February.
Two months of winter are behind us. The harshest month is left, which will definitely bring challenges, as it always does. But the year has started, we’ve somehow crawled through January. Some mnemonic knots can be made.
No matter how the negotiations develop, no matter how the situation with the shelling changes in the coming frosty days, there are things that should not be overlooked.
1. To begin with, it makes sense for everyone to decide on the “modality” (a good word, few can articulate its exact meaning, but it gives some intuitive hints) of assessments.
Let me explain with an almost perfect example that unexpectedly came from women’s tennis.
How to evaluate Elina Svitolina’s performance at the concluding Australian Open in Melbourne?
A) One could say that she lost in the semifinals and missed the chance to win her first Grand Slam tournament. And that would be a bitter truth.
B) But one could also say that Svitolina started this season brilliantly. She won the tournament in Auckland without losing a single set and reached the semifinals in Melbourne (top 4 best in the world), beating two Russians. As a result, she earned decent prize money and by January had already achieved her goal for the year – returning to the top 10 of the WTA rankings. These are solid facts.
Moreover.
C) People who understand this sport agree that Svitolina is showcasing excellent tennis. Which is promising in terms of achievements throughout the year.
But even more so.
D) Svitolina lost to the world number one – Belarusian Aryna Sabalenka. To whom we feel rather negative than positive. In the tournament final, Sabalenka, being the favorite, lost while leading 3:0 in the final set. Which gives us a certain moral satisfaction.
E) However, Sabalenka lost to a Russian!
F) But not just a Russian – former Russian Elena Rybakina, who with the efforts of billionaire Bulat Utemuratov changed her citizenship in 2018 and represents Kazakhstan, winning first Wimbledon, and now AO for her new country (Tokayev has already congratulated her).
G) Russians are whining that they “didn’t see her potential,” and attempt to remind that she kept her Russian passport, “lives in Moscow” (Kazakh officials insist she’s registered in Astana), and so on. Rybakina herself ends posts with the phrase “Alğa, Qazaqstan!” and publicly and seemingly sincerely thanks Kazakhstan and Kazakh fans for their support.
Now decide which of the above is significant, what can be discarded, and on what basis you will personally form an assessment of Svitolina’s performance.
And this is just tennis…
Now extrapolate to everything happening. The war, winter, energy, the world situation, prospects, etc. Facts won’t change. But the context you place them in, and your attitude towards them, are variables. Considering facts in isolation or in some connection – that is always a choice.
The main thing is to ensure that variables don’t distort (as this may lead to errors, including fatal ones) and at the same time don’t drain or burn out internal resources. This allows for seeing different options and maneuvering in situations that objectively should have already deteriorated.
2. Observing what is happening in the rear, we can state that our compatriots are showing very decent tennis!
Despite obvious problems, the Ukrainian rear does not provide Putin with the negotiating arguments he clearly anticipated by this point. The Russians will likely try to increase the pressure even more, but as of now, they have already started discussing the scenario of “what to do if the Ukrainians don’t break this winter?”
3. The main priority remains the situation on the front.
Objective facts and evidence from various sectors indicate that the overall dynamics have slightly decreased; however, the pressure from the Russians has not eased.
The decrease in intensity is linked both to significant losses of the occupying forces in December 2025, as they pushed forward trying to execute plans under favorable weather conditions, and to the onset of colder weather. As a result, the Russian troops are taking short pauses for regrouping, slightly changing tactics, but they are still advancing over their own fallen.
For example, in the repeatedly “captured” Kupiansk, instead of chaotic and fruitless attempts to “restore the situation” with suicidal assaults on narrow segments, they have switched to increasing pressure around the entire perimeter of our troops’ control zone on the left bank of the Oskil. That means there will be more pressure. However, to maintain it, they need to deploy additional forces, which would either have to be pulled from other sections or some other reserve plans would need to be revised.
Among the latest highlights: the Ukrainian Defense Forces eliminated a TOR-M1 air defense system in the temporarily occupied territory of the Luhansk region and an Osa air defense system in the temporarily occupied territory of the Zaporizhzhia region. Additionally, the Russians lost at least one aircraft.
There is less information about deep strikes, but medium-range strikes continue against warehouses, transport, locations, and enemy troop concentrations. As well as valuable military equipment, primarily various air defense elements (radars, launchers, etc.).
In January alone, the Ukrainian Armed Forces disabled 9,500 Russian occupiers (around 5,000 killed). This is less than the record figures of December. But cumulatively over 2 months, the Ukrainian Armed Forces eliminated 21,500 Russian soldiers (more than 11,000 killed). This is approximately one-third of the confirmed Russian losses.
Thus, over two winter months, Russian army combat losses amount to around 60-62 thousand people, of which about 30 thousand are killed. Plus, some non-combat losses: suicides, drugs, accidents, mishandling of weapons, incidents, illnesses, and deserters. Overall, the cumulative losses of Russian troops at around 35 thousand per month, due to the Ukrainian Defense Forces, have already become a reality.
The stated plan to increase this figure to 50 thousand is justified but, of course, requires a series of measures.
I emphasize that the federal budget of the Russian Federation for 2026 includes compensation for 160,000 PLANNED burials of regular soldiers (not counting various special categories). Currently, the level of Russian losses is slightly above (by ~10%) their plan. If the losses increase, the Kremlin will have to review not only the budget (a consequence) but also approaches to personnel recruitment (aiming to attract about 410,000 people in 2026). And make decisions.
4. Remember last winter.
In February, Russians significantly intensified strikes on the rear, resulting in more civilian casualties, and there was comprehensive informational pressure. It was intense all over, not just from Moscow. The basic reason—the roughly six-month military cycle moved into a downward phase.
