Pavlo Aksionov, Svyatoslav Khomenko, BBC / BBC News Ukraine
If Russia attacks a NATO country, the alliance intends to stop it at the very beginning, try to keep the conflict localized, and if that fails, strike the resources and forces supporting the military operation.
These are the provisions of the “theory of victory” — a concept to deter Russia and use NATO armed forces in case of an attack by Moscow. This concept was presented at the beginning of the week by the Supreme Allied Commander Europe of NATO’s Allied Command Operations, General Alexus Grynkewich.
The BBC studied this concept and explains what kind of war the North Atlantic Alliance is now preparing for.
“I do not believe that conflict is inevitable or that it will start anytime soon. It’s not the case,” said General Alexus Grynkewich, speaking at a security forum in Warsaw.
During his speech, he did not once mention the word “Russia,” although the overall sense of his words and the context of the speech were related to a potential Russian threat.
Grynkewich’s view is not shared by everyone in Europe or even in NATO. In December 2025, the Secretary General of the Alliance, Mark Rutte, stated: “We are Russia’s next target, and we are already in danger.”
However, despite somewhat differing assessments, since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO’s approach to Russia is guided by the principle of “focusing on capabilities rather than intentions.” And, judging by the statements of alliance representatives, they consider Russia strong enough to pose a threat to neighboring countries.
The potential theater of military operations in the event of a Russian invasion is considered to be the Baltic countries and Poland. The most likely location is the so-called Suwalki Corridor. This is a small section of the Polish-Lithuanian border between Russia’s Kaliningrad region and Belarus, with a straight-line distance of only 65 km.
At the same time, other sections of the borders of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are also considered potentially dangerous, so news about NATO military construction near the Russian borders primarily comes from this region.
In October, the Financial Times reported that Estonia is moving troops closer to the Russian border.
At the end of September, it became known that American troops are returning to Lithuania after a six-month absence: a tank and engineer battalion, totaling over a thousand military personnel.
Germany began forming a brigade in Lithuania, aiming to increase its number to 4,800 military personnel by the end of 2027.
Meanwhile, Lithuania and Poland are preparing evacuation plans for the populations of the Baltic countries in case of a Russian invasion. For this, they are identifying alternative border crossings, refugee reception centers, and other infrastructure.
Four Eurofighter jets from the German Air Force have been temporarily deployed to Latvia. This was done due to concerns about drone intrusions from Russia during the Seimas elections in early October. Simultaneously, this deployment tested NATO’s ability to reinforce air presence over the Baltic countries.
On the other side of the border, troop movements are also taking place. For example, Belarus conducted command-staff exercises in the Suwalki Corridor area starting from September 15.
Simultaneously, in the Kaliningrad region, the Baltic Fleet aviation conducted exercises where pilots practiced striking ground targets.
What War is NATO Preparing For
In his speech, Alexus Grynkewich described a full-scale conflict reminiscent of the Cold War era confrontations in Europe, when the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO were preparing for clashes between large armies.
In September, Russia accused NATO of intending to isolate the Kaliningrad region from the rest of the country and even promised to use nuclear weapons if that happened. In a written response, NATO stated that the alliance is a defensive union committed to countering security threats to its members from all directions, and that “no NATO exercises or actions pose a threat to the territory of the Russian Federation.”
The “theory of victory” adheres to the principle of “deterrence by denial,” where the adversary is made to understand that any offensive operation on their part will not be successful, and its cost will be too high. An alternative principle, “deterrence by punishment,” involves the threat of a powerful and destructive retaliatory strike against a potential aggressor.
“We will stop the initial attack. If the attack continues, we will weaken it and prevent the adversary from advancing. If necessary, we will crush the enemy forces and the operational war system deployed against us,” said Grynkewich.
This principle was adopted by NATO back in 2023 at the Vilnius summit, when the alliance announced its intention to defend “every inch of allied territory.” This led to the strengthening of NATO’s military presence in the Baltic countries and Poland.
