Kupiansk direction.
The enemy (Russian forces) continues to implement their plan to eliminate the Kupiansk bridgehead of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). During the reporting period, they achieved certain tactical results in this direction.
1. To accomplish this task, the Russian command has concentrated and deployed units and formations from the 1st Tank Army (TA) of the “Zapad” group of forces, and has strengthened them with forces and means from the 6th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and possibly the 11th Army Corps (AC) from the “Sever” group, namely:
1st TA:
– 47th Tank Division (TD) – 26th and 153rd tank regiments (TR), 272nd, 347th, and 380th motor rifle regiments (MRR), and 744th self-propelled artillery regiment (SAR). Apparently, it operates in this direction with most of its forces;
– 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– several separate units from the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division (MRD) and 4th TD.
6th CAA:
– 68th MRD, presumably operates in this direction with the 121st and 122nd MRR. Units of its 1009th MRR “Territorial Troops” (TrT) may also be present here.
11th Army Corps:
– Possibly some units of the 18th MRD and its 7th Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment (SMRR).
Currently, there have been no significant changes in the combat and numerical composition (CNC) of Russian troops deployed in the Kupiansk direction. Although, it is quite possible that part of the operational reserves of the 1st TA or the entire “Zapad” group could appear in this direction in the near future.
2. Current Situation in the Kupiansk direction is characterized by the activation of the enemy in the tactical zone in the sectors of the 47th Tank Division and the 27th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade. It is evident that the Russian command seeks to “split” the Kupiansk bridgehead of the AFU into two parts — northern and southern, advancing the main forces of the forward units and divisions of the 47th Tank Division in the general direction of Pishchane — Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, and subsequently eliminate them in stages, starting from the northern part.
Initially, by capturing the eastern part of the city of Kupiansk (the so-called “Zaoskillya”), including the villages of Petropavlivka and Kucheryvka, through active “infiltration” actions by assault groups of the 27th SMRB and part of the forces of the 68th MRD, they aim to eliminate the northern part of the bridgehead. Then they plan to “clear” the southern part in the “triangle” of Kivsharivka — Novoosynove — Hlushkivka.
So far, the enemy has managed to achieve more or less significant tactical results mainly in the sector of the 47th Tank Division, in the direction of Pishchane — Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, particularly:
– It is likely that he managed to expand the presence of his small infantry groups in the Kurylivka area (including the territory of the former “military town” and Kurylivka Lyceum). Additionally, several such groups were able to advance along the northern bank of the Lozovatka River to the Kurylivka railway station.
– In turn, towards Kurylivka — Kivsharivka, Russian assault groups have also likely managed to expand their presence in the northeastern part of Kivsharivka (east of the local “pond” and vocational school No27).
However, in this context, it should be noted that the presence of small Russian infantry groups in these areas does not imply confident control over these sections, as Ukrainian units are evidently also present there. Currently, the main forces of the Russian 47th Tank Division’s forward units are positioned just slightly west of the village of Pishchane, from where most of their “infiltrations” towards Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi and Kivsharivka mainly begin, predominantly along the railway leading to Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi from Stepova Novoselivka.
– In the northern part of the bridgehead, the enemy is actively carrying out “infiltration” along the Hnylytsia River towards Petropavlivka (where there are likely already several small enemy infantry groups), as well as on a fairly large front segment from Oskil to Synkivka generally southwards (towards Kucheriivka and Zaoskillya).
It seems that the enemy has managed to deploy several of its “micro” infantry groups (and in some cases even individual personnel) towards Kupiansk Lyceum No7, the area of the Milk Canning Plant, Kucheriivka, and the damaged wholesale store “Komora”.
However, it is still too early to speak of any “major” enemy breakthrough in Zaoskillya, despite opposing claims from various Russian “sources”.
– Additionally, from time to time, enemy assault groups have attempted to “break through” towards the villages of Podoly, Novooosynove, as well as along the western bank of the Oskil River through Holubivka towards the western part of Kupiansk, but they have evidently not been particularly successful.
Thus, it can currently be stated that the situation on the Kupiansk bridgehead for the Armed Forces of Ukraine, although quite slowly, continues to deteriorate tactically. The enemy, taking advantage of several factors (such as numerical superiority in assault infantry, the presence of abundant “greenery” and quarters with dense urban development where small enemy infantry groups can hide from Ukrainian UAVs, as well as their ability to provide fairly intensive aerial and artillery support for their infantry actions, etc.), has managed to achieve a series of successful tactical results.
3. Regarding the further prospects for the development of the situation in the Kupiansk direction, it should be noted that they currently do not look particularly positive for the Armed Forces of Ukraine. There is clearly a quite stable tendency towards their deterioration. At the same time, from an operational point of view, this situation does not appear as unanimous as it seems at first glance.
Thus, the enemy managed to deploy a powerful grouping of forces in this direction, which can be compared to an enhanced army corps (in total, there are approximately two divisions here, along with a separate, full-fledged motorized rifle brigade) and is using it quite successfully. However, the problem for them is that despite this, their Kupiansk grouping still requires constant reinforcement and replenishment, since, due to the nature of the combat operations in the tactical zone (intense “infiltration”) they are conducting, their forward units suffer significant losses in manpower, especially in combat-ready assault infantry.
Forward Russian regiments and battalions cannot indefinitely form assault groups and units from their composition unless they are CONSTANTLY replenished with enough personnel. Sooner or later, they still have to be withdrawn to temporary deployment points to restore their combat capability. And with this, the Russian command is already experiencing quite obvious difficulties. They can still maintain a numerical advantage in infantry over the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Kupiansk direction, but it is becoming increasingly difficult for them to do so every day.
Moreover, it is clear that battles directly for Zaoskillya, Kupiansk-Vuzlovyi, etc. (i.e., in conditions of dense urban terrain) will require a sharp increase in the number of assault infantry in the forward units of the Russian Kupiansk grouping, beyond what the Russian command is currently using in this direction. All of this evidently requires strengthening this grouping with ADDITIONAL forces and means.
The question is, where to get them from?
Currently, the other two armies of the Western Military District (the 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies) are engaged in intense fighting in the Lyman direction. Moreover, to strengthen them, the Russian command has even deployed part of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division from the 1st Guards Tank Army. In addition, another division of the 1st Guards Tank Army (the 4th Tank Division) together with a division of the 20th Combined Arms Army (the 3rd Motorized Rifle Division) is currently “storming” Borova, and they are doing this quite slowly.
Therefore, it will be quite difficult for the Russian command to “find” anything additional for Kupiansk specifically from the Lyman direction (unless they stop attacks in the Borova direction and shift most of the 4th Tank Division to Kupiansk).
Of course, they can look for something extra for Kupiansk from the forces of the Northern Military District, but then they will have to curb their aggressive appetites in the Ukrainian border regions of Sumy and Kharkiv, as well as reconsider their “schedule” for advancing towards Velykyi Burluk.
They could also request something from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but it is unlikely to be substantial, especially during the peak of the offensive on the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration. Therefore, most likely, the command of the 1st Guards Tank Army and the Western Military District will have to strengthen their Kupiansk grouping mainly at the expense of “internal reserves.” Almost similarly to how the commander of the Dnipro Group of Forces, General Teplinsky, is managing his 58th Combined Arms Army in the Zaporizhzhia direction.
And this practically means that the Ukrainian command in the Kupiansk direction is almost guaranteed to get the time and opportunity to make and implement its own decisions regarding the defense of the Kupiansk region. The question is whether they can effectively take advantage of this opportunity?
Photo: 37th Separate Marine Brigade
