Information on the current losses of Russia due to sanctions as of 18.02.2026.
1. Ukraine attacked a Russian defense industry facility in Chuvashia for the second time since the beginning of winter.
– On the morning of February 18, drones struck in Cheboksary — in the areas of the village Yaushi and Novoyuzhny, where the “VNIIRE-Progress” enterprise is located.
– An energy facility near the enterprise, which had already been targeted in December 2025, was hit. “VNIIRE-Progress” is part of “ABS Electro” and produces radio electronics for the Russian army — including “Kometa” antennas for protecting “Geran” drones from electronic warfare, as well as satellite navigation receivers for “Kalibr” and “Iskander” missiles.
– The repeated attack on the enterprise indicates the vulnerability of Russia’s defense industry facilities even deep within its territory and creates additional risks for the production of critical components of Russian missile and drone systems.
2. The “hole” in Russia’s budget system exceeded 8 trillion rubles.
– The cumulative deficit of Russia’s budget system at the end of 2025 reached a record 8.291 trillion rubles, according to data from the Ministry of Finance of Russia. Over the year, the gap increased 2.6 times — by 5.696 trillion rubles.
– The revenues of budgets at all levels increased by only 6.5%, while expenditures jumped by 13%. Two-thirds of the deficit fell on the federal budget — 5.625 trillion rubles, five times the initial plan. Regions ended the year with a record “hole” in two decades of 1.5 trillion rubles.
– The deficit of the Social and Pension Insurance Fund exceeded the plan by almost three times — 1.078 trillion rubles. Another 80.7 billion rubles are lacking in the OMS fund, which finances state medicine.
– It is noteworthy that the gap is growing despite increased tax pressure. Last year, the authorities raised the profit tax, introduced a progressive income tax scale and expected to receive more than 3 trillion rubles in additional revenues.
– However, taxes are increasing again this year: VAT has been raised to 22%, a tax reform for small businesses has been launched, and new fees and increased tax burdens for certain industries are being prepared.
3. Russia is facing a wave of corporate defaults.
– The slowdown in the economy, declining profits, and high central bank interest rate in Russia have triggered a payment crisis in the Russian debt market.
– In January 2026 alone, companies failed to meet bond obligations 51 times — concerning coupons, redemptions, offers, and covenants. This is twice as much as in January of the previous year.
– In just one week, ten companies from various sectors — from engineering and logistics to retail and agribusiness — went into default.
– Last year in Russia, 25 bond defaults were recorded — a record since 2022.
– Despite the central bank starting to lower the rate after a sharp increase to the highest levels in two decades, the situation for businesses has hardly improved: market rates on bonds have remained high for six months.
– To retain investors, companies are increasingly switching to monthly coupon payments instead of quarterly or annual payments.
– However, the rising cost of debt servicing along with deteriorating payment discipline among clients only increases the risk of new payment failures.
4. Russian “AvtoVAZ” cuts sales plans due to declining demand.
– Russia’s largest automaker, “AvtoVAZ,” reduced its sales plan for February by 15% due to weak demand for Lada cars.
– Even taking the reduced plan into account, the company is not yet meeting the expected dynamics. In January, “AvtoVAZ” sold only 19.6 thousand cars, and in February aims to sell over 20 thousand, although the market shows pessimistic trends.
– Expectations for a revival of the car market at the beginning of 2026 have not materialized. An additional blow was the sharp decrease in car loans, used by about two-thirds of buyers.
– Even a reduction in the key rate from 16% to 15.5% could not stimulate demand.
– The situation indicates further cooling of the Russian car market and issues with consumer activity amid expensive loans and the overall economic decline.
5. Drilling rates in Russia have fallen to a three-year low, creating additional risks for the oil and gas sector and undermining prospects for stable production.
– In 2025, approximately 29.1 thousand km of operational wells were drilled in Russia — 3.4% less than the previous year. After record figures at the beginning of the year, activity began to decrease as early as June, and in December drilling volumes were about 16% lower than in December 2024.
– The reduction is associated with the global drop in oil prices, an increasing discount on Russian raw materials, and the strengthening of the ruble, which reduces export revenue.
– Additional pressure comes from sanctions that limit access to technology and complicate the implementation of new projects. In this context, production in Russia has been declining for the second consecutive month.
– The slowdown in drilling exacerbates structural problems in the industry and increases the risk of further production decline, especially given the depletion of old fields and uncertainty regarding future decisions within the OPEC+ framework.
6. Crude oil exports from Russia in the first half of February increased to an average of 3.39 million barrels per day.
– A formal increase in shipments is occurring against the backdrop of escalating Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries and disruptions in pipeline supplies to Hungary and Slovakia.
