Briefly on the main directions. Today – Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction.
1. In this direction, the enemy’s command (Russian forces) continues to make quite significant efforts to stabilize the situation on the left flank of its 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the “Dnepr” grouping of forces (GF) (in the zone of its 19th motorized rifle division/mrd), while attempting to reach the near approaches to the city of Orikhiv from the south and southeast with the forces of the 42nd mrd of the 58th CAA. In fact, the advance of the 58th CAA, as well as the attached forces and means from the airborne troops (abn) of the RF Armed Forces in the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, has been halted.
Moreover, it’s evident that the command of the 58th CAA, as well as the command of the entire “Dnepr” GF, are forced to make significant efforts to prevent further retreat of the forward units and divisions of its 19th mrd towards Stepnohirsk – Kamianske. Additionally, it’s apparent that all attempts by the 42nd mrd and its reinforcement means to break through to Orikhiv through Mala Tokmachka and Novodanylivka, made over the past week, were also unsuccessful.
Let me remind those who forgot, the composition of forces and means of the Russian operational grouping of forces acting in the direction of Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia.
It mainly consists of the forces (means) of the 58th CAA of the “Dnepr” GF, in particular:
– 19th mrd — 392nd, 429th, and 503rd motorized rifle regiments (mrr);
– 42nd mrd — 70th, 71st, and 291st mrr + 270th mrr “Akhmat-Kavkaz”, possible presence of several units of the 78th motorized special purpose regiment (mrSpR) “Sever-Akhmat”;
– 136th separate motorized rifle brigade (smrb);
– 100th separate reconnaissance brigade (srb), likely acting in this direction with its separate units;
– Composite regimental tactical group (TGr) from the 7th military base (MB) “RF Armed Forces” in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali).
Apart from its forces and means, the 58th CAA command of the “Dnepr” GF also deployed parts and units of the 18th CAA in this direction. Specifically, it’s about the “mobilization” 47th mrd (1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th motorized rifle regiments), formed on the temporarily occupied Crimean Peninsula as part of the “planned increase in forces of the RF Armed Forces for the period of 2022-2023.” At least one of its regiments is acting in this direction (and most likely, two regiments at once).
The reinforcement forces and means of the 58th CAA are mainly represented by parts and formations of the airborne troops, which are concentrated and deployed here quite “densely,” unsurprisingly, considering that the commander of the “Dnepr” GF Colonel-General Mikhail Teplinsky is simultaneously the commander of all airborne troops of the “RF Armed Forces.” This refers to at least three formations of the Russian airborne troops, including:
– 7th Air Assault Division (AAD) – 56th, 108th, and 247th Air Assault Regiments (AAR). In this direction, units from at least two of its regiments — the 108th and 247th AAR — have been observed.
– 76th Air Assault Division (AAD). At the end of winter and the beginning of spring, it was regrouped with its main forces (104th, 234th, and 237th AAR) from the Sumy direction to the area north and northwest of the city of Polohy, “at the junction” of the flanks of the 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) of the Dnipro Operational Command and the 5th CAA of the Vostok Operational Command (essentially into the sector of the 35th CAA). This, in turn, allowed the command of both Russian groups not only to allocate a portion of their forces and resources to form an operational reserve but also to increase the overall density of their troop deployments in the operational zones of both formations.
– In addition to the above-mentioned airborne units of the Russian Armed Forces in the area of the 58th CAA and the adjacent 49th CAA, separate units and elements of the 104th AAD and the 98th Airborne Division (AD) have been observed, for example, the 299th Parachute Regiment (PR) of the 98th AD in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia region.
– Additionally, it is likely that several units of the 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SSPB) of the Russian Airborne Forces are operating in this direction.
Thus, it can be stated that on the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, the Dnipro Operational Command has concentrated and deployed an operational grouping of troops with a total of 5 (five) “calculated” divisions (58th Combined Arms Army + reinforcement forces and resources).
Considering the fact that the entire 5th CAA, the most powerful army of the Vostok Operational Command (also with its reinforcement forces and resources), is operating in the interests of this grouping to the east and southeast of the Orikhiv defensive district of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, trying to break through to Orikhiv from the direction of Huliaipole, it can be assumed that the opponent’s command has targeted Zaporizhzhia with a grouping of forces comparable to the one slowly “creeping” towards the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
2. Current Situation in the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, as I mentioned above, is characterized almost by the complete halt of the Russian advance in the area of the 58th CAA. In addition, the enemy is forced to exert significant effort on several sectors and directions to prevent a substantial retreat of its forward units and sub-units (still in the tactical zone) and to stabilize the situation.
For example, about a week ago in the sector of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division (around Kamianske), the command of the Russian 58th CAA was compelled to return units of the 247th AAR (7th AAD), which were previously withdrawn from there for “combat readiness restoration,” and performed the same procedure with the 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment.