Prior to this, NATO contingents in these countries served as a sort of “tripwire” or signaling mechanism that, in the event of an attack, would ensure the arrival of additional reinforcements. This is a classic example of “deterrence by retaliation.”
These two types of deterrence require different approaches to deploying forces and means.
“Deterrence by denial” involves deploying as many forces as possible at likely points of outbreak of hostilities or at a short distance from them. This is how the current redeployment of troops closer to Russia’s borders appears.
In the second case, a relatively small barrier remains in place, the task of which is not to stop the enemy, but to delay them. Meanwhile, a devastating counterstrike is being prepared in the rear.
Israeli military expert David Hendelman believes that at this stage, NATO is trying to maintain restraint, if only to avoid escalating the situation with its statements.
According to him, this is the minimally possible variant of a military response without escalation and raising the stakes:
“Ideally, they do not want to fight at all. But if they have to, they declare that they will fight to the minimally necessary extent and no more. They believe that declarations of a devastating blow and defeat in response to an invasion are themselves escalatory, so they do not make such statements, but rather declare minimally necessary actions.”
Does NATO fear war with Russia
One possible reason for choosing such a strategy is the fear that a conflict with Russia may escalate uncontrollably. After all, “retaliation” in response to an initial attack, a devastating strike, is a very sharp one-time increase in the conflict’s temperature, which could provoke a similar response.
The strategy chosen by NATO involves a much smoother escalation of the conflict.
Of the three stages of a defensive operation described in the “theory of victory” – stopping the first strike; preventing the advancement of an offensive deep into the territory; “destroying the operational system of warfare” – only the third involves strikes, likely against Russian territory. And even then, it will most likely not be about strategic goals, but operational ones: communications, depots, headquarters.
Grinkevich says that NATO will try to place the “burden of escalation” on the side that starts the conflict. According to him, the alliance’s forces will only defend themselves, not allowing the enemy to develop an offensive.
“It is he [the enemy], and only he, who will bear all the moral, political, and strategic responsibility for the decision to escalate. And here we have to make sure that the enemy also understands: the advantage is on our side, and any escalation will only worsen their position both militarily and politically,” the general emphasized.
However, is it possible to contain the escalation of a conflict by artificially limiting oneself in the use of forces and means?
“Escalation can be completely contained if the parties strive for it. Most conflicts in the world usually do not escalate ‘to the limit.’ Especially in this case, when NATO is not really interested in escalation, and the hypothetical Russian attack currently fits more into the logic of ‘escalation for de-escalation,’ meaning extracting political concessions through military pressure, rather than the logic of a real military victory,” said David Hendelmann.
NATO sees its advantage in intelligence and decision-making systems, as well as in aviation, precision weapons, and the ability to coordinate actions across all five ‘domains’—land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.
In other words, NATO obviously expects that any advantage that might fall into Russia’s hands in the event of war will not give it a significant edge, as the preparation for an invasion, its scale, and the composition of the strike group will be known in advance.
Is there a danger of the use of nuclear weapons
The greatest threat of escalation between NATO and Russia is nuclear weapons. In the “theory of victory” presented by General Grynkiewicz, their use is not mentioned. However, the situation with nuclear weapons in Europe is changing.
The threat of its use is regularly echoed in statements by Russian officials and propagandists. Speaking at the annual Valdai Club meeting at the beginning of October, Russian President Vladimir Putin accused Europe of escalating tensions in relations with Russia.
“If it comes to a direct attack on the Russian Federation, in this case, it means Kaliningrad and possibly other territories, then, of course, the issue of the use of all types of weapons at the disposal of our country by the Russian Federation will inevitably and immediately be on the agenda,” he stated.
“All types of weapons” includes nuclear weapons.
At the end of September, the Russian state news agency “RIA Novosti” published a column by Alexander Nosovich titled “Russia awaits another Special Military Operation. It will be very short,” which claimed that in the event of war, Russia could use nuclear weapons in the Baltic countries. This publication was later deleted.