– In February, strikes targeted oil facilities in Volgograd, Ukhta, and the Ilsky refinery in Kuban. Damage to infrastructure is forcing companies to redirect crude oil flows for export, as some processing capacities are operating unstably.
– Thus, the increase in exports is partially explained by domestic issues rather than production expansion. Meanwhile, production in January decreased by almost 300,000 barrels per day compared to the level allowed under OPEC agreements, indicating structural limitations of the industry and difficulties in maintaining stable production volumes.
– China increased its import of Russian oil to 2 million barrels per day during the first two weeks of February. More shipments of Urals are being redirected from India, which is reducing its purchases.
– Almost all oil from Pacific and Arctic ports is also heading to the Chinese market.
– This concentration of supplies increases Moscow’s dependency on one buyer and limits its ability to maneuver under sanction pressures and price discounts.
7. Russia attempted to engage the USA with a large-scale “deal of the century.”
– In a note prepared for the Russian Security Council ahead of the meeting in Alaska last August, it was proposed to present Trump with an economic cooperation package worth $12 trillion. However, the promised benefits seem more like political marketing than an economically justified project.
– Alongside negotiations to end the war, Russia was promoting a business track — access to Arctic oil and gas, rare earth metal deposits, infrastructure, and energy megaprojects.
– In Moscow, they tried to present this as a “huge prize” for American companies in case of easing sanctions. However, calculations indicate much more modest scales.
– Even assuming a return to import levels of 2021 and a fantastic US share of 50% in supplies, the total annual flows (not profits) would amount to about $340 billion. To achieve the declared $12 trillion, such volumes would have to be maintained for decades without new crises and sanctions, which seems unlikely under current conditions.
– The Arctic projects are also accompanied by significant risks. Most geological assessments are based on Soviet research, infrastructure is absent or requires hundreds of billions of dollars in investments, and implementation is complicated by sanctions, technological constraints, and high logistical costs.
– An additional factor is China’s dominance in the supply and processing chains of rare earth metals.
– A separate problem is the institutional environment: the sanctions regime includes tens of thousands of restrictions, some of which cannot be quickly lifted.
– Even in the case of a political decision, investors will face the risk of sanction reinstatement, the judicial system’s lack of transparency, and the increasing role of the state in the economy. In the end, the “deal for $12 trillion” is largely an exaggeration.
– Potential benefits for specific players are possible, but it does not guarantee a systemic economic breakthrough for the US. On the other hand, for Russia, opening Western markets would mean financial respite and partial recovery of economic potential, which has long-term geopolitical consequences.
– Economic reset of relations would provide the Russian economy with additional resources for recovery and potential revanchist policy. Therefore, any US president guided by national interests should evaluate such proposals without illusions and considering the political risks.
8. In the EU, resistance to sanctions against ports associated with Russia’s “shadow fleet” is growing.
– The European Commission’s initiative to restrict access of Russian “shadow fleet” tankers to ports in the EU and third countries has faced resistance from certain member states. This may weaken the 20th sanctions package being prepared for the anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
– Several governments have raised objections to restrictions on ports in Georgia and Indonesia. Italy and Hungary are concerned about potential sanctions against the Georgian port of Kulevi, which also receives gas from Azerbaijan — an important supplier for Europe.
– Greece and Malta are doubtful about the advisability of restrictions against the Indonesian port of Karimun. Both ports were proposed to be included in the sanctions list due to operations with Russian oil.
– If some restrictions are eased or blocked, it could give Moscow additional opportunities to bypass oil sanctions through alternative logistics.
– Discussions are ongoing, and a final decision on the sanctions package has not yet been made.
9. The EU has begun discussing a complete ban on the import of Russian steel.
– Discussions have started in the European Union regarding a total halt on the import of Russian steel. Although the supply of finished steel products from Russia was banned in 2022, billets continue to arrive — about 3 million tons per year worth approximately €1.7 billion.
– Belgium, Italy, Czechia, and Denmark state that they cannot yet completely abandon Russian billets used in major construction projects. Meanwhile, the European Parliament insists on a full embargo.
– Negotiations between lawmakers and EU countries are set to begin next week.
– According to Swedish MEP Karin Karlsbro, the EU “has not done everything possible to limit Putin’s military budget.” She called the Russian steel industry the “backbone of the war” and part of the “Russian war machine.”
– If the full ban is enacted, it would mean the loss for Russia of yet another billion-euro market in Europe and further narrowing of export opportunities for the metallurgical sector.
