
The current “bridge war” plays an important role in the broader context of the war.
And the context is this: strategically, the war on the front line has practically ended. The continuation of hostilities has long ceased to improve the situation for Russia, only increasing its costs. It seems that the dead-end nature of this strategy is already understood in Ukraine, Europe, and the USA, but it remains unclear whether it is understood in Russia itself. Putin continues to dream of a “new Yalta” and control over Europe, although in reality, even control over Kostiantynivka will require further fighting.
Unable to win on the front, the Kremlin has intensified the missile campaign against the Ukrainian rear, hoping that society will explode from within and stage a pro-Russian Maidan. But this is not a military strategy—it’s hoping for a miracle. And if it didn’t work in past years, it’s unclear why it should work now. Especially since strikes on Ukrainian energy are seasonal and will lose any meaning by March. As a result, Russia is throwing its entire economy into the production of drones and missiles, which can hurt Ukrainians but cannot improve Russia’s own situation.
Thus, the almost only way where Russia still has a chance to exit the war on more or less acceptable terms is through negotiations. However, for Russia, this is the worst moment to enter negotiations: in the absence of successes on the front and with the failure to protect the Kerch Bridge, Putin enters the process with weakened positions. That’s why they have started delaying the process, rejecting the US proposal for European participation.
At the same time, negotiations are not the end of the war. In fact, they are another dimension of it, which is added to the traditional domains: land, sea, air, and cyberspace.
During the Vietnam War, American bombings intensified precisely at moments of negotiation activation, to pressure the other side. And such examples can be found in any war. Diplomacy and military actions are not isolated from each other but often complement each other.
Therefore, although the campaign of strikes on bridges over the Dnipro and the Kerch Strait itself cannot change the situation on the front line, it can potentially influence negotiating positions. Russia was the first to hit Ukrainian bridges over the Dnipro. Ukraine responded with strikes on the Kerch Bridge, stopping traffic and demonstrating the ability to do the same with the railway branch.
Whether this will be an argument for at least stopping the “bridge war,” we do not know. But we recently saw an example of such an exchange in the “tanker for tanker” campaign organized by the USA in response to Iran’s attacks on ships in the Persian Strait.
It is known that the negotiation process did not end last week. On Thursday in Berlin, representatives of Ukraine, the USA, and several dozen European countries will gather to agree on negotiating positions. Meanwhile, American officials are leaking information that Trump’s visit to China, his bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping, and later a trilateral meeting with Putin are part of coordinated US diplomatic work. Europeans have finally determined their representatives for participation in the negotiations, emphasizing that the war in Ukraine is only a separate episode of a broader war of Russia against Europe, and this war began long before 2014.
Of course, all this diplomatic activity does not mean that the war will end soon. We should not have vain illusions about this. In this structure, our task is as grounded and pragmatic as possible—not to let our partners in Europe, the USA, and other countries forget about Ukraine and the necessity of its support in terms of finances and providing access to technologies like Starlink. After all, according to the most probable scenario, the war will continue into 2027, so stable support from partners and allies remains a matter of survival for us.