The Nosovich column appeared after the Lithuanian Seimas began considering the possibility of placing nuclear weapons on its territory. For this, changes to the constitution are necessary. The relevant amendment passed its first reading on October 6, and the final vote is scheduled for January 12, 2027.
This amendment does not mean that Lithuania will receive its own nuclear weapons. However, it may allow the temporary placement of weapons from another state on its territory. For example, the country could join the French nuclear deterrent system, within which French Air Force aircraft with nuclear missiles may be stationed in European countries.
Since we are talking about Europe, the nuclear weapons that could potentially be used in a conflict of this scale are most likely non-strategic or, as they are also called, tactical.
After 2023, Russia placed low-yield nuclear warheads in Belarus. This weapon belongs to and is controlled by Russia. It is likely about the Iskander operational-tactical missile systems with nuclear warheads.
In addition, Russian medium-range missile systems “Oreshnik” capable of carrying a nuclear charge are deployed in Belarus.
Currently, the US is developing a concept of “controlled escalation,” within which they also plan to expand the arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons. According to experts, this is necessary to control potential escalation of conflict with the use of nuclear ammunition.
The US has tactical aerial bombs in several European countries, but they are less effective than missiles. Therefore, Washington believes they lack a deterrent tool more powerful than conventional weapons but not as destructive as strategic nuclear missiles.
All of these preparations occur against the backdrop of the termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which for many years reduced tension in Europe by removing the most dangerous nuclear weapon systems from the arsenals of the parties involved.
How NATO Will Respond to Hybrid Threats
A lot of attention in the “theory of victory” is also given to hybrid threats. Judging by the statements of Western politicians, NATO countries are already facing them.
The day after Grinkevich’s speech in Warsaw, the Polish authorities accused Russia of organizing the arson of a ground station of the Starlink satellite network. “We have no doubt that Russian special services are behind this act of sabotage,” said Tomasz Semoniak, the minister responsible for the activities of Poland’s special services. The arson itself occurred in September.
Grinkevich touched on the topic of hybrid threats in response to a question from the host:
“When a state under attack is ready and has fulfilled all the necessary legal requirements to establish responsibility for this attack, we must do it publicly. This lets the Russians understand (…) that we see what they are doing.”
However, he did not say anything about response measures, i.e., how to react to a proven fact of sabotage.
On one hand, marking “red lines” in hybrid warfare can provoke a potential adversary to approach these limits as closely as possible and possibly test how decisively they will be defended. On the other hand, it is important that these limits are clearly understood by those who establish them and that there is a clear plan to respond to their violation.
Another danger of hybrid warfare is that its escalation can gradually increase, and each subsequent step on its own may not be enough justification to start a war.
General Grynkiewicz in his speech did not directly address this issue but stated that in any case, the enemy will not be able to conceal preparations for full-scale war.
Will America enter a war with Russia?
After the speech, Grynkiewicz was asked about the U.S. involvement in the conflict with Russia, should it begin. This issue has been discussed for a long time; moreover, doubts about it were openly expressed as far back as 1961 by French President Charles de Gaulle.
On one hand, the United States is the most powerful country in the world. The North Atlantic Alliance was created from the very beginning to protect the European allies of the U.S.
On the other hand, a war with Russia could result in a nuclear apocalypse, threatening all countries in the world.
Grynkiewicz called his presence in Europe an example of how the U.S. remains committed to NATO unity, yet mentioned no specific plans.
“Listen, American troops are already here in Poland. American troops are deployed along the entire eastern flank. Ultimately, the question of who and where provides troops is a political decision. But, I think no one should doubt the commitment of the United States to this alliance”, he said.
Meanwhile, back in the summer, Pentagon Chief Pete Hegseth stated at a meeting of NATO defense ministers that the times of “restraint” are over, and Europe must independently take care of its own defense, while the U.S. will reevaluate its military presence in Europe over the next six months.
