Sanctions are timely. 05/07/2026

Sanctions are timely. 05/07/2026
Volodymyr Omelyan

Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 07.05.2026.

1. Ukrainian drones on May 7, for the second time in eight days, attacked one of Russia’s largest oil refineries, “Lukoil-Permnefteorgsintez” in Perm.

– After the strike, a column of smoke was recorded over the enterprise, and local authorities confirmed the attack on the industrial facility. PNOS is among Russia’s key refineries and can process about 17 million tons of oil per year.
– The plant produces gasoline, diesel fuel, aviation kerosene, and lubricants, products critically important for both the civilian sector and military logistics.
– Perm is located hundreds of kilometers from the Ukrainian border, but this no longer guarantees the safety of strategic facilities.
– A series of attacks on refineries creates a cumulative effect for Russia: increased costs for infrastructure protection, risks of fuel production disruptions, and complications in the export of petroleum products. This increases pressure on one of the main sectors of the Russian economy — oil refining.

2. The Russian authorities are reducing support for small and medium-sized businesses amid increasing tax burdens and budget deficits.

– In the first quarter of 2026, the volume of grants for SMEs fell by 53% — to 3.1 billion rubles, and the total direct financial support decreased by almost half — from 9.6 billion to 5.5 billion rubles.
– The number of companies that received assistance also decreased — to 92.9 thousand enterprises. Support reduction occurs after tax increases and alongside the reallocation of budget resources to military spending.
– As a result, small businesses operating under high rates and falling demand are losing one of the few mechanisms of state support.
– At the current pace, grant support may cease to be a widespread tool within the next 18 months, threatening new company closures and a slowdown in the Russian economy.

3. Sociological surveys and consumption statistics increasingly clearly record the deterioration of the economic well-being of Russians, despite official statements about income growth.

– In the last two to three months, 26% of citizens reported a worsening of their financial situation, while only 8% mentioned an improvement. This is the worst ratio in the past four years.
– A year ago, negative assessments were significantly lower: in the spring of 2025, 18% of respondents spoke of deterioration.
– At the same time, the percentage of Russians who directly assess their situation as unfavorable is rising — now 20%, which is the highest level since the full-scale war began. The deterioration is particularly noticeable in regions outside major agglomerations, where people are more affected by inflation, income stagnation, and reduced economic activity.
– Official statistics are also beginning to show signs of slowdown. Though Rosstat reports a 1.5% increase in real incomes for the first quarter, the growth rate has sharply fallen — approximately five times compared to the previous year.
– In practice, consumer activity is declining: according to “SberIndex”, real spending by the population has remained below last year’s level for several consecutive weeks. Additional pressure comes from the worsening situation in the corporate sector. The share of unprofitable enterprises is rising, and salary arrears are increasing.
– This gradually undermines the effect of formal salary growth, which is largely supported by military spending and a labor shortage.
– As a result, anxiety and demand for stability are increasing in Russian society. More and more Russians are noting a decline in their quality of life and a worsening of their financial situation.

4. In the Russian banking sector, the number of unprofitable institutions is increasing against the backdrop of the effects of tight monetary policy and an economic slowdown.

– If at the beginning of 2026 there were 34 unprofitable banks, by March their number had risen to 60 — almost one in five market participants. This is the worst figure since 2022, when the Russian financial system faced large-scale sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine.
– The main reason cited is the prolonged maintenance of a high key rate: the central bank kept it at 21% for over six months, significantly worsening lending conditions and the profitability of the banking business.
– The situation indicates the accumulation of problems in Russia’s financial sector. High rates, an increase in the share of problematic borrowers, a slowdown in consumer demand, and a general worsening of the economic situation are gradually weakening the resilience of the banking system.

5. China continues to effectively ignore Western export restrictions, supplying components for the production of attack drones to Russia and Iran.

– The Chinese company Xiamen Victory Technology offered Limbach L550 engines, used in Iranian Shahed-136 drones. Despite American sanctions and a ban on exporting such components, Chinese companies continue to send engines, microchips, gyroscopes, and other dual-use products to Russia and Iran.
– This is critically important for Russia, as without Chinese technologies and components, its production of drones and some precision weapons would face serious problems.
– The situation also highlights the limited effectiveness of the West’s export control regarding the Chinese direction.

6. An unknown Serbian company, Senator, has offered €2 billion for a controlling stake in the Serbian oil company NIS, which is owned by Gazprom Neft and Gazprom.

– The proposal concerns 56.1% of NIS shares — the company operating Serbia’s only oil refinery. According to Senator owner Ranko Mimović, the Russian side “generally agreed” to the offer.

– The deal is under a deadline pressure set by OFAC: the U.S. has given Russian companies until May 22 to exit the asset. Additional pressure comes from competition with Hungarian MOL, which also seeks control over NIS.

– Meanwhile, Serbia aims to increase its own stake in the company, striving to reduce dependence on Russian influence in energy.

– Russia is gradually losing ground even in traditionally friendly Balkan countries, where the Kremlin’s energy influence remained one of the main tools of political pressure for years.

7. Schengen in 2025: The EU issued a record number of visas to Russians.

– In 2025, Schengen countries issued more than 620,000 visas to Russians — 10% more than last year. Most of them were tourist visas. The most visas were issued by France, Italy, and Spain, with France leading in the number issued. This statistic contradicts EU statements about isolating the Kremlin.

– Meanwhile, Poland and the Baltic countries, which directly feel the threat of war, insist on stricter restrictions for Russians. After Russia’s full-scale invasion, the EU revoked the simplified visa regime and tightened checks, but the number of visas issued continues to grow.

– It is also reported that some countries, including France, opposed the publication of this data.

8. Italian UniCredit has begun scaling down its presence in Russia, agreeing to sell part of its local business to an investor from the UAE.

– After the deal, the bank plans to retain only the payments division, which still plays an important role in conducting international transactions for Western companies that continue to work with Russia.

– UniCredit’s decision demonstrates the gradual reduction of major Western banks’ presence in the Russian market, even though certain financial operations remain profitable.

– Due to sanctions and isolation of the Russian banking system, international payments have become complex, and banks that maintained access to such operations have effectively become critical infrastructure for Russia’s foreign trade.

– At the same time, exiting the Russian market is becoming increasingly costly. UniCredit acknowledged that the partial sale of the business will lead to a loss of €3-3.3 billion in revenue. This highlights how deeply Western financial structures were integrated into the Russian economy before the full-scale war.

– The transfer of assets to a UAE investor also reflects a new trend: some Russian or Russia-related assets are coming under the control of entities from countries that have not joined Western sanctions.

– However, even such schemes do not change the overall trend — Western financial presence in Russia is gradually decreasing, and the Russian banking system itself is becoming increasingly isolated from the global market.

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