain restrictions on fuels made from Russian raw materials in third countries.
– As a result, the market once again showed the weakness of the sanction framework: as soon as there is a risk of a global fuel shortage, political declarations quickly give way to economic necessity. For the Kremlin, this became a temporary gift, allowing it to maintain foreign currency earnings despite a reduction in physical export volumes.
8. The US has moved closer to effectively blocking the import of Russian palladium.
– The U.S. Department of Commerce has imposed a 109.1% countervailing duty on the import of raw palladium from Russia — a rate that effectively makes shipments economically unfeasible.
– The final imposition of tariffs depends on the decision of the U.S. International Trade Commission, which must determine whether Russian imports harm American producers. The initiative is actively supported by the American Sibanye-Stillwater and the United Steelworkers union, which seek to eliminate Russian metal from the U.S. market.
– For the Kremlin, this is another blow to raw material exports. “Norilsk Nickel,” which controls about 40% of the global palladium market, is already predicting a decline in production by 2026 to its lowest level in nearly two decades.
– Although palladium is not yet formally under full sanctions, Washington is gradually increasing pressure on strategic Russian metals. This creates additional risks for Russia’s foreign exchange revenues, which increasingly depend on raw material exports.
– Notably, the restrictions are being imposed against the backdrop of falling global palladium prices and weakening demand from the automotive industry. Thus, Russian producers face two challenges at once — shrinking sales markets and worsening price conditions.
