Novopavlivsk-Velykonovosilkivsky direction.
The enemy (Russian forces) continues to conduct active defense in the sectors of their 29th Combined Arms Army (CAA) from the “Vostok” group of forces (GF) and the 90th Tank Division (TD) of the “Center” GF to prevent further advancement of the forward units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) north and south of the N-15 road Zaporizhzhia — Donetsk along the directions Novopavlivka — Novoukrainka, Piddubne — Vidrodne, and Maliivka — Velyka Novosilka.
To this end, the enemy attempts to hold their positions along the Mokri Yaly River from the village of Perebudova to the village of Burlatske, and also tries to counterattack in the directions Dachne — Filiya and Orikhove — Novopavlivka. Additionally, the Russian command aims to maintain several positions in the combat formations of the forward units of the AFU with their remaining small infantry groups to the west, south, and east of the village of Filiya.
In the reporting period, the enemy failed to fully execute this task. In certain areas, evidently, forward Ukrainian units managed to advance in the tactical zone. However, from an operational point of view, these results can hardly be considered significant or even substantial, although they did have a certain operational-tactical effect.
1. In this direction, the enemy operates with the following forces and means (approximately):
29th CAA:
– 36th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB);
– 39th SMRB of the 68th Army Corps (AC);
– Consolidated Tactical Group (CTG) of the 18th Machine Gun-Artillery Division (MGAD) of the 68th AC;
– 430th Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR);
– 200th Artillery Brigade (AB);
– Also, likely, certain units of the 120th Naval Infantry Division (NID) from the Baltic Fleet (BF) are observed here;
– Part of the forces of the 90th Tank Division, likely units of its 6th Tank Regiment (TR) and 228th MRR.
90th TD:
– 6th, 80th, and 239th Tank Regiments (TR), the first of which is likely regrouped in the 29th CAA sector;
– 228th and 428th MRR, the first apparently also operates mainly in the 29th CAA sector;
– 400th Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (SPA).
Additionally, about one and a half months ago, in the sectors of the Russian 51st CAA of the “Center” GF and the 8th CAA of the “South” GF, which operate in the direction of the city of Druzhkivka along the Kazennyi Torets River, a number of units of the 90th TD of the enemy were also observed.
As for the 120th NID, most likely, its main forces operate at the junction of the 29th and 36th CAA. At the same time, likely, a larger part of this division is still deployed in the 36th CAA sector of the enemy.
2. The current situation in this direction is characterized by rather stubborn opposing battles north and south of the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway, particularly along the Mokri Yaly River, with tactically minimal advancement of forward Ukrainian units, as well as their gradual but persistent progress towards Shevchenko — Burlatske. Specifically:
– Operating in the directions of Novopavlivka — Kotliarivka and Novopavlivka — Orikhove, the Ukrainian Armed Forces managed not only to hold part of the Donetsk region between Kotliarivka and Orikhove but also to reach a distance of 2.6 km from the northwest to the first and almost to the northwestern outskirts of the second.
In turn, the enemy periodically launches counterattacks towards Novopavlivka from Orikhove, attempting to push forward Ukrainian units west of the administrative border between the Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions of Ukraine, and continues to carry out active “infiltration” actions towards Novopavlivka from Kotliarivka.
However, this has not led to significant tactical changes in the positions of the parties, though the enemy evidently still maintains a small infantry group (likely up to 5-6 infantrymen) within Novopavlivka. They are hiding in the area of LLC “Chuhuevo” (Kommunarivska Street), on the northern outskirts of Novopavlivka, beyond the Solena River. Additionally, the enemy still manages to control half of one planting 1.5 km south of Novopavlivka. Thus, it can be confidently stated that Novopavlivka is almost entirely “cleared” of Russian military presence by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
– In the direction of Dachne — Filiia, Russian troops are quite stubbornly trying to hold several of their positions around the latter, occasionally even counterattacking from Dachne in this direction. As a result, evidently, several Russian infantry groups continue to “sit” in the forest southwest of the village of Filiia (in the area where the Solena and Vovcha rivers meet), in the southern part of the village itself, and in several plantations south of it.
However, tactically, the situation for the enemy in this area appears not very favorable. Since Ukrainian forward units southeast of the village of Filiia have already advanced along the Vovcha River towards Yalta (village) — Dachne by over 2.5 km and are now 2.3 km west of Dachne itself. Furthermore, from the north, from the direction of Novopavlivka where the road from Dachne leads, Ukrainian units have also advanced southward and are not more than 4.5 km from Dachne.
Thus, it becomes clear that the enemy is able to supply and support their infantry groups in the Filiia village area only from the direction of Dachne and through a rather narrow corridor. If the Ukrainian Armed Forces can approach Dachne closely (which is quite likely), the position of these Russian infantry groups in the Filiia area will evidently deteriorate to a “critical” level.
By the way, the enemy command understands this well, which is why they occasionally attempt to counterattack in the Dachne — Novopavlivka direction, to widen this corridor.
