Ukraine received critically important documents from the EU. They describe and detail the list of requirements for Ukraine to be ready for accession. The EU will use these to check if Kyiv has met the membership requirements.
Even if the EU makes a political decision regarding Ukraine’s membership, these criteria will remain relevant. Some of them, the so-called Fundamentals, will need to be met before joining the EU, even in the fastest scenario.
Each criterion has been assigned a number, which Brussels will use for official assessment – initially internal, then public.
For example, criterion IBM 23.3.3 (negotiation chapter 23, Interim benchmark 3, measure 3) states that Ukraine’s success will be evaluated by the “quality of the justice system” (23.3). Criterion CB 5.3 (chapter 5, closing benchmark 3) requires Ukraine to have a reliable history of transparent public procurement.
A positive assessment from the EU is necessary for all indicators. Ukrainian authorities will not be able to simultaneously “repress Poroshenko a little” and talk about the “move to Europe.”
EU criteria are precisely what “European Solidarity” has been insisting on all along, including:
- IBM 23.13 – Freedom of expression, including media freedom and pluralism;
- IBM 23.1.1 Achieving substantial progress in optimizing judicial governance and court operations.
- IBM 23.1.2 Achieving substantial progress in optimizing the prosecutor’s office to increase its efficiency.
- IBM 23.6.1 Strengthening the independence, efficiency, and capacity of specialized anti-corruption bodies.
- IBM 23.6.2 Extending the jurisdiction of NABU to all high-risk public positions.
- IBM 24.3 – Reform of the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI).
- IBM 24.5.3 Strengthening and advancing the reform of the Asset Recovery and Management Agency with significant involvement of independent experts nominated by international partners.
- IBM 24.7.4 Achieving substantial progress in further strengthening the capacity, status, and independence of the Bureau of Economic Security.
- IBM 24.7.5 Achieving substantial progress in reforming the Security Service of Ukraine.
Obviously, Ukrainian authorities, gritting their teeth, will swear allegiance to the European path. However, Zelensky’s statements, which appeared in the information space simultaneously with reports on the EU criteria, are very revealing. These statements reflect the Ukrainian leadership’s inadequate understanding of realities.
In an interview with the BBC, Zelensky said: “It’s a lie that there is more corruption in Ukraine than in other European countries. There is, but it exists in every European country. We should recognize our weak spots but not lose dignity and not claim that we have it, and others don’t. I think we are doing well in fighting it.”
This is yet another confirmation that Zelensky “still hasn’t understood or learned anything.” He said something very similar in 2021, commenting on US President Joseph Biden’s words, stating he is offended when “corruption in Ukraine is talked about in principle.”
Both before the full-scale invasion and now, Zelensky remains a proponent of the well-known statement by Kuchma (at the Lisbon summit in 2000): “Corruption is not a Ukrainian word. It was brought to us, and Ukraine is no exception to the rules that apply worldwide.”
This self-justification was eagerly repeated during Yanukovich’s time. For example, Azarov would insist he “knows the real level of corruption in many countries,… so let’s not exaggerate (the level of corruption in Ukraine)” and that “Europe is labeling Ukrainian corruption and lack of democracy.”
This is bad company. Similar self-justifications are unbecoming of the leader of the Ukrainian state, which must implement the European choice of the Ukrainian people. The fates of Kuchma, Yanukovich, and Azarov aptly illustrate what happens to those who obstruct this choice. And if Kuchma ultimately had the sense not to interfere, the example of Yanukovich and Azarov should be a serious warning for Zelensky.