Moreover, Hegseth confirmed that the U.S. will already reduce its participation in NATO’s rapid response forces.
However, this does not mean that Americans are literally going to reduce their contingent on the European continent. According to him, the United States stands for a “fast and irreversible move toward Europe taking a leading role and assuming primary responsibility for its own defense”.
No Specific Answers
The very fact that General Grynkevich’s program speech was delivered in the capital of Poland was symbolic. Grynkevich himself called Warsaw “a place where deterrence and defense are taken seriously and where actions match words.”
The Polish authorities constantly warn the population: the number of acts of sabotage, diversions, and incidents at infrastructure facilities related to Russia will increase. Russia, Warsaw explains, will try to “destabilize” European societies, intimidate them, and achieve a withdrawal of support for Ukraine.
The speech of the Commander-in-Chief of the NATO Allied Armed Forces in Europe was fundamentally different from the rhetoric of Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk and members of his government, who predict further escalation and possible missile and drone strikes on Poland.
This contrast was so striking that the influential newspaper Rzeczpospolita called Grynkevich’s speech “a voice from another reality.”
For many experts, the alliance’s position, which intends to deter Russia not by threats of force but by building a strong defense, seems untimely.
“Even now, NATO has not abandoned its course of preventing escalation and does not intend to provoke a third world war in response to a Russian attack on its eastern flank. The alliance intends to defend itself, including by striking enemy territory, but does not seek to bring Russia to its knees, decapitate its leadership, or destroy its nuclear potential,” writes military expert Marek Świerczyński from Polityka Insight.
On the one hand, TokFM radio commentator Szymon Kempka notes, it would be extremely naive to expect specific answers to complex questions from an American general holding such a high position:
“We must not forget that we are not the only audience for his speech. The theory of victory is also being listened to closely in the Kremlin.”
On the other hand, commentators urge to consider Grynkevich’s speech not in isolation but in conjunction with a speech at another panel of the Warsaw Forum by another representative of the American administration, close to Donald Trump, the US Ambassador to NATO, Matthew Whitaker.
He reminded that in President Trump’s national security strategy, priorities are set as follows:
“First and foremost, the security of the United States itself. If we fail in this task, everything else will not matter. Secondly, the Western Hemisphere. Clearly, we must focus on what is closest to the United States. Thirdly, the Pacific region. And fourthly, Europe. I think this is the order in which we now consider all current security priorities of the United States and our allies.”
Misinterpretation of Two Concepts
After the Warsaw conference, on October 14, the Belarusian Foreign Ministry issued a statement in which it condemned General Grynkevich’s speech, seeing a threat to Belarus in it.
“This concept involves preemptive strikes on Belarusian territory using drones and ground robotic systems,” stated the official MFA declaration.
Meanwhile, in General Hrynkevych’s speech, such claims were not present.
It may be a result of a misinterpretation of The Wall Street Journal article, which, while discussing the “theory of victory,” suggested it might rely on the work of the retired General Chris Donahue, former commander of the US Army in Europe and ex-head of the alliance’s land command.
The idea of a decisive counterattack, which would include missile strikes on Russian command posts, air defense systems in Kaliningrad, near St. Petersburg, and in Belarus, appears specifically in Donahue’s concept described in the WSJ, not in Hrynkevych’s speech.
“This approach has been named the ‘Eastern Flank Deterrence Initiative,’ and according to American military officials, its main goal is to make Putin, upon assessing NATO’s defense, conclude: ‘not today’ if he considers an attack,” the article noted.
According to the publication, “within this strategy, it was proposed to create a large ‘autonomous zone’ so that drones and ground robots could repel a Russian attack without significant losses among allies.”
The deterrence concept proposed by Donahue differs from Hrynkevych’s “theory of victory.” It aligns more closely with the concept of “deterrence through retaliation”—an approach that NATO does not currently seem to be planning to use.
Caption: Assignment of private ranks following the BZVP in the German TRO. Photo: Bundeswehr
