Clément Molen — a French OSINT analyst and researcher specializing in tracking combat zones, particularly the Russian-Ukrainian war.
Tyzhden spoke with him about the reasons for Ukraine’s recent successes on the front, the reality of the Russian threat to European countries, as well as the prospects for the escalation of hostilities in 2027.
— Let’s talk about Ukraine’s recent successes. What do you think they are due to? Is it a new Ukrainian tactic, the exhaustion of Russia, new technologies, or something else?
— It’s a combination of various factors. The first is the relative stabilization of the front line in 2026 compared to the previous two years. These years were significantly tougher for Ukraine mainly because Russia had an advantage in manpower and could constantly exert pressure along the entire front line. The Russians managed to advance, especially in the Donbas, and they continued to develop weapons: FPV drones, guided aerial bombs, and artillery. This further complicated Ukrainian defense over several years. But recently, especially in 2026, the situation has relatively stabilized in certain areas.
In the Donbas, it is still very difficult, especially in the area of Dobropillia and up to Sloviansk. But overall, almost everywhere, the situation is better than it was last year. And there are various reasons for this.
One of them is Russia’s problems with human resources. It is starting to run out of people, so it is forced to concentrate new recruits mainly in the Kramatorsk direction. Other directions receive fewer human resources.
A new Ukrainian tactic has also emerged with greater use of FPV drones. It’s been almost a year and a half since the creation of the Unmanned Systems Forces. This has allowed the implementation of several new tactics for strikes on Russian forces. The USF are present along the entire front line and carry out tasks every day.
This has significantly impacted Russia. There are also strikes deep in the rear on Russian logistics. This is not as effective in the Donbas because there are more cities, making it much easier to hide personnel, equipment, and ammunition. However, in the south, for example in the Zaporizhzhia direction, there are vast open fields with few cities, and the Russians have few places to store their equipment. Logistics in the south today is significantly more complex.
Ultimately, it all comes down to the main factors:
- shortage of personnel on both sides, but more so on the Russian side, forcing them to prioritize certain directions;
- new Ukrainian defensive and offensive approaches, which are particularly effective due to the new tactics of drone deployment.
— Russian maps, similar to DeepState, claim that the occupiers control about 5,000 square kilometers more territory than Ukrainian maps show. Why do you think Russia claims such an amount of territory it doesn’t actually possess? Is this done for the domestic audience or to influence the West and intimidate their opponents?
— There is an internal factor. Russia wants to continue saying that it is advancing, even if it’s not true, to show people that it is winning.
As for the external aspect, it is less obvious because in Europe and the USA we have certain knowledge, as well as Ukrainian and neutral sources, that expose Russian lies. But there is another thing that I believe should not be forgotten — the lies within the Russian army itself.
If you look at the settlements that Russia has claimed as targets of its attacks in recent months, they are located much further away than any map shows. Some settlements are not even near the front line. We’re talking about 20, sometimes 25 or even 30 kilometers from the front.
For example, Sviatohirsk is now located 30–35 kilometers from the front line, and Vladimir Putin claimed to have “liberated” this city, which is not true. There is still a civilian population there. There are still military personnel there. Logistics are still operating there. This demonstrates the falsehood of Russian sources.
— In recent months, we have heard that Putin might shift his focus to European countries due to the stalemate in Ukraine. This topic began to be discussed especially sharply after CIA Director John Ratcliffe’s visit to Moscow, where he supposedly warned the Russians against invading European countries. Do you think there is a danger to Europe now?
— I do not see opportunities for a Russian military intervention in the form of a ground invasion of any European country in the coming months. If you look at where the Russian army is now, where its resources and logistics are located, all of this is in Ukraine or around Ukraine.
Currently, they do not pose a direct threat to Europe. They are conducting a sabotage campaign to prepare for the next stage, which may follow Ukraine. Their activities outside Ukraine are aimed at weakening European support.
If they try to do something in Estonia, Latvia, or any other country, they risk a strike on Kaliningrad, which cannot be protected by nuclear deterrence alone. I don’t think it’s a good idea, and I don’t believe Russian command is that reckless. Although we know that in the past they have already conducted very bold invasions, like in Ukraine, with less than 200,000 troops. I do not see the risk of a ground invasion.
