Information on current Russian losses due to sanctions as of 03/02/2026.
1. Ukrainian drones attacked one of Russia’s largest oil terminals on the Black Sea.
– On the night of March 2, drones attacked Novorossiysk. The main target was the Sheskharis oil terminal at the port of Novorossiysk. A fire was reported in the area following the attack.
– Sheskharis is one of the largest complexes for transshipment of oil and oil products in southern Russia and holds strategic importance for the country’s export infrastructure in the Black Sea direction. A significant portion of Russian oil supplies passes through it.
– The Ukrainian side previously claimed that the terminal is used to supply Russian military groups conducting combat operations against Ukraine. The facility is viewed as a logistics element supporting Russian military operations.
– This is not the first attack on the port’s infrastructure. In November 2025, drones also struck facilities in Novorossiysk, resulting in damage to an oil base, one of the piers, and a container terminal.
2. Industrial production in Russia in January 2026 decreased by 0.8% year-on-year after a 3.7% increase in December 2025.
– This is the first decline since February of last year, indicating the exhaustion of short-term recovery at the end of the year.
– Formally, the decline is attributed to calendar factors, but results from business surveys point to a deeper issue. After the December surge, production dynamics returned to zero or negative values, and civilian sectors remain stagnant.
– The slowdown confirms the structural weakness of the economy, which is increasingly reliant on military orders and does not generate sustainable growth in peaceful sectors.
3. Russian industry is slowing down again: plans for production cuts prevail.
– Russian industrial enterprises in February lost hope for the so-called “economic thaw” and once again revised their production plans towards reduction.
– Now, the number of companies planning to decrease production exceeds those expecting to increase it. Two factors preceded these negative expectations.
– First, in January, the Russian manufacturing industry showed a 3% decline year-on-year, indicating deepening stagnation in the sector.
– Second, there is a persistent decline in the profitability of enterprises, undermining their financial stability and restraining investment activity.
– Reduced profitability means fewer funds for modernization, equipment upgrades, and production expansion.
– As a result, a vicious cycle is forming: production cuts reduce the supply of goods, which in the long term, may create additional pro-inflationary risks for the Russian economy.
4. Oil sharply rose — shares of Russian companies went up.
– Brent oil prices jumped by about 13% to around $82 per barrel in early trading amid escalation in the Middle East.
– The market is factoring in risks of supply disruptions due to potential shipping restrictions in the Strait of Hormuz. Increased volatility and instability in the oil market are expected.
– Amid rising oil prices, shares of Russian oil and gas companies also increased.
5. Moscow does not hide its satisfaction with the possible spike in global oil prices amid the conflict around Iran.
– Despite losing a political ally after the death of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the Kremlin sees the Middle East escalation primarily as an opportunity to replenish the military budget.
– The closure of the Strait of Hormuz — one of the key routes for transporting oil and liquefied gas — triggered speculation about a sharp increase in prices.
– Currently, Brent oil is trading around $78 per barrel (peaking at $83), while WTI is approximately $67. Meanwhile, expectations of over $100 per barrel are already being voiced in Russian circles if the region’s destabilization continues.
– An additional factor is the increased US control over Venezuelan supplies. In this scenario, major importers, including India and China, may further shift towards Russian raw materials.
– For Moscow, which is entering its fifth year of full-scale war against Ukraine and facing budget pressure and sanctions, this would mean additional foreign currency revenue.
– Notably, at the official level, Russia publicly condemns strikes on Iran and warns of a “disbalance” in global markets.
– However, simultaneously, in the pro-government information space, there are frank assessments that the reduction in Iranian supply benefits the Kremlin, as it strengthens Russia’s position as one of the few major exporters capable of quickly increasing deliveries.
– Moscow considers any oil shock as an opportunity to partially offset losses from sanctions and finance further aggression.
– The dependence of Russian finances on external crises only underscores the vulnerability of an economic model that relies on commodity rent and military expenditures.
6. Russia accused of buying real estate near military bases throughout Europe.
– Kremlin-linked structures and agents are purchasing properties near military bases, ports, and strategic infrastructure in several countries on the continent.
– This involves the acquisition of dachas, warehouses, apartments, abandoned buildings, land plots, and even islands in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
– According to intelligence estimates, these properties might be used as observation posts, bases for sabotage training, or covert equipment storage.
– In several cases, intelligence services suspect the presence of drones, explosives, and weapons at these locations, as well as the activities of undercover agents. This is part of a hybrid strategy aimed at destabilizing NATO member states without formally transitioning to open aggression, which would automatically trigger collective defense mechanisms.
– Potential targets of such actions include transportation infrastructure, energy, and communication systems. The systemic acquisition of assets near strategic objects is seen as another tool for Moscow to exert pressure on European states amid the prolonged war against Ukraine and Russia’s growing isolation.
7. Due to the escalation around Iran, India may partially revert to more active purchases of Russian oil.
– Indian state refineries and government officials held emergency consultations due to supply risks related to the blockage of the Strait of Hormuz. Up to half of the country’s oil imports are under threat.
– India, the third-largest oil importer in the world, is considering the prompt use of Russian shipments already near its waters.
– As of the end of last week, about 9.5 million barrels of Russian oil were located in Asian waters.
– Formally, this is a temporary crisis solution, but for Moscow, it creates an additional “window of opportunity.” India’s reserves, including commercial and strategic stocks, are estimated to last about two weeks. Meanwhile, Indian officials are insisting on negotiating greater flexibility with Washington regarding sanction limitations.
– For Russia, the potential reorientation of Indian demand would mean short-term support for export revenues at a time when the budget faces increasing pressure from war and sanctions.
– However, such dependence on external crises once again demonstrates the structural weakness of the Russian economy, which is forced to rely on geopolitical shocks for the stabilization of oil revenues.
8. Chinese refineries are shielded from the impact of the conflict with Iran thanks to significant Iranian and Russian supplies.
– Short-term disruptions due to the conflict surrounding Iran are unlikely to significantly impact refining thanks to record deliveries of Iranian and Russian oil, as well as large-scale accumulation of state reserves.
– Chinese refineries could receive fundamentally new purchasing conditions if a review of sanctions against Iranian oil is possible. A scenario is being discussed in the market where, if the U.S. gains control over Iranian oil exports, some restrictions might be lifted.
– Currently, Iran accounts for 11.5% of China’s seaborne imports, Russia 10.5%. Both suppliers compete for Chinese independent refineries, offering significant discounts.
– In February, Iranian oil exports were estimated at 2–2.15 million barrels per day — the peak in several years. The sanction status allowed Iran to sell crude with a discount of up to $11 per barrel to ICE Brent, making it especially attractive for “teapots.”
– If Iranian oil loses its sanction discount or receives a formal relaxation of restrictions, its price will inevitably rise, and supply channels will become more transparent.
– In this case, Iran will be able to more actively return to the broader Asian market, no longer limited to semi-shadow schemes. This will intensify competition for China — a key sales market for Russia after losing a significant part of its European direction.
– For Moscow, the consequences may be negative. Russian oil remains competitive precisely due to discounts and geopolitical isolation, which forces it to sell crude at a discount.
– If Iranian exports normalize, China will have more options for diversification, weakening Russia’s negotiating positions.
– Additional pressure may manifest in a forced increase in discounts on Russian grades or in the loss of some volumes.
– Thus, the potential removal of sanctions from Iranian oil poses a risk for Russia of losing the price advantage and further narrowing margins in its main export market.
Illustration generated by AI
