Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 21-22.05.2026.
1. Ukrainian drones attacked the Syzran refinery of Rosneft in the Samara region on the night of May 21.
– After the strike, a strong fire broke out at the facility, and thick black smoke rose over the plant. The Syzran refinery is part of the Rosneft structure and processes up to 8.5 million tons of oil per year. This is not the first strike on the facility: in April, a drone attack damaged the key primary processing unit AVT-6, which provides over 70% of the plant’s capacity. Following this, part of the production had to be stopped.
– The new strike continues a series of attacks on Russian oil refining infrastructure. In recent weeks, major refineries in Ryazan, Yaroslavl, Moscow, and Nizhny Novgorod have been hit. A significant portion of oil refining in the central part of Russia is either completely halted or operating with significant restrictions.
2. Drone strikes have effectively paralyzed a significant part of oil refining in the central part of Russia.
– Large refineries were forced to completely shut down or sharply reduce fuel production after a series of attacks in recent weeks. According to estimates, the total capacity of the plants that have been completely or partially shut down exceeds 83 million tons per year — about a quarter of Russia’s entire oil refining system.
– These facilities provided over 30% of gasoline production and about 25% of diesel fuel in the country.
– Among the most affected facilities is the Ryazan refinery, which completely halted on May 15, the Moscow refinery, which ceased operations on May 17, and the Yaroslavl refinery, which is operating at only about a quarter of its capacity.
– One of the country’s largest plants — Kirishi Petrochemical Plant with a capacity of 20 million tons per year — has been completely down since May 5. The Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refining Plant (NORSI) with a capacity of 17 million tons per year was also hit. Whether the plant retained any partial operational capability after the attack on May 20 is still unknown.
– The situation is so serious that Moscow has already been forced to impose a ban on gasoline exports from April to the end of July, trying to avoid a large-scale fuel shortage within the country. Even other refineries that could theoretically compensate for the losses have also been affected by attacks or are operating with serious restrictions.
3. Since the beginning of the year, Russia has sold over 4 billion dollars’ worth of gold from its reserves.
– The Central Bank of Russia reported the most significant reduction in the country’s gold reserves in over 20 years. Since the beginning of 2026, the reserves have lost nearly 28 tons of gold, and the total volume has dropped to a minimum since the full-scale war against Ukraine began.
– As of May 1, reserves held 73.9 million ounces of gold. In just four months, Russia reduced its reserves by 900,000 ounces. It is estimated that gold sales could have brought the Kremlin over $4 billion amid record-high global prices.
– Previously, the Central Bank mainly accumulated gold, purchasing it by the hundreds of tons annually. Now the situation has changed: the authorities are forced to sell off reserves due to budget problems and currency shortages.
– Russia’s federal budget deficit has already reached 4.6 trillion rubles, and weak export revenues at the beginning of the year have increased pressure on the financial system.
4. Russian “Kamaz” began mass layoffs after a record loss of 43 billion rubles.
– Russia’s largest truck manufacturer has already laid off about 2,000 employees from April to May. Some employees have had their salaries cut by a third, are moved to a four-day work week, and sent on unpaid leave.
– Kamaz’s problems are yet another signal of the deepening crisis in Russian industry. At the end of 2025, the company reported a record loss of 43 billion rubles, and truck sales fell by 16%.
– Overall, the heavy machinery market in Russia has shrunk by nearly half. Following sanctions and the loss of Western technologies, the Russian auto industry is increasingly dependent on Chinese components and government orders. However, even military contracts no longer save the sector from falling demand, high interest rates, and reduced investment.
– The situation with Kamaz shows that economic problems in Russia are moving from financial statistics to a social dimension: businesses are starting to economize on staff, and regions are losing jobs and tax revenues.
5. Xi Jinping again refused Putin a new gas contract.
– Despite the fifth visit to China since the start of the full-scale war, Moscow has not been able to negotiate the launch of the “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline. The project, which the Kremlin has been promoting for over ten years as a key replacement for the European market, is effectively stalled due to Beijing’s reluctance to pay Russia a favorable price for gas.