However, I think they will carry out diversionary operations against the military industry and energy facilities, because today Europe is facing certain difficulties. For example, in France, there are protests over fuel prices, which are primarily related to the situation in the Middle East, but partly also due to the war against Ukraine. For Russia, this is a good opportunity if it wants to weaken support for Ukraine, especially financial support.
Today the situation is very complicated because Russia is not attacking directly. It uses covert methods — sabotage. Drones fly over the Baltic countries. They fly over Moldova every day. Over Romania, sometimes over Poland.
There is a likelihood that Russia could carry out drone or missile strikes on industrial facilities in Europe supplying Ukraine with ammunition, drones, missile components, or something else. I would say that this is the risk, but I do not currently see the risk of a Russian ground invasion.
— There was information about Russian military ships in the Mediterranean Sea. They were supposedly carrying drones that could be launched at Italy, Spain, and France before elections to influence public opinion. Do you think this could become an effective tool of influence?
— I don’t think so. It was just propaganda because the French president and the Italian side both denied it. Russian troops in Libya, the African Corps, or “Wagner” — I’m not sure who exactly is present there now — but there is no threat of launching drones from Libya on European countries, and any attempt to launch drones from the sea will be immediately targeted by NATO aviation, and every tanker of the Russian “shadow fleet” is under constant monitoring by the Alliance.
The threat is significantly greater for Central and Eastern European countries because they are much closer to Russia. I don’t see what interest Russia would have in bombing French, Spanish ports or other facilities. It would only help Ukraine as it would signal Europe to wake up in defense matters and strengthen support for Ukraine.
— Do you think people in Europe believe that Russia won’t stop if it conquers Ukraine? That it will move further — to Poland, Hungary, further west?
— Yes, this is characteristic of Central and Eastern European countries, primarily the Baltic states, Finland, and Poland, which directly border Russia. Also for Sweden, because the island of Gotland in the Baltic Sea is a strategic priority for NATO, as it could become one of the targets of Russian invasion in the coming years.
Currently, these Eastern European countries really believe that Russia poses a direct threat to their existence. If Ukraine disappears, they will be next. At the same time, there is almost no such feeling today in Greece, Spain, or Italy, which are very pacifist societies.
The Russian threat is not very noticeable there. They often forget how Russia acts in Africa — in Mali, Niger, Sudan, and Libya. Processes are also happening on the southern flank, although usually, only the eastern flank of Europe is mentioned, which is under direct pressure.
But the southern flank is no less dangerous because there are millions of people in Africa who can be involved in these processes. Today the war is ongoing in many areas of the Sahel. If these people start moving north, they will arrive in Spain, Italy, Turkey, Greece.
But today, for example, in France, the situation is about 50-50. Half of the people consider Russia a threat, and the other half are not sure. At the same time, the majority of people in France and generally in Europe still support Ukraine. But this does not mean that they fully understand the threat Russia might pose.
— How do you see the year 2027? Is there a chance that Russia will agree to some arrangement given its battlefield losses, Ukrainian successes, and the economic damage inflicted by Ukraine and western sanctions?
— Today, I don’t see the end of the war in the near future. Russia still believes it can win, and Ukraine believes it cannot lose. So currently both states think they can win the war, gain something, or at least not lose. And they will continue the fight, and today it is Russia continuing the war.
Ukraine obviously wants to stop the war because of human resource issues, because of the economy, as this war is a true catastrophe in terms of human lives and destruction of the country. But Russia does not want to stop because it believes it can continue the offensive.
That’s why the current Ukrainian counter-offensive and defensive actions in the Donbas are very important, as they show the Kremlin: how many years will it take you to capture the Donbas, and then advance to Dnipro, Odesa, and Kharkiv?
I would say that the situation on the front for Ukraine is significantly better than it was before. However, there is the issue of Russian strikes on the energy infrastructure.
The recent Russian missile and drone attacks on Kyiv, especially on energy facilities, are something new. Throughout this summer, they frequently targeted energy facilities — more than 200 or 250 objects per month. Now they are beginning their winter campaign to freeze Ukrainians, as they did last year, but this time they will try to act on a larger scale.
This could also pose a danger to nuclear power plants because some of them may be disconnected from the power grid and temporarily cease operations. And when they need to be restarted, it will take a lot of time.
The year 2027 will likely be marked by attempts to capture Dobropillia and approach Sloviansk. The main question is whether Ukrainians will be able to stop this Russian timeline in Donbas, as they have already managed to stop it in Zaporizhia and even advance.
