1) Russian Offensive in Donetsk Region.
The situation in Kostyantynivka is difficult with a very challenging battlefield, where countering infiltration is not easy. However, efforts are underway, and if everything I’ve heard is implemented, I think the enemy will be stopped around there. As usual, when the Russians manage to break through somewhere, they immediately transfer reserves and increase pressure. We’re seeing this now in this example. But this pressure cannot be compared to what they opposed us with a year ago. I hope everything will work out to make this sector a gray zone.
2) Strikes on Logistics.
This is currently a game-changer, where we are using this opportunity to the maximum. But the enemy is actively countering, and not without successes.
Some sectors are now closed off from Starlink with electronic warfare, and unlike those instances where trailers with antennas are openly hit, these are already camouflaged. Additionally, the “underground gardens” that the Russians are currently building in the second echelon clearly have pits where they will place these electronic warfare devices. While Russia has few such devices and they are very expensive, they are gradually accumulating them. Over time, this will become a problem because if Starlink is taken away, how many drones can we fly on a radio link for 100 km and successfully hit a target? Not that many. The same Hornet, to have such capabilities without Starlink, requires a communication module that costs about $15,000. That’s just the communication module, without the drone. Are we ordering the required number of radio modules through MTD? I don’t know. But I hope the balance in this matter is maintained.
The enemy’s anti-aircraft crews are increasing their effectiveness, and their capabilities to counter our logistics strikes are growing. But not enough to block these opportunities for us. Moreover, there is simply less logistics, and it is difficult to hit a target that is not on the road. Activity in logistics has decreased, the number of drones per hit target is increasing, but we still dominate the air. This all has a strong effect, which should influence point 1 above.
3) Enemy’s Game-Changers.
Unlike us, increasingly dependent on Starlink, the enemy has begun developing their communication. It must be acknowledged that they have made significant progress in building mesh networks in drones. And this is a problem because we have not evolved as quickly in electronic warfare (which, by the way, is as important for our air defense as interceptor drones). Simply put, the investment in electronic warfare and UAVs is very different, which is why it turned out that if UAVs are like a sword, then electronic warfare is like a shield, but the sword for us turned out huge, while the shield is more like a buckler, if using such analogies. They’re working on the problem, and I hope that soon the counteraction to the enemy’s drone mesh networks will reach a new level. Otherwise, we could be in trouble. Because a lot of various stuff is launched at us, if the mesh can increase the efficiency of even what’s launched at us, then oh. Moreover, drones are increasingly equipped with optical navigation systems, object identification, and capture/guidance systems, which the enemy makes simpler and more effective with each iteration, so the latest evolutionary changes in Russian drones should not be underestimated.
4) Results of mid-, deep-strikes. I would like to remind two points.
A) Our strikes (bridges, oil refineries, factories, etc.) do not have an immediate effect. The real impact is visible in weeks or even months. All these are delayed-result strikes. The result we see now is the result of strikes made a month ago. And it already hurts the Russians. But let them wait; the present will soon catch up with them.
B) We have not yet reached the maximum of our capabilities in mid-, deep-strikes. I think the maximum will be towards the end of summer. So there will be a lot of interesting things for the Russians this year, the concept of “we destroy Ukrainian cities, but we are not interested in politics, so why us” will get a significant crack this year. Well, let’s see how ready the Russians are for this.
Photo: General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