– After negotiations in Beijing, Kremlin spokesman Peskov was forced to admit that the parties have yet to agree on “nuances,” with no specific timeframes for the project’s implementation.
– Despite Putin’s loud declarations about the “limitless prospects” of cooperation, none of the 40 signed documents included any agreement on the “Power of Siberia-2” or new oil and gas contracts.
– The main issue remains the price. China demands gas to be sold at nearly domestic Russian rates — about $50 per thousand cubic meters. This is five times less than what Beijing currently pays and significantly lower than prices for Gazprom’s other buyers.
– For the Russian gas industry, such terms mean an actual loss of export profitability. The situation increasingly demonstrates Russia’s dependency on China after losing the European market. The Kremlin tries to reorient energy exports to Asia, but Beijing takes advantage of Moscow’s weak position and dictates its own terms.
– As a result, Russia risks turning into a raw material appendage of the Chinese economy with progressively lower revenues from energy exports.
6. Gazprom shares sharply fell after Putin’s visit to China ended once again without an agreement on the “Power of Siberia-2” gas pipeline.
– Investors were expecting specifics about the project, which Moscow has been presenting for years as a strategic replacement for the lost European gas market, but the negotiations ended once again with only vague statements about “further discussion.”
– On the Moscow stock exchange, Gazprom shares fell by 3.5%, and the company lost about 100 billion rubles in capitalization in one day. Along with it, TMK shares also plummeted by almost 6%, as the market anticipated the company would receive large orders for pipes for the new gas pipeline.
– The decline affected the entire Russian energy sector: shares of Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, and Novatek also went down. The market effectively acknowledged that the Kremlin is currently unable to reach an agreement with Beijing on a new large gas contract.
7. China resumed LNG imports from the Yamal LNG project after a four-month pause.
– Two tankers carrying Russian liquefied gas, forced to circumvent Africa via the Cape of Good Hope due to sanction risks, are now approaching Chinese ports. One arrives in China just as Putin visits Beijing, appearing as a demonstrative political signal of support from China.
– The return of Chinese purchases comes amid increasingly severe restrictions from the EU. At the end of April, a European ban on short-term contracts for Russian LNG came into force, and by 2027, Brussels plans much broader restrictions.
– Although “Yamal LNG” has not yet come under direct sanctions, it is becoming apparent to Moscow that the European market is gradually closing. In April, Russia rose to second place among LNG suppliers to China, increasing exports by 43% year-on-year to 641,000 tons. However, such reorientation only intensifies the Kremlin’s dependence on the Chinese market.
– Beijing gains more opportunities to dictate purchasing terms, taking advantage of Russia’s loss of access to Western buyers, forcing it to sell energy with discounts and through complex logistical routes.
8. The EU court allowed the freezing of Russian assets even through trusts and complex offshore schemes.
– The European Court ruled that assets can be frozen even without a direct legal link to a sanctioned individual. It is sufficient to prove indirect control or influence over the property via trusts, shell companies, or obscure ownership structures.
– The decision was made in a case concerning the seizure in Italy of companies and a yacht, formally registered through trust mechanisms but factually connected to sanctioned Russians.
– The court emphasized that sanctions should block any use of assets and prevent circumvention of restrictions. This is a serious blow to the usual schemes of Russian oligarchs who have hidden property through offshore accounts, nominal owners, and trusts for years.
– Now, to seize assets in the EU, it is not necessary to have a direct entry in documents; proving real control or influence is enough.
– The EU gains broader legal opportunities to hunt Russian money, real estate, yachts, and corporate assets hidden behind multi-layered financial structures.
9. Finnish customs uncovered an EU sanction evasion scheme supplying trucks to Russia.
– According to the investigation, a Finnish company illegally exported 135 trucks and 29 trailers to Russia in 2022-2023, worth 17.5 million euros. Formally, the equipment was registered as deliveries to Kazakhstan or Turkey, transiting through Russia, but it actually remained on the Russian market.
– The case involves three suspects, one of whom has been in custody since the investigation began. Finnish customs also demands the confiscation of the value of all equipment supplied to Russia in evasion of sanctions. Russia continues to depend on parallel import schemes to support its transport and industrial infrastructure.
– Meanwhile, the EU is responding increasingly harshly to attempts to circumvent sanctions through third countries, and risks for companies working with the Russian market are rapidly growing.
10. Ukrainian drones attacked the Novo-Yaroslavl oil refinery (“Slavneft-YANOS”), one of Russia’s five largest refineries, on the night of May 22.
– Ukrainian forces struck a target approximately 700 kilometers from the Ukrainian border. Released videos and analysis by Ukrainian monitoring resources indicate that the target was indeed the “Slavneft-YANOS” refinery.
– The Yaroslavl refinery is one of the key enterprises in Russia’s fuel sector. The plant can process over 15 million tons of oil per year and produces large volumes of gasoline, diesel fuel, and fuel oil.
– The attack was a continuation of a large-scale campaign of strikes on Russian oil refining infrastructure.
11. Since the start of the full-scale war, Ukraine has carried out at least 158 strikes on Russian refineries.
– Attacks targeted 24 out of 33 large Russian refineries with a capacity of over 1 million tons of oil per year. While Ukrainian forces rarely attacked Russian refineries in 2022, in 2023 there were 4 strikes, in 2024 — 34, and in 2025 the number increased to 88. In less than five months of 2026, Ukrainian drones attacked Russian refineries 33 times — more than in the same period last year.
– The Ryazan and Saratov refineries were most frequently hit — each was attacked 15 times. The Ryazan plant is among the top three largest in Russia and can process about 17 million tons of oil per year. The Saratov refinery processes approximately 7 million tons annually.
– The Afipsky, Ilsky, and Tuapse refineries in the Krasnodar region are also regularly targeted — each has been hit 12 times. These enterprises supply a significant portion of the fuel production in southern Russia.
12. One of Russia’s largest refineries, Nizhny Novgorod Oil Refinery (NORSI), owned by “Lukoil,” partially shut down after drone attacks.
– The plant stopped the key AVT-6 primary processing unit, which provides more than half of the facility’s capacity — about 25.7 thousand tons per day.
– NORSI is among the top five largest refineries in Russia and is the second largest in the country for gasoline production. After the strike, the plant ceased small wholesale shipments of fuel and temporarily halted gasoline sales on the exchange.
– The facility’s capacity is about 15–16 million tons of oil per year, or approximately 320 thousand barrels per day. NORSI’s issues have dealt another blow to Russia’s fuel system.
– In recent weeks, UAV attacks have already disabled or seriously limited the operations of several major refineries in Ryazan, Yaroslavl, Kirishi, and the Moscow region.
– For Russia, this means not only a loss of export revenues but also the risk of a fuel shortage within the country.
13. The fuel crisis in Russia, triggered by Ukrainian drone strikes on refineries, has begun to enter an open phase.
– The first region where the authorities officially imposed restrictions on gasoline sales was the occupied Sevastopol. At the TNS network gas stations, gasoline sales were limited to 20 liters per vehicle or canister.
– Currently, only AI-92 gasoline is available at some gas stations, while supplies of AI-95 and diesel fuel are delayed. Diesel is temporarily sold in the city only with coupons.
– Authorities also urged the public “not to create a stir,” which effectively confirms fears of a further fuel shortage. A similar situation already occurred in 2025 following attacks on Russian refineries, when fuel disruptions began in Crimea and the Far East. Fuel problems are also being recorded in other Russian regions.
– Due to Ukrainian drone strikes, almost all major refineries in central Russia have been forced to completely or partially cut production.
