Information on the current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 17.05.2026.
1. On the night of May 17, Ukrainian drones launched a massive strike on Moscow and the Moscow region, targeting fuel infrastructure facilities, military-industrial enterprises, and transport hubs in the central region of Russia.
– In Zelenograd, which is part of Moscow, there are reports of strikes on the “Angstrem” enterprises, one of the manufacturers of microelectronics, semiconductors, and microprocessors for the Russian industry and defense sector.
– In the Moscow region, the Solnechnogorsk oil filling station in the village of Durykino was hit. A fire began at the facility after explosions. The station is an important element in the system of main oil product pipelines around Moscow and is used for the storage, pumping, and shipment of gasoline and diesel fuel.
– Another target was the Raduga Design Bureau in Dubna — an enterprise that develops cruise missiles for the Russian army.
– There are also reports of an attack on Sheremetyevo — one of Russia’s largest airports.
2. Russia is gradually transforming not into an “energy superpower,” but into an energy “survivor,” which is forced to spend more and more resources not on development, but on maintaining exports under conditions of sanctions and isolation.
– After 2022, the Russian energy model has changed dramatically. Previously, Moscow could claim the role of one of the key players in the global energy market, but now it increasingly depends on discounts, intermediaries, a “shadow fleet,” and constant improvisation in logistics.
– Russia has retained large volumes of oil and gas exports but has lost the ability to influence market rules and provide long-term predictability for buyers.
– Instead of strategic development, the system operates in a constant crisis response mode: redirecting flows, finding new routes, circumventing sanctions, and compensating for technological losses. This adaptation comes at a high cost.
– Constant “patching of holes” exhausts financial, technological, and managerial resources. Due to sanctions and years of underfunding, the Russian oil and gas industry is losing the ability to implement large long-term projects and modernize infrastructure.
– Even a temporary increase in oil revenues due to the war in the Middle East does not change the fundamental problem. Russia benefits only from yet another global crisis, not from its own strengthening.
– Meanwhile, key buyers — primarily China and India — take advantage of the situation to get discounts and maintain maximum flexibility, not wanting to become dependent on Russian supplies. Europe has also drawn a strategic conclusion: the problem is not only with Russian energy resources themselves but with the unpredictability of Russia as a supplier.
– This is why the EU is restructuring its energy system to minimize reliance on Moscow even in the event of a change in the political situation. As a result, Russian energy increasingly resembles a system capable of surviving under pressure but losing the ability to develop.
– Formally, exports continue, but technological lag, infrastructure wear, and dependence on a limited number of buyers gradually undermine the industry’s long-term sustainability.
3. Russian companies are massively transitioning to workforce reductions due to the deteriorating economic situation.
– In 2025, 25% of employers have already conducted layoffs compared to 10% in 2023. Businesses that actively expanded their workforce after the start of the war for import substitution and government orders are now shifting to rigid cost-saving modes.
– Companies are cutting expenses, freezing new projects, and letting go of employees who were previously hired “for the future.” Russian HR specialists openly state that 2026 will be a period of mass layoffs and finding ways to minimize employee compensation.
– This is yet another signal of the deepening economic problems in Russia: businesses no longer believe in a quick economic recovery and are preparing for a prolonged period of stagnation, high interest rates, and declining demand.
4. The level of “happiness” in Russia has fallen to its lowest in the last 15 years, according to data from the state-owned VCIOM.
– In April, the happiness index fell to 52 points, the lowest since September 2011. According to the social service, only 74% of respondents said they considered themselves happy, while 22% responded negatively. The gap between these figures was higher in March.
– After the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine, the index remained significantly higher — within the range of 58–73 points, but began to steadily decline in the second half of 2024.
– For most Russians, “happiness” means basic financial stability, accessible income, and the absence of serious domestic problems. These factors are increasingly worsening due to the consequences of the war, inflation, rising tariffs, and tax burdens.
– The decline in the index coincides with the deterioration of the situation in the Russian economy. The government has already lowered the GDP growth forecast, the budget deficit is rapidly increasing, and the profits of large and small businesses are falling.
– Against this backdrop, even state sociological services are beginning to record a decline in support for the authorities and an increase in social pessimism in the country.
5. Spain increased its purchases of Russian LNG in 2026.
– According to gas transmission system operator Enagás, in the first four months of the year, supplies from Russia increased by more than 30% — to 23,157 gigawatt-hours compared to 17,435 a year earlier.
– Despite Brussels’ loud statements about rejecting Russian energy, the European market is once again returning to dependence on Russian gas. The crisis in the Middle East, interruptions in LNG supply from the Persian Gulf countries, and strikes on energy infrastructure have forced European importers to purchase Russian gas more actively.
– The situation demonstrates the main problem of EU energy policy: in times of global instability, Russian LNG remains one of the few sources available to quickly cover deficits.
– As a result, Moscow continues to receive foreign currency revenue from gas exports despite sanction pressure and Europe’s official course towards energy separation from Russia.
6. The Trump administration did not extend the temporary waiver that allowed certain transactions with Russian oil, despite the tense situation in the global oil market.
– These are short-term permits that the US issued in March and April to complete shipments of Russian oil already loaded onto tankers.
– The decision effectively marks a return to a stricter sanctions regime against Russia. At the same time, it has sparked disputes among Washington’s allies.
– European countries insisted on maintaining maximum pressure on the Russian oil sector to reduce Russia’s energy export revenues and limit financing for the war against Ukraine.
– Meanwhile, several Asian countries, including India and Indonesia, asked the US to extend the sanctions relief due to the sharp deterioration in the oil market situation after the attacks in the Strait of Hormuz area.
– US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent previously acknowledged that Washington had already changed its position on these exemptions under pressure from countries dependent on oil imports. According to him, extending the permits in April was necessary for stabilizing the energy market.
– Despite the expiration of the privilege, the White House does not rule out a new temporary easing of sanctions if the oil market situation continues to worsen.
– At the same time, the US has already taken other steps to alleviate the energy crisis — temporarily allowing foreign ships to transport oil between American ports and easing certain domestic fuel requirements.