– Further south (between the Vovcha River and the Zaporizhzhia – Donetsk Road), the Ukrainian Armed Forces continue to expand their bridgehead on the Mokri Yaly River. They have completely liberated the area of Hrushivske — Yalta (village) — Zaporizhzhia (village) — Zirca and continue quite active actions towards Zaporizhzhia (village) — Novoukrainka (having advanced 2 km east of Zaporizhzhia).
However, they are expanding this bridgehead not only to the east but also to the south, that is, from north to south, along the eastern bank of the Mokri Yaly River, advancing in the direction of Zirka — Perebudova and Zaporizhzhia — Perebudova. Moreover, it is evident that this is being done quite in coordination with their active operations from the western bank of the river towards Piddubne — Perebudova and Myrne — Komar.
As a result, according to several reports, Ukrainian assault groups have already secured positions in Perebudova and are actively fighting in the western part of the village of Komar (in the area of Zarychna and Nahorna streets). It is evident that it is now quite difficult for the Russian command to maintain positions along the Mokri Yaly River north of Fedorivka. As advanced Ukrainian units have also broken through to the river between it and Komar, cutting the road 00509.
– However, the most unpleasant situation for the command of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army is apparently unfolding further south, where advanced Ukrainian units have liberated the village of Shevchenko and advanced towards the village of Burlatske (reaching a distance of 1.5 km from it), as well as simultaneously advanced south of Shevchenko to the village of Vilne Pole, approaching it to less than 1 km.
3. Now a bit about the prospects.
I have already written earlier that in case of the complete liberation by Ukrainian forces of the Shevchenko — Burlatske — Pryvilne — Vilne Pole area (and they are already quite close to this), the Russian command will face quite obvious difficulties not only in holding positions along the Mokri Yaly River north of Fedorivka, but also south of it — all the way to Novocheretuvate.
However, in this sense, it should be remembered that the Ukrainian Armed Forces are already practically on the northern outskirts of Fedorivka and have advanced quite deeply from the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk and Donetsk regions into the latter, advancing in the direction Malivka — Burlatske (up to 7.5 – 8 km).
And although directly south of Novopavlivka (between the Vovcha River and the Zaporizhzhia-Donetsk highway), in the direction Ivanivka — Zaporizhzhia (a village in the Donetsk region), this figure is even more significant (the Ukrainian Armed Forces have advanced in this direction from the administrative border of the Dnipropetrovsk region into the Donetsk region by almost 15 km), the advance towards Burlatske (and possibly further east, to the Mokri Yaly River) has more operational-tactical significance than the actions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Zaporizhzhia – Donetsk road. For one simple reason — it gives the Ukrainian Armed Forces quite real chances to reach from the north and northwest the immediate approaches to Velyka Novosilka itself. Furthermore, “on the way,” they also aim to dismantle the entire enemy defense along the Mokri Yaly River.
However, FOR NOW, the Ukrainian Armed Forces clearly DO NOT have such an opportunity for several reasons, including:
– The enemy is defending quite stubbornly, occasionally counterattacking. Therefore, the pace of advancement of Ukrainian forward units in the mentioned areas and directions is virtually minimal. For example, their advance to Burlatske and Vilne Pole occurred at least a few weeks ago. However, they have not yet managed to liberate these villages. The Ukrainian bridgehead on the Mokri Yaly River, north of Komar in the eastern and southeastern directions, is also expanding very slowly, with Russian forces stubbornly holding positions southeast of Zaporizhzhia (village).
– Besides this, it is evident that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are conducting offensive actions in the sectors of the Russian 29th Combined Arms Army and the 90th Tank Division with rather limited forces and means. In fact, they are operating in these specific areas with forces no greater than 1-2 brigades (even if reinforced and specifically designated for this purpose). As a result, the Ukrainian command is compelled to assign their troops quite limited scale tasks. Furthermore, these have to be carried out gradually and in stages, which, in turn, provides the Russian command with a certain time lag to respond accordingly, such as maneuvering their own forces and means. Essentially, the Armed Forces of Ukraine were conducting, and in some areas continue to conduct, offensive actions in this direction without achieving a decisive advantage over the enemy in terms of forces and means.
– Moreover, it is quite obvious that the Russian command operating in this direction (and evidently not only them) fully understands the possible operational-tactical consequences for themselves and the troops under their command if they cannot completely stabilize the situation in this direction or at least significantly slow down the advancement of the Ukrainian forward units. That is why, in this sense, they act fully in accordance with the situation and quite quickly. The regrouping of parts and units of the 90th Tank Division and the 120th Motorized Rifle Division into the sector of the 29th Combined Arms Army at least a month ago is a sufficiently visible and clear confirmation of this.
In addition, there are still a number of objective and subjective factors that directly influence the situation in this area. In this sense, I have only mentioned the main ones.
Regarding the operational-strategic scale (i.e., the situation in the entire Southern strategic operational zone), it is quite possible to assert that the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Novopavlivka-Velikonovosilka direction have not yet had a significant impact on it. After all, the enemy continues their offensive on the left flank of their “Vostok” Operational Group (in the sectors of the 5th and 35th Combined Arms Armies in the Hulyaipole direction, the section between Dobropillia and Bilohirya) and achieves certain tactical successes there. In addition, they are quite actively trying to resume the offensive on the right flank of their 58th Combined Arms Army “Dnipro” Operational Group to eliminate the Orikhiv defense area of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the near future, and also not without certain results for themselves.