– Enterprises producing over 30% of gasoline and about a quarter of diesel fuel in Russia were hit. As a result, the Kremlin is already forced to switch to manual control of the fuel market and impose restrictions on the population.
14. Losses in the Russian coal industry in 2026 could reach 570 billion rubles, and even the Russian Ministry of Energy no longer hides the scale of the crisis.
– Due to a drop in exports and worsening global conditions, 65 Russian coal enterprises have found themselves in the so-called “red zone”—virtually on the brink of survival. The Kremlin is forced to urgently rescue the industry with tax deferrals and payment installments.
– Out of 138 companies that received preferences regarding mineral extraction tax and insurance contributions, 97 have already submitted “financial recovery” programs.
– The Federal Tax Service of Russia allowed 86 enterprises to postpone payments until the end of 2026, further emphasizing the critical state of the sector. In the first quarter, Russian coal exports fell by 0.4% to 34.9 million tons.
– Against the backdrop of sanctions, logistical problems, and weak demand in Asia, the Russian coal industry is rapidly losing sales markets and profitability.
15. Russia’s large-scale contract with Indonesia for oil supply has practically stalled due to sanction risks and tanker shortages.
– Despite the Kremlin’s loud statements about “new Asian markets,” Jakarta has not yet managed to establish a stable mechanism for importing Russian oil. Back in April, Indonesian authorities announced plans to purchase 150 million barrels of oil from Russia in 2026 after negotiations between President Prabowo Subianto and Putin in Moscow.
– However, so far, there has only been one delivery of Russian Arctic Novy oil through the Malaysian Pelepas terminal to the refinery in Cilacap. No other shipments have been recorded.
– Indonesian authorities acknowledge that the purchase scheme has not yet been agreed upon. The country’s Ministry of Energy stated that Jakarta is forced to separately develop a special import mechanism and regulatory framework due to fears of secondary sanctions.
– An additional problem for Russia has been the tanker shortage, exacerbated by Western restrictions on the “shadow fleet.” The long supply routes to Southeast Asia also sharply increase logistical costs and make Russian oil less competitive.
– Even countries formally willing to cooperate with Moscow are attempting to minimize sanction risks and are not in a hurry to fully integrate into Russian export schemes.
16. Kazakhstan allowed the seizure of Gazprom’s assets over Ukraine’s $1.4 billion claim.
– A court in Kazakhstan granted “Naftogaz of Ukraine” permission to enforce the seizure of Gazprom’s assets in accordance with an international arbitration decision. This concerns the debt of the Russian monopoly in the amount of $1.4 billion for a gas transit contract through Ukraine.
– The dispute arose after Gazprom effectively stopped fully paying for transit services in 2022, despite the contract being in place. In 2025, arbitration in Switzerland sided with Naftogaz, and in the spring of 2026, the Federal Court of Switzerland finally confirmed this decision, marking the first public decision by a foreign court recognizing and allowing the enforcement of an arbitration award against Gazprom in a separate state.
– For the Russian state company, this creates a dangerous precedent: assets in other countries could also be at risk of seizure.
17. Russian oil exports to China increased by 26% from January to April, reaching 40.8 million tons.
– Moscow increased supplies through restructuring Asian logistics and ship-to-ship transfer schemes in international waters. However, behind the record volumes, there’s an increasingly noticeable trend — the growing dependence of Russia on China.
– By April, shipments began to slow down due to reduced profitability of Chinese refineries. Independent refiners in China started demanding even larger discounts on oil from Russian suppliers.
– Chinese factories essentially dictate the terms: in case of refusal, they can easily switch to other sanctioned oil.
– After losing a significant part of the European market, the Kremlin is increasingly tying oil exports to China and Asian logistics. But instead of an “energy pivot to the East,” Moscow is facing growing dependence on a single buyer, who exploits Russia’s weakness to secure the most favorable conditions for itself.
