Information on Russia’s current losses due to sanctions as of 24.05.2026.
1. Russia’s positions in the global gas market continue to rapidly weaken.
– In 2025, Norway surpassed Russia in pipeline gas export volumes for the first time, effectively stripping Gazprom of its status as a global leader.
– According to the International Gas Union’s report and data, Norway exported 108.6 billion cubic meters of pipeline gas in 2025, while Russia only exported 103.5 billion cubic meters.
– For the Kremlin, this is a symbolic and strategic blow: two decades ago, Russia dominated the European market, and now its export volumes have fallen by more than half compared to 2005.
– The main reason for the degradation of Russian gas exports was the actual rupture of energy relations with Europe following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Gazprom lost its most profitable sales market, and attempts to reorient to Asia have yet to compensate for these losses.
– Particularly indicative is Moscow’s dependence on China. The “Power of Siberia-2” pipeline project, which the Kremlin has promoted for years as an alternative to the European direction, has not yet been agreed upon. Beijing is using the weakening of Russia’s positions to strengthen its own negotiating position, seeking the most favorable terms and not rushing to rescue the Russian gas sector.
– As a result, Russia is gradually losing not only income but also the energy leverage used for decades as a tool of political pressure on Europe.
2. International trucking in Russia is rapidly losing profitability.
– By the end of the first quarter of 2026, each truck operating on international routes averaged a net loss of 108,000 rubles per month.
– For comparison: in 2023, one truck generated about 236,000 rubles in profit. Revenue per vehicle was 7% lower than three years ago, and the profitability of international transportation has sharply declined.
– The industry’s problems are related to the reduction of import-export flows, high credit rates, rising maintenance costs, and a shortage of spare parts due to sanctions.
– As a result, even large transport companies are increasingly operating at a loss.
– The logistics crisis is yet another signal of the deteriorating state of the Russian economy: after losing part of the Western markets and complicating international transactions, the transport sector is losing one of its key income drivers.
3. The Kremlin is forced to move to the sale of state assets.
– The Russian government’s plan is to sell nearly a quarter of Aeroflot’s shares to partially cover the large budget deficit. Rosimushchestvo announced the preparation for the sale of 23.76% of Aeroflot’s shares, which constitutes about a third of the state package.
– Currently, the state owns 73.8% of the company. The sale is planned to be conducted through the stock exchange, where about a quarter of the carrier’s shares are already being traded.
– The sale of a stake in one of the largest state-owned companies indicates that reserves for financing the war are gradually depleting.
– Notably, Aeroflot’s market capitalization is currently only about $2.6 billion — several times less than major international airlines.
– Sanctions, isolation of Russian aviation, a shortage of spare parts, and restrictions on international flights continue to pressure the industry, forcing Russian authorities to practically sell off assets to patch up budget holes.
4. The European Union will temporarily lift tariffs on some nitrogen fertilizers due to the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz.
– The relaxation will not extend to Russia and Belarus. The decision was a response to a sharp increase in global prices following the near-total blockade of one of the key routes in global fertilizer trade.
– The EU will suspend tariffs for a year on the import of urea, ammonia, and other nitrogen fertilizers from several countries to partially ease the pressure on European farmers. About a third of the world’s fertilizer trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and supply disruptions have already caused a spike in prices on the global market.
– At the same time, Brussels emphasized that the new concessions do not apply to Russian and Belarusian suppliers. Even amid risks to food security and fertilizer shortages, the EU is not ready to ease trade pressure on the Russian economy.
– In 2024, the European Union imported about 2 million tons of ammonia, 5.9 million tons of urea, and 6.7 million tons of nitrogen fertilizers and mixtures. Although the EU’s direct dependence on the Middle East is limited, the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz is already affecting the global market and intensifying competition for supplies.
– For Russia, the situation appears particularly unpleasant, as fertilizers remain one of the few sectors where Moscow still maintained stable export revenues despite sanctions.
– Now, even amid a global shortage, Europe is trying to find alternative suppliers to avoid increasing dependence on Russian exports.
5. The European Commission has proposed a temporary easing of the anti-Russian sanctions regime for the Chinese company Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic.
– The company was included in the 20th EU sanctions package due to supplying components related to the Russian military machine. Brussels proposes to allow European companies to continue doing business with the Chinese chip manufacturer for another nine months to avoid supply disruptions for the EU automotive industry.
– It mainly concerns the time needed to find alternative suppliers. The European Commission has explicitly acknowledged that Yangzhou Yangjie Electronic products were found in Russian drones and guided aerial bombs used by the Russian army in the war against Ukraine. This is why the company was added to the sanctions list.
– The situation once again demonstrates the critical dependence of the Russian military-industrial complex on imported electronics and Chinese technological components.
– Despite the Kremlin’s claims of “technological sovereignty,” the Russian defense industry remains incapable of independently producing a significant part of modern microelectronics for drones, missiles, and guidance systems.
– Meanwhile, the discussion within the EU also shows the complexity of sanction pressures: the European industry itself partially depends on Chinese supply chains.
– However, even with a temporary exception, the company remains under sanctions for assisting Russian military aggression.
6. In the Netherlands, law enforcement struck a blow to infrastructure related to Russian activities in cyberspace.
– The Dutch Ministry of Finance’s investigative service conducted a large-scale operation in a case of violating EU sanctions, arresting two suspects and seizing over 800 servers.
– As part of the investigation, a 57-year-old man from Amsterdam and a 39-year-old suspect were detained. Searches took place in three commercial premises and two data centers. Investigators seized server equipment, documents, laptops, and mobile phones.
– At the center of the case was a hosting company, Stark Industries, established on February 10, 2022 — shortly before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On May 20, 2025, the company was added to the EU sanctions list.
– According to the Dutch investigative service, after the sanctions were imposed, a significant part of Stark Industries’ infrastructure was transferred to a newly created company in the Netherlands, which may indicate an attempt to circumvent European restrictions.
– Investigators claim the hosting provider supported Russian activities aimed at undermining democracy and security. This is another example of how Russian structures and related networks attempt to use European digital infrastructure for cyber activities, information operations, and sanction circumvention.
– The seizure of hundreds of servers could significantly impact the infrastructure used to support Russian operations in Europe, and the case itself highlights increased attention from European intelligence agencies to technological and financial circumvention schemes of Russian sanctions.
