Information on current losses of the Russian Federation due to sanctions as of 02/04/2026.
1. Russia’s oil and gas revenues in January nearly halved — the lowest since 2020.
– The oil and gas revenues of Russia’s federal budget sharply decreased by almost half year-on-year in January, falling to the lowest level since July 2020. This sharply increased pressure on the Russian budget, which is critically dependent on raw material revenues.
– According to the Russian Ministry of Finance, in January the budget received only 393.3 billion rubles in oil and gas revenues compared to 447.8 billion rubles in December. The key reasons for the decline were the fall in world oil prices and the strengthening of the ruble, which significantly reduces the ruble revenues of exporters.
– In total, Russia’s oil and gas revenues decreased by 24% in 2025 — to 8.48 trillion rubles. At the same time, the federal budget was implemented with a deficit of 5.6 trillion rubles, which highlights the deepening financial problems of the state.
– For 2026, the Russian authorities plan to receive 8.92 trillion rubles from the sale of oil and gas with total budget revenues exceeding 40 trillion rubles.
– However, the current trend demonstrates that achieving these figures is becoming increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in the ruble exchange rate and unfavorable conditions in global commodity markets — factors that Moscow is less and less able to control.
2. The Russian budget deficit may almost triple in 2026 due to the collapse in oil revenues.
– The Russian government’s budget deficit by the end of 2026 could almost triple compared to official plans amidst a sharp drop in oil revenues, reduced purchases of Russian oil by India, and increasing discounts on Russian resources.
– According to internal calculations by the government analytical center, which are not planned for publication, energy revenues in 2026 may be 18% lower than those budgeted.
– In this case, the deficit will grow to 3.5–4.4% of GDP instead of the planned 1.6% of GDP, and expenditures will exceed the plan by 4.1–8.4%. Total budget revenues could decrease by 6% — to 37.9 trillion rubles.
– In January 2026, Russia’s oil and gas revenues already fell by half — to 393.3 billion rubles, the lowest since July 2020. Additional pressure comes from Russian oil trading at a discount of over 20% to global benchmarks, and a 45% strengthening of the ruble over the past year reduces ruble tax revenues.
– Estimates were made even before President Trump’s statement about India’s halting purchases of Russian oil, but even in the baseline scenario a 30% drop in Indian imports was assumed. India was previously a key market for Russian oil after losing Europe.
– Russia’s fiscal reserves amount to 4.1 trillion rubles, but at the current rate of declining revenues, they could be largely exhausted within a year. According to Alfa Investment, the budget could fall short by about 3 trillion rubles, meaning the use of up to 73% of liquid reserves. Russian VTB predicts reserves will shrink to 1.6 trillion rubles in 2026.
3. The Russian federal budget for 2026 is increasingly vulnerable to currency and oil price fluctuations.
– Its stability is effectively based not on the dollar price of oil but on the ruble cost per barrel, and the strengthening of the ruble amidst a weaker dollar works against the treasury’s revenues.
– The basic budget parameters include the Urals price at $59 per barrel, which corresponds to approximately 5.4 thousand rubles. However, with a lower dollar price or a stronger ruble, the ruble revenue sharply decreases.
– If the actual price approaches $50 per barrel, the budget will lose up to 1,000 rubles per barrel of oil. In such a scenario, the loss of revenue could reach 0.5–0.7% of GDP even without considering additional negative effects on the exchange rate and tax base. The pressure on the oil market is increased by the growth of global production and geopolitical uncertainty, particularly around Venezuela, Iran, and risks in the Strait of Hormuz.
– A slight reduction in the Urals discount to Brent could partially ease the situation, but it will be insufficient if the ruble cost per barrel does not maintain the budgeted level.
– In summary, oil revenues, crucial for funding Russia’s expenditures, remain under increasing pressure, heightening the risk of a budget deficit in 2026.
4. The Russian government has acknowledged the actual halt in investment growth in the economy.
– For the first nine months of 2025, the increase in investments was only 0.5%, and by the end of the year, the figure likely approached zero. This sharply contrasts with previous expectations: just in autumn, a growth of 1.7% was forecasted, but in the third quarter, the first annual decline in investments in five years was recorded — 3.1%. The official forecast for 2026 also predicts a decline — by 0.5%.
– The largest declines were in key areas — infrastructure, machinery, and equipment, where investments fell by 15% yearly. This indicates a halt in the expansion of production capacity and the risk of its further contraction.
– The main source of investments — companies’ own funds — is sharply decreasing. From January to September, business profits fell by 7.7%, and factoring in inflation, the real decline reached 15%. High interest rates force companies to postpone new projects, and the cost of credit remains unacceptable for investment in 2026.
