Information on the current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 28.02.2026.
1. Russian regions are entering the fifth year of war with an unprecedented budgetary imbalance.
– By the end of 2025, the cumulative deficit of regional budgets increased 3.6 times to 1.478 trillion rubles — this is the worst indicator for the entire observation period.
– Despite the formal growth in regional revenues to 22.6 trillion rubles (+4% y/y), expenditures grew much faster — to 24.1 trillion rubles (+9%). The imbalance has become systemic: 74 regions ended the year with a deficit compared to 50 the previous year.
– The largest absolute gap was recorded in Moscow — 299 billion rubles. The rapid expansion of the “financial gap” indicates an increase in the burden on regional budgets in the context of military spending, a decline in investment activity, and structural constraints due to sanctions.
– The formal increase in revenues no longer compensates for the accelerated growth of expenditures, which increases the risks of debt pressure and the dependence of Russian entities on federal transfers.
2. Consumer sentiment in Russia has shifted back to a pessimistic zone — for the first time since late 2022.
– The Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) in February decreased from 101 to 98 points. A level below 100 points indicates a predominance of pessimistic assessments. The indicator was last in this zone in December 2022 amid the first large-scale sanction shocks and a sharp drop in real incomes.
– All components of the index worsened — both current economic situation assessments and future expectations. Respondents also have a poorer view of conditions for making large purchases, indicating increased household caution.
– The dynamics of the CSI reflect the accumulation of structural problems: high inflation, expensive loans, ruble depreciation, and uncertainty regarding income.
– The decline in consumer expectations creates an additional risk for retail turnover and domestic demand, which remains one of the few drivers of economic activity under sanction constraints.
3. A chain of non-payments is growing in the Russian economy: debts are hitting records.
– The real sector of Russia increasingly relies on partners. The volume of liabilities is growing, and the share of overdue payments is also increasing, indicating systemic liquidity problems.
– By early 2026, the agricultural sector accumulated 3,052.4 billion rubles of debt, increasing its liabilities by almost 10%. The coal industry has approached the mark of 1.5 trillion rubles, and the rate of debt growth is raising concerns even among industry officials.
– The most troubling situation is in the manufacturing industry. There, about 1.53 trillion rubles, or three-quarters of the debt to suppliers, has already become overdue.
– Essentially, companies are postponing settlements, shifting financial pressure onto counterparts. This dynamic creates a domino effect. When companies widely stop paying each other, “clots” in the payment chains can occur, potentially destroying even financially stable enterprises — merely because they found themselves at the end of the delay queue.
– The shortage of working capital forces businesses to effectively lend to partners involuntarily. Against this backdrop, the risk of returning to the semi-forgotten practices of offsets and bartering is increasing.
– In such conditions, the advantage goes not to the most efficient producer, but to the one who can delay fulfilling financial obligations the longest, which is a troubling signal for the entire economic system of Russia.
4. Russia has been linked to at least 151 acts of sabotage and disruption in Europe since the start of the full-scale war against Ukraine. These data are presented in a report by the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), based in the Netherlands.
– According to researchers, Russian special services are actively recruiting individuals in EU countries for arson, infrastructure sabotage, acts of vandalism, and destabilization attempts — primarily in countries that most actively support Ukraine.
– The document discusses operations for which responsibility has been confirmed as a result of completed investigations or the emergence of convincing evidence.
– The authors emphasize that the actual number of incidents may be higher, as establishing involvement occurs with a delay.
– Since last summer alone, an additional 12 cases have been identified. Notably, in Germany in 2025, 320 sabotage attempts were recorded, including numerous instances of unidentified drones appearing near airports and military bases.
– Similar incidents have also been noted in Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway, Denmark, and the Baltic states.
5. The cost of chartering oil supertankers has sharply increased amid escalating security risks in the Persian Gulf, complicating Russia’s attempts to redirect crude oil exports to Asian markets.
– The daily rental rate for VLCC class tankers on the benchmark Middle East – China route has exceeded $200,000, which is 600% higher than at the beginning of the year, when it was less than $29,000.
– Such levels have not been recorded since the start of the pandemic, when a supply glut and a price war led to massive oil stockpiling at sea. According to the Baltic Exchange, the earnings for shipments on this route have almost tripled since the beginning of the year, reaching $151,208 per day — the highest level since 2020.
– The increase in rates reflects higher insurance premiums and war risks in the region, through which a significant portion of the world’s oil supply passes.
– For Russia, the rise in freight costs creates additional financial pressure. After a sharp reduction in India’s import of Russian oil, Moscow is attempting to increase Urals deliveries to China, which requires longer routes and the use of larger vessels.
– However, the sevenfold increase in rates effectively nullifies the potential effect of scaling up shipments.
6. Deliveries of Russian oil to India in January sharply fell to the lowest level since June 2022.
– According to Argus Media, volumes dropped by 40% compared to December and more than halved year-on-year — to 859,000 barrels per day (3.68 million tonnes).
– In 2025, India already reduced purchases of Russian oil by 5% — to 84.86 million tonnes. In December alone, imports from the Russian Federation decreased by 4% year-on-year and by 25% compared to November — to 5.78 million tonnes.
– In January, Russia’s share in Indian imports fell to 21.2% — the lowest level since October 2022, when New Delhi only began actively increasing purchases amid the full-scale war against Ukraine.
– The key factor in the decline was the increased sanctions and political pressure from the United States, as well as India’s desire to secure a favorable trade agreement with Washington.
– As a result, the country is quickly shifting to alternative suppliers. Saudi Arabia increased its share in Indian imports to 55% and regained its position as the main supplier. According to estimates by the analytical company Kpler, February shipments from the kingdom may reach 1–1.1 million barrels per day — the maximum since 2019.
– Additionally, India resumed purchases of Venezuelan oil, ordering at least 6 million barrels for delivery in April.
– For Russia, this means losing one of its key sales markets, which became critically important for maintaining oil revenues after 2022. The reduction in share in the strategic Asian direction intensifies competition for buyers and limits Moscow’s ability to compensate for losses in the European market.