In general, as of the morning of May 19, 2026, the situation in this direction was determined by the following events:
– The forward Ukrainian units have almost completely expelled the enemy from the central part of Stepanohirsk (the enemy still confidently controls only the “Vysotka” district, the southernmost area of the city, where the Children’s Music and Middle Schools are located). The Armed Forces of Ukraine also managed with several infantry groups southwest of the city to reach the E-105 highway and advance along it southward over 1 km, bypassing the village of Plavni from the east.
– The assault units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue the “clearing” of several small enemy infantry groups entrenched south of the road junction between Stepnohirs’k and Prymorske, as well as between Tavriyska and Ahrarna streets in the southwestern part of the city itself.
In turn, the enemy is trying with all its strength to hold the southern part of Pokrovska Street (in Prymorske) and the village of Plavni itself. However, this is obviously very difficult for them, as the Ukrainian Armed Forces keep almost all passages and communications north of Kamianske under heavy fire control. In this context, the “return” of Russian 7th Airborne Division units to this sector (near Kamianske) seems quite logical.
– Attempts by the enemy to advance north of Stepove and in the area of Malyi Shcherbaky (towards Pavlivka and Novoiakovlivka) in order to “restore the situation” that existed earlier, before the start of Ukrainian counterattacks in this direction, ended in predictable failure.
The maximum the enemy could achieve was “penetration” by a few very small infantry (assault) groups northwest of Malyi Shcherbaky, north of Shcherbaky, and in the area of Novoiakovlivka.
However, it’s evident that all of them were promptly detected by the forward units of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and tightly blocked. In this sense, the Ukrainian troops currently quite confidently control Pavlivka, Lukyanyvske, and are preparing to eliminate these “infiltrators,” more precisely, those who have survived so far.
Moreover, it is likely that the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed to push the enemy out of Malyi Shcherbaky and Shcherbaky themselves (the enemy has retreated south of them). I am not really sure about the reliability of this information, but several of my “sources” from that direction claim it to be true.
The only “bright spot” for the enemy in this sector is their penetration in the tactical zone by several small infantry (assault) groups northwest of Nesteryanka, approximately 2 km (along one of the plantations). The Ukrainian Armed Forces have, it seems, not yet eliminated this penetration.
– Unlike the “entrenched” few “patients” in the southern part of the Uspenivka ravine, who survived an unsuccessful attempt to break through to the road junction south of Novodanilivka. It seems they were completely “removed.”
– The “saga” with Mala Tokmachka, which has already become something of a meme-legend, continues. The forward units of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division, after successful counterattacking actions by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Bilohir’ya area (where the latter managed not only to advance within the village but also to consolidate there), were evidently forced to retreat again from the southeastern part of Mala Tokmachka due to the obvious flank threat to themselves arising as a result.
Currently, the forward units of the Russian 42nd Motorized Rifle Division have retreated along the Mala Tokmachka River towards Novopokrovka and fortified themselves south of Bilohir’ya.
The overall situation to the south, southeast, and east of the Orikhiv district defense of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is as follows:
– Ukrainian forces have regained full control over Mala Tokmachka and Bilohir’ya, continue to hold Novodanilivka, and are engaged in fierce battles in the area of the village of Luhivs’ke for control over it.
– The enemy, in turn, has managed numerous “penetrations” north of Luhivs’ke (mainly towards Charivne and Hulyaipilske) in the sector of the 5th ZVA UV “Vostok.”
3. In operational terms, the future prospects for the development of the situation on the “major” Zaporizhzhia front appear “quite unclear” for the opponent. Although, it is worth noting that this might be temporary. Over time, this could change unfavorably for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Especially considering the volume of forces and resources that the opponent’s command has already concentrated and deployed in this direction and continues to bring there.
The 58th CAA UV “Dnipro” is evidently depleted, and without serious reinforcements and regrouping, it will likely be unable to continue a large-scale offensive on Zaporizhzhia along the Dnipro, as well as storm the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Even more so, to do this SIMULTANEOUSLY. The transfer and concentration of the main efforts of the UV “Dnipro” command and its 58th CAA on the assault of Orikhiv itself, obviously, has not yet yielded the desired result.
The opponent’s forward units and subunits have not yet managed to break through to the city itself. Because without the preliminary capture of Mala Tokmachka, Novodanylivka, and Novoandriivka, such an assault in the near future is unlikely.
The latest attempts by Russian forces to achieve their desired result were successfully repelled by the Armed Forces of Ukraine. It is quite possible that the opponent’s 58th CAA will try to repeat these attempts soon, especially given the gradual buildup of airborne forces and resources “of the rf” in its zone.
In reality, on the “major” Zaporizhzhia front, only the Russian 5th CAA UV “Vostok” continues to “crawl forward” very, very slowly. Moreover, this “crawling” is accompanied by quite significant losses on its part.
Thus, the hypothetical advance of Russian forces to the line of Malokaterynivka-Kamyshuvakha (in the zone of the 58th CAA UV “Dnipro”) and to Vilniansk (in the zones of the 5th or 36th CAA UV “Vostok”), as was probably intended by the Russian command at one time, is obviously, to put it mildly, “slightly delayed.”
Photo: 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade named after Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi
