
Information on Russia’s current losses due to sanctions as of 27.10.2026.
1. Russia is shipping less crude oil, even despite the resumption of flows at key Baltic ports.
– Russian sea-borne oil exports have decreased, despite the resumption of shipments through the key Baltic port of Primorsk. In the four weeks to October 25, shipments averaged 3.55 million barrels per day — 30 thousand barrels less than the previous four-week period. This is the lowest figure in five weeks.
– Last week, 12 tankers departed from the Primorsk terminal compared to only four a week earlier. After several days of downtime, shipments resumed, and the average daily volume of sea-borne exports for the seven days to October 25 increased by 730 thousand barrels — up to 3.85 million barrels. This is the highest level in a month, but the weekly recovery was insufficient to offset the previous decline.
– One factor in the increase in shipments could be the resumption of operations at Russian refineries after a lull in Ukrainian attacks. In the seven days to October 25, no strikes on Russian refineries were recorded, which could have allowed increased processing and redirected some oil to the domestic market instead of exports.
– The main buyers of Russian oil remain China and India. However, Indian companies may reduce purchases due to a sharp increase in transport costs and the emergence of cheaper alternatives from the Persian Gulf countries.
– The return of Middle Eastern supplies to levels close to pre-war times heightens competition for the Indian market and creates additional risks for Russian exports.
2. The Northern Sea Route has not become a reliable alternative for exporting Russian oil to Asia.
– The Northern Sea Route, which Russia is trying to develop as an alternative oil supply route to Asia, remains dependent on complex ice conditions and the assistance of nuclear icebreakers.
– In July 2026, several sanctioned Russian tankers were trapped in the ice of the Vilkitsky Strait while transporting oil to China. The vessels were unable to continue moving for several days, and two nuclear icebreakers were required to escort them.
– This incident highlights one of the main problems of the Arctic route: even during periods of ice cover reduction, navigation remains unpredictable. Delays for tankers and the need for icebreaker support increase costs and complicate supply planning. Thus, the Northern Sea Route does not guarantee faster and cheaper transportation of oil to Asian buyers.
– The route currently plays a minor role in Russian oil exports, accounting for only about 1% of seaborne shipments. Expansion of transportation is hindered not only by natural conditions but also by Western sanctions, which complicate the construction and maintenance of specialized vessels. Additionally, the development of ports and other infrastructure requires significant investments.
– Russia’s attempts to reorient oil exports to the Arctic route face numerous obstacles: complex navigation, dependence on the nuclear icebreaker fleet, sanction limitations, and high infrastructure costs. This limits the ability to quickly turn the Northern Sea Route into a full-fledged alternative to traditional routes to Asia.
3. Russian regions are cutting medical expenses due to budget deficits and war expenditures.
– Russian regions are reducing hospital and clinic funding due to budget issues, while significant funds are directed towards the war against Ukraine and recruitment of contractors. In the first half of 2026, regional health care spending decreased by 5.8% to 999 billion rubles. This is 61 billion rubles less than the same period last year, reported the Accounts Chamber of Russia.
– Medical funding was cut in 42 regions, and in 11 of them, the reductions exceeded 20%.
– Particularly affected was the primary health care modernization program, which involves repairing outdated clinics. This year, 57.5 billion rubles were allocated to it — 2.1 times less than last year. In the first six months, only 12.6 billion rubles were actually spent, which is 5.2 times less than in the same period of 2025.
– Overall, regional budget expenditures increased by 5.8% in the first half of the year, reaching 12.579 trillion rubles. In addition to medicine, national economy funding also decreased — by 4.7%, to 231 billion rubles. Amid budget deficits, regions are cutting spending on basic services, including medical care for the population.
4. Russia has increased diesel production following agreements with the USA for fuel supply.
– Russian refineries are increasing diesel production in October after the Russian government issued export quotas amidst agreements with the US and a temporary easing of American sanctions.
– In the first half of October, diesel production fell to about 160,000 tons per day compared to 175,000 tons in September. After issuing export quotas, the volumes began to rise and are approaching 180,000 tons per day.
– Since August, there has been a ban on diesel exports in Russia. Meanwhile, domestic consumption in October is estimated at about 140,000 tons per day. At these production levels, at least 40,000 tons a day could remain for export—more than 1 million tons per month. Of these, 200-300,000 tons may be directed to neighboring countries.
– According to US President Donald Trump, Russia must immediately deliver over 300,000 tons of diesel, another 500,000 tons in November, and an additional 1 million tons. With sufficient production capacity, the volume could increase by another 3 million tons.
– According to LSEG, a tanker with 40,000 tons of Russian diesel for New York set sail on October 23. The Kremlin stated that fuel supplies to the US could become regular.
5. In Kazakhstan, Russians are being refused car sales due to EU sanctions.
– In Kazakhstan, Russians have begun to be refused car purchases at dealership centers even with local registration. Such an incident occurred at a Skoda showroom in Almaty: employees refused to process the purchase with a Russian passport, citing EU sanctions and the Czech manufacturer’s policy.
– Previously, reports of refusals mostly involved Russians not residing in Kazakhstan. Restrictions on car sales to Russian citizens were noted at Hyundai, Kia, Toyota, Volkswagen, Chery, Audi, Nissan, and Lexus dealership centers.