– Under current conditions, investment activity in the RF is practically paralyzed, increasing the risks of prolonged economic stagnation.
5. Russian “Severstal” recorded a sharp deterioration in financial results by the end of 2025.
– The net profitability of the metallurgical company decreased almost fivefold — to about 32 billion rubles. Revenue fell by 14% yearly and amounted to 712.9 billion rubles. EBITDA dropped by 42% — to 137.6 billion rubles, and profitability decreased to 19% (minus 10 percentage points).
– The company’s net debt at the end of the year reached 21.67 billion rubles.
– The company explains the collapse in net profit by a sharp reduction in operating results — more than halved, to 90.2 billion rubles, and a one-time loss from the impairment of long-term assets in the resource segment.
– The financial decline is accompanied by a 15% drop in selling prices for metal products, reflecting weak demand in the domestic market and a general deterioration in the market environment.
– Even without considering the “paper” impairment of assets, key indicators point to a systemic weakening of the positions of one of the largest metallurgical producers in the RF.
6. Deliveries of Russian maritime oil remain formally stable, but the export structure increasingly indicates difficulties with sales and loss of key markets.
– Over the four weeks leading up to February 1, Russia exported an average of 3.27 million barrels per day, roughly 600,000 barrels per day less than at the peak before the end of the year.
– In January, China once again became the largest buyer of Russian seaborne oil, while shipments to India sharply declined. The flow to Indian ports dropped to about 1.12 million barrels per day from 1.2 million barrels in December, the lowest level since November 2022. This undermines Russia’s position in a market that became critically important after 2022 for maintaining oil revenues.
– The reduction in supplies to India is partially compensated by China: in January, approximately 1.65 million barrels per day were unloaded at Chinese ports — the highest since March 2024. At the same time, such reorientation only increases Moscow’s dependence on a limited circle of buyers and makes exports vulnerable to political agreements and sanction pressure.
– An additional signal of problems is the growth of Russian oil stocks at sea. The volume of crude oil stored in tankers has exceeded 140 million barrels for the third week in a row, and from the end of August to mid-January, sea stocks increased by about 60 million barrels.
– This indicates difficulties in finding buyers and unloading delays. Amid potential compliance by India with US agreements to reduce Russian oil purchases, risks to Russian exports are growing.
– Even with stable overall volumes, an increasing share of shipments “hang” at sea or are redirected, raising costs, reducing export efficiency, and weakening Russia’s oil revenue budget.
7. In January, oil supplies from Russia to India sharply decreased — by 3.5 times compared to last year. This is reported by S&P Global Commodities at Sea analysts.
– While Russian Urals tankers previously queued up at Indian ports, this flow has now virtually evaporated. The reason for the decline is not so much political pressure from the US as a cold economic calculation.
– The European Union closed a loophole that allowed Russian oil, after being processed in India, to return to the European market as “refined” oil products.
– For a long time, the scheme worked flawlessly: Russian raw materials were transformed into gasoline and diesel at Indian refineries, which sold seamlessly in Europe.
– After Brussels decided to ban the import of oil products made from Russian oil, the economic sense of this model vanished instantly. India simply cannot consume such volumes internally, and alternative markets are absent.
– For the Russian budget, this is a serious blow. Back in 2025, India absorbed about 73% of the Urals export blend, effectively acting as the main hub to circumvent restrictions.
– January 2026 became a moment of truth: New Delhi is no longer a global transshipment point for Russian oil. A complete refusal by India to use Russian energy resources is not expected, but the previous volumes can be forgotten.
– The question of where to now dispose of excess Russian oil remains open — and increasingly painful for Moscow.
8. Estonia detained a container ship heading to Russia on suspicion of smuggling.
– Estonian law enforcement detained a container ship heading to Russia as part of intensified maritime control in the Baltic region.
– The ship, under the flag of the Bahamas, was stopped in Estonian territorial waters by the tax and customs service. According to Estonian authorities, the container ship was traveling from Ecuador to St. Petersburg and may be linked to illegal supplies to Russia.
– Although the ship is not formally part of the so-called Russian “shadow fleet” and is not under EU sanctions, the fact of its detention underscores the growing suspicion of any logistic routes towards Russia.
– Tallinn emphasizes that the incident is not related to the sanctions regime but is part of standard customs and law enforcement procedures.
– At the same time, the situation demonstrates that even “clean” ships from a legal standpoint, operating on Russian routes, are increasingly under the watchful eye of European services amid Russia’s systemic attempts to circumvent restrictions and leverage global trade for its own interests.
Collage: TSN