Obviously, in this sense, the offensive actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, especially limited in scope and scale, in the sectors of the Russian 29th and 36th Combined Arms Armies are insufficient. To achieve significant changes in the situation in the entire Southern strategic operational zone in favor of the Ukrainian forces (I mean within the framework of the Strategic Defense Operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine), a combination of at least two factors is needed:
– A significant intensification of their efforts in the offensive actions on the right flank of the Russian “Vostok” Operational Group (Novopavlivka-Velikonovosilka and Oleksandrivka directions, sectors of the Russian 36th and 29th Combined Arms Armies).
– Increasing the level of stability and resilience of the defense system of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the tactical zone in the Hulyaipole and Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia directions (the offensive sectors of the Russian 5th, 35th, and 58th Combined Arms Armies).
Such a combination (or combination) is not yet evident.
The situation in the combat zone in quiet mode.
While we are all waiting for another set of good news from the Third Army Corps, and they will come, I want to note that the situation for the enemy has significantly worsened in several areas within the combat zone.
Particularly in the Kharkiv region, aside from the Charter pushing against the Dvurechensky bridgehead and displacing the enemy not only from the Kreydyane and Korobochkyne zones, but also in Dvurechny itself, the positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces have improved in the area of Vovchansk Khutors. This especially concerns the Vovchansky Botanical Reserve and Siverskyi Donets areas.
In the Donetsk region, the situation has not improved for the enemy on the eastern flank of the Sloviansk-Kramatorsk bridgehead in the zone from Piskunivka to Rai-Oleksandrivka. There is a highly positive trend along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets in the “Kreydova Flora” area.
In the Kostiantynivka direction, the enemy has lost the initiative concerning bypassing the city on the flanks, particularly stalling in the area of Khrushchov Pond and Novodmytrivka. In this context, the Ukrainian Armed Forces not only continue to control the northern areas of Kostiantynivka but also continue to counterattack in the city center.
In the Dobropillya direction, events reminiscent of August-September 2025 have begun, when the Russian 51st Offensive Combat Vehicle Brigade attempted to break through to Dobropillya and suffered heavy losses as a result. It was then that the emerging “fire” on the direction was assigned to be extinguished by Mykhailo Drapatyi. Actions from that period significantly reduced the enemy’s advance, and now the 1st National Guard Corps of Denys “Redis” Prokopenko has already conducted a sweep in the Tor fort area and created several unpleasant situations for the enemy along a 35 km front. I think we will hear about this soon.
Meanwhile, the “Audit” operation conducted by the 40th Marine Brigade units in the Donetsk region went completely unnoticed in our information space, allowing the Ukrainian Armed Forces to expand their control zone by 5.6 km². Of course, it seems insignificant compared to hundreds of square kilometers from the “Trinity,” but it is an extremely hard work, detailed planning, and a foundation for further initiative development. The “Trinity” is currently doing colossal and fundamental work, but dear journalists and marathon channel pools, let’s not forget about the other units achieving success in the most difficult combat zones.
However, as it seems to me, of no less intrigue with the release of the commander of the 3rd Army Corps, Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky, with another official report on the results of the 4th season of “Vivaldi” is the expectation of coverage of events in the border area of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipro regions on a 70 km section of the front.
Here, the enemy clearly faces collapse. The enemy is losing control over an important crossing on the N-15 highway on both banks of the Mokri Yaly River.
After the ROV were pushed beyond the boundaries of the Novopavlovsk forest and the Dibrovsky reserve, they found themselves in a highly vulnerable position on both banks of the Vorona, with very unfavorable terrain and landscape features for defense. I won’t hide it, I wouldn’t be surprised if soon we see the occupiers hiding in the ruins of Velyka Novosilka, trying to use the Mokri Yaly, Kashaglach, and Shaitanka rivers as natural defense lines.
The situation for the enemy in the Yanchaul-Gaichul interfluve is no better. Here too, pressure is put on their positions along the banks, and if the flank along Velyka-Novosilka gives way, everything here will fall apart much faster than one can imagine.
In the Orikhiv direction, the enemy has been quite intensively trying in recent weeks to activate the mad attack mode, intending to infiltrate around Mala Tokmachka and Novodanilivka with their suicidists. It didn’t work. It turns out that Ukrainian units started to be recorded by the enemy in the area of the “rabochka.”
Similarly, the 58th OVA fails to regain control over most of Stepnohirsk and the northern districts of Plavni, although they maintain stable control over the 3rd microdistrict. The 58th OVA has also invested considerable forces in maintaining control along route 08-12 from Stepove to Shcherbakov.
In other words, speaking of a sufficient quantity of forces and means for GVO “Dnipro” for large-scale operations – no, they don’t have them. And as soon as these are exhausted, this section will collapse too.
Thus, October in silence mode seems no less intriguing than any other month of this year, and perhaps even more.
Let’s observe! And let’s not pour ashes on our heads. The ashes should be poured on the Frunzenskaya embankment.
To be continued!
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