– Reasons for refusals vary depending on the manufacturer. Volkswagen cited the political situation for restrictions, while an Audi representative referred to the company’s decision not to sell cars to foreigners. At Kia, Russians could buy a car if they had a residence permit or a tax registration document with an Individual Identification Number (IIN).
– The new case indicates that sanction restrictions are increasingly impacting Russians’ ability to purchase cars abroad, including in countries that have not joined the EU sanctions against Russia.
6. Democrats in the US Congress are preparing to investigate Trump’s deal with Putin on Russian diesel supplies.
– Democrats in the U.S. Congress are preparing to investigate Donald Trump’s agreement to supply Russian diesel fuel to the United States. They have sent letters to banks and port administrations demanding the preservation of all documents related to transactions under this agreement. Democrats hope to secure a majority in at least one chamber of Congress following the midterm elections on November 3.
– In the letters, legislators warn that the delivery of Russian diesel to the U.S. could lead to lawsuits and Congressional investigations. They also express concerns about national security risks, as revenues from fuel sales would help finance Russia’s war against Ukraine.
– Letters were sent to banks JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, Citigroup, and Morgan Stanley, as well as to several port administrations, including the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. Meanwhile, the first tanker carrying Russian diesel fuel is heading to the U.S.
– The vessel Agioi Fanendes, under the flag of Malta, loaded 40,000 tons of diesel in the Baltic port of Primorsk last Thursday and departed for its destination. It is expected to arrive on November 7 — after the announcement of the midterm election results.
– The agreement was also criticized by Republican Senator Mitch McConnell, accusing Trump of indulging the Russian aggressor and autocrat.
7. Romania exposes a diversionary network coordinated by Russia that may have been behind the arson of an industrial facility.
– The Romanian intelligence service announced the exposure of a diversionary network coordinated by Russia, suspected of being involved in a fire in September at an industrial facility in the central part of the country near a state-owned weapons manufacturing enterprise.
– Romanian prosecutors are seeking the extradition of two Belarusian citizens detained in Germany and a Ukrainian citizen detained in Poland. They are suspected of involvement in the arson. According to intelligence reports, they were part of a network whose coordinators targeted state and private weapons manufacturing enterprises, as well as other military and industrial facilities.
– Romanian President Nicușor Dan stated that the country is facing a hybrid war from Russia aimed at destabilizing states that support Ukraine. Among such actions, he mentioned Russian drone incursions into Romanian airspace, cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and diversions.
– The accusations came amid escalating tensions in the Black Sea. Reports indicate that over the past three weeks, at least eight cargo ships have been involved in collisions near the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria, with about 34 sailors killed or missing.
– Dan previously accused Russia of stepping up attacks on NATO’s eastern flank. Moscow has repeatedly denied accusations of organizing diversions.
8. Slovakia intends to purchase Russian gas and nuclear fuel as long as EU legislation permits.
– Slovakia intends to continue purchasing Russian gas and nuclear fuel as long as it is legally possible. This was stated by the country’s Deputy Minister of Economy, Vladimír Šimonaik, after a meeting with the Russian side in Moscow. Bratislava also aims to maintain uninterrupted supplies of Russian oil via the “Druzhba” pipeline.
– Slovakia has challenged the EU regulation aimed at gradually phasing out Russian gas in the Court of Justice of the European Union. Bratislava believes that these restrictions are effectively sanctions, although the EU presents them as part of a plan to phase out Russian energy resources.
– At the same time, the Slovak authorities claim they are adhering to the current EU restrictions.
– One of the reasons for wanting to maintain purchases is a long-term gas contract that is in place until 2034. Early termination could lead to multibillion-dollar lawsuits, and switching to other suppliers would increase costs. Slovakia is also preparing its oil refinery to work with alternative materials but is not yet rushing to abandon Russian oil.
– The European Commission plans to halt imports via the “Druzhba” pipeline by autumn 2027. Until then, Bratislava is likely to try to maintain supplies, which it considers economically advantageous.
9. Japan will maintain its involvement in the Russian “Sakhalin-1” and “Sakhalin-2” projects despite sanctions.
– Japan does not plan to exit the Russian oil and gas projects “Sakhalin-1” and “Sakhalin-2,” considering them important for energy security. Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) accounts for about 9% of Japan’s import of this fuel — approximately 3.6–3.9 million tons per year. Therefore, Tokyo is not ready to abandon these supplies despite sanction pressures.
– Meanwhile, Japan has significantly reduced the purchase of other Russian energy resources. The import of Russian coal decreased from 10.5 million tons in 2021 to 800 thousand tons in 2024 — about 92%. In January–July 2025, Russian oil accounted for only 0.1% of Japan’s total oil imports.
– Tokyo is reducing its dependence on Russian oil and coal but maintaining access to gas from “Sakhalin-2.” Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsubishi own 12.5% and 10% of this project, respectively, and long-term contracts help ensure a stable supply of fuel. Japan continues its course of gradually reducing dependence on Russian energy, primarily oil and coal.
– However, Tokyo is currently not ready to abandon projects that provide stable gas supplies.
