Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 11.05.2026.
1. The increase in the money supply in Russia undermines the government’s attempts to curb inflation and indicates deepening imbalances in the wartime economy.
– Estimates show that in April, the annual growth of the money supply reached 12.5%, and 12.7% excluding currency revaluation, greatly exceeding the declared target range of 5–10%.
– The main driver of this growth has been aggressive budget spending, which Moscow is increasing to finance the war and support the economy. Meanwhile, the volume of cash in circulation increased sharply: by 3.3% in just one month, and by 14.9% annually.
– This trend indicates systemic problems – particularly, the intensification of the shadow economy. Amidst the growing tax burden, businesses are increasingly moving to cash transactions to avoid fiscal control.
– This creates additional pressure on the budget, which is already strained by military expenses. As a result, a vicious circle is forming: the state increases expenditures, boosting the money supply, while businesses respond by going underground, reducing tax revenues.
2. A quarter of the Russian bond market is at risk due to the sharp rise in credit costs and the inability to refinance.
– The first quarter recorded 11 technical defaults, some of which quickly turned real. The key reason is the gap between old debts at 13–15% and new rates, which have become unmanageable for many companies.
– As a result, refinancing has lost its meaning, and debt burdens are starting to crush the corporate sector. In 2026, businesses will have to repay 5–6.6 trillion rubles in debts.
– With expensive money and limited access to financing, this creates a systemic risk of a wave of non-payments. The number of defaults is expected to increase by another 10–15% by the end of the year.
– The consequences are already evident: investors are exiting risky securities and moving funds to deposits, further narrowing business capital raising opportunities. The most vulnerable are mid-sized companies, which traditionally depended on debt financing. The Russian economy is entering a “high-cost money” phase, where only companies with real profitability survive.
– The model built on constant refinancing is collapsing, intensifying overall financial instability.
3. Russia continues to escalate military aggression.
– Moscow offered Iran the supply of thousands of fiber-optic drones, which are practically immune to electronic warfare.
– This involves at least 5,000 short-range drones, as well as an unspecified number of longer-range systems with satellite guidance.
– It is noted that Putin personally initiated the proposal, including organizing the training of Iranian military personnel to use these drones against U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf. This move indicates several critical trends.
– Firstly, Russia is increasingly exporting not only energy resources but also military technologies, effectively monetizing the war and creating new centers of instability.
– Secondly, this is a direct signal of the Kremlin’s readiness to act through proxies, increasing the risks of confrontation between Iran and the USA.
– Thirdly, the spread of drones resistant to electronic warfare could change the balance of power in the region and complicate the protection of critical infrastructure and military bases. Moscow is attempting to transform its own war experience against Ukraine into an export model, enhancing global threats and expanding the geography of conflicts.
– This also confirms that the Russian military economy is increasingly dependent on external weapon markets and political alliances with states opposing the West.
4. The new EU sanctions package will strengthen restrictions against Russia’s shadow fleet.
– Imposing additional sanctions against the shadow fleet will help cut off one of the Kremlin’s most important sources of income and increase pressure on dictator Putin to abandon his maximalist demands in the peace agreement regarding Ukraine.
– The new sanctions package, expected to be introduced at the end of June or the beginning of July, will likely also target Russian banks, financial institutions, and military-industrial companies, as well as firms selling stolen Ukrainian grain.
– Europeans also want to continue sanctions against high-ranking members of the Russian Orthodox Church, including its leader and Putin’s close ally — Patriarch Kirill. Previously, these restrictions were blocked by the government of Hungary’s former prime minister, Viktor Orban.
– The European Commission may also revive the idea of banning maritime transport for Russian ships, which was previously blocked by Malta and Greece.
5. The United Kingdom is expanding its sanctions pressure on Russia, shifting focus from energy to information and social control.
– The new restrictions target dozens of officials, media structures, and organizations associated with propaganda, youth programs, and the deportation of Ukrainian children.
– It’s about attempting to hit the Kremlin’s influence tools on society, not just its financial resources. Since 2022, the UK has imposed sanctions on more than 3,200 individuals, companies, and vessels, trying to limit Moscow’s ability to fund the war and support a repressive system.
– The latest packages demonstrate a change in approach: while earlier the main focus was on oil revenues, now mechanisms of recruitment, propaganda, and ideological processing are under attack. Notably, sanctions were previously imposed on structures involved in recruiting migrants for the war and drone production.
– This is a signal that the West increasingly views Russia’s war as a complex system — not only military but also socio-informational. Consequently, sanctions pressure gradually covers all key elements of this model.
6. North Korea monetizes Russia’s war against Ukraine, turning military support into a key source of currency inflow.
– It is estimated that the DPRK could have earned up to 14 billion dollars in three years from supplying weapons and sending military personnel. This is comparable to half of its GDP, which in 2024 was estimated at approximately 26.6 billion dollars.
– It’s not just about ammunition. The DPRK transfers ballistic missiles, artillery to Russia, and sends thousands of military and technical specialists. In return, it receives currency, energy resources, food, and military technologies, partially offsetting the effect of international sanctions.
– In effect, Moscow helps Pyongyang rebuild its economy, while deepening its own dependence on isolated regimes. Such cooperation undermines sanction mechanisms and creates additional risks of spreading military technologies.
– Simultaneously, this demonstrates the degradation of Russia’s military-industrial potential: instead of self-sufficiency, the country is forced to import weapons and human resources from one of the world’s most isolated economies.
7. New leadership in Hungary may review one of Russia’s key nuclear projects in Europe, threatening the Kremlin’s multibillion-dollar contracts.
– This concerns the expansion of the Paks Nuclear Power Plant, implemented by Rosatom. The project’s cost is estimated at nearly $15 billion, but the new authorities declare intentions to review the financing, spending, and terms of the agreement. István Kapitány, the candidate for Minister of Economy and Energy, emphasized the lack of transparency and the need to review “secret contracts” concluded back in 2014 without a tender under Viktor Orbán’s government.
– New Prime Minister Péter Magyar also previously stated the inflated cost of the project and the need for an audit.
– Although the construction of two new power units actually started only in 2026, the political change in course may disrupt or significantly delay implementation.
– For Russia, this means the risk of losing one of the few major infrastructure projects in the EU, which remained a channel of economic influence. In the event of a review or cancellation of the agreement, Rosatom’s positions in the European market would weaken even more, and Moscow itself would lose not only financial inflows but also a tool of long-term energy dependence.
8. Another scheme to bypass sanctions related to supplying technology to Russia has been uncovered in Sweden.
– The Swedish Security Service SAPO detained two individuals suspected of organizing the supply of high-tech engineering equipment that could be used in the war against Ukraine.
– The investigation believes that the products reached Russia bypassing EU restrictions. Searches took place in Stockholm, as well as in the southern and western regions of the country. The suspects are citizens of Sweden and Turkey.
– One of them has already been taken into custody, while a preventive measure for the second is being considered. The incident confirms a systemic problem for the sanctions regime: Russia continues to receive critical technologies through third countries and private intermediary networks.
– Despite formal restrictions, such channels allow for the maintenance of military-industrial potential, although they increase costs and complicate logistics.