The Russian troops did not achieve their goals, but they exhausted most of their offensive potential. They needed time for regrouping, replenishing, and adjusting objectives. It is at such a moment that a window for negotiations opens.
While still head of the GUR, Kyrylo Budanov said that space for dialogue would arise in February. How the dialogue will end is another question. But currently, Russian troops are reaching (or have reached) the peak of the cycle, exhausted significant potential, and are entering a correction phase (approximately until April) before the next possible cycle.
This raises the traditional question—will Putin decide to continue for another six months? This implies combat actions until the US elections.
In the fall of 2025, Trump stated that the Russian economy is in a difficult position, Putin is not ready to make concessions, but “we’ll see in six months.” This is roughly the end of February-March.
Thus, a period of intensive discussions objectively arises, accompanied by pressure on the front (conditionally descending), strikes on the rear (ascending), and psychological pressure (ascending).
As I have repeatedly written, the practical task is not to crumble by April, so that Russia and the USA do not force at the negotiating table what Putin cannot obtain on the front.
5. What must be considered.
The nature of warfare is changing due to the total penetration of drones. This affects traditional cycles. Trend #1 in the Russian army is the scaling of drone forces (which they plan to bring to a colossal number—165,000 people).
For this, they are largely copying Ukrainian approaches, including creating funnels to engage the civilian sector. The wooden hierarchical Russian army is clearly adapting in some parts.
Last week, the Russian Ministry of Defense, together with the “People’s Front” movement and with the participation of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, launched another network project “Voentech.” The goal is to accelerate the introduction of innovations in the defense industry complex. To catch up with Ukraine in terms of military creativity, but to surpass them in scale.
This background story with drones may change the nature of the preparation period for a new offensive cycle. Scaling will become more noticeable by the end of spring. This process may become the drop that motivates the Kremlin to attempt another offensive. Some hawks will surely see it as a chance for a breakthrough.
But the drone topic is in one way or another related to Russia’s international contacts. Russia remains heavily dependent. How this will unfold—there are options.
6. Regarding the situation inside Russia—I won’t go into detail. Much has already been written, and there’s a lot of good content online.
The general narrative: against the backdrop of the apparent worsening economic situation (which is far from catastrophic but should cause concern in the Kremlin), the already incurred and prospective long-term losses of Russia become increasingly clear. Which inevitably raises the question—how much longer to continue if there is no breakthrough?
For a specific Putin or a hypothetical Patrushev, such a question may not arise at all or remain on the periphery. However, for many other people within the elites, it becomes more acute. This will inevitably affect the regime’s effectiveness and reach the leaders, as they have a pressing task—to preserve themselves and ensure a transition so they don’t worry about their offspring.
Therefore, an important basket of events will include anything that worsens the situation in the Russian Federation.
Something not yet happened but giving reason for optimism: the public rhetoric of European countries not only to block the ‘shadow fleet’ in the Baltic but to stop Russian oil trade altogether. This is what we’ve been insisting on for I don’t know how long.
There won’t be any rapid progress here. But it will require additional efforts from the Russian Federation and increase costs. Well, if it happens and affects at least dozens of ships—it will be a strong argument to allow Europe at the table to discuss the future security architecture.
7. Assembly Point – USA and Trump.
After a flashy performance in Venezuela, the Trump administration clearly needs new noisy effects both related to the Epstein case and the peculiarities of the domestic situation.
Fully channeling the story of the moral degradation of the elite onto the British aristocracy, the reptilian Gates, and other characters won’t work. They’ll have to bomb someone. The success of this bombing will determine the disposition for spring and the entire complex of negotiation tracks with China, India, Europe, Russia, etc.
There are several options for justified bombing: Mexico, Cuba, Iran, random ‘terrorists’/drug dealers in any unexpected place, like California. Each has its pros and cons.
Mexico is trying to maneuver by extraditing criminals and enhancing/imitating pinpoint pressure on cartels, hoping to avoid the use of American troops (even in the format of drone strikes) until Trump switches focus again.
With Iran, there’s a lot going on. A blockade may be the most reasonable tool but doesn’t provide the necessary fireworks.
There are interesting formulations regarding Cuba, which I’ll cover in a separate text.
The USA cannot ignore (clearly showing displeasure) the attempts of Canada, Britain, and other entities to seek fortune in embracing China. Revoking visas for short visits of Britons to China is insignificant, but as a symbolic gesture, it’s resonant.
What many perceived as a retreat in Davos from Greenland after Europe’s rejection undermines the narrative of the hegemon’s omnipotence. There will be more stubbornness. A demonstrative use of force in some spot becomes practically inevitable.
For the bureaucratic logic in which the American state machine operates, the primary point of effort should be the Western Hemisphere. Different moves may arise, like blocking the supply of Russian diesel to Brazil, which gains access through dumping. This really deprives the USA of part of the earnings. In the context of the total eradication of Russian-Chinese presence—quite an adequate story for the moment.
Naturally, no one will meddle in a hypothetical Brazil, but it implies additional sea activity. However, being active on all seas won’t be possible, and choices will have to be made. The easiest task is to solve it in the Baltic and simultaneously play on the Greenland storyline.
Russians have started talking openly about the need to have their naval ships escort their tankers. This surely causes dread among Russian sailors, but it may be demonstratively implemented a few times outside the Baltic. Washington will be forced to react; otherwise, the electorate won’t understand.
So while our war follows a linear logic, the number of reasons for military incidents (including accidental ones) is growing, which could indirectly but significantly affect our track. Significantly doesn’t mean negatively. But it could be negative. For example, if oil prices allow Russia to finance the war even with a reduction in hydrocarbon trade volumes.
8. Regarding China, the U.S. clearly articulates the priority to avoid direct military confrontation. But the mutual “nibbling” through others’ hands hasn’t been canceled.
Comrade Xi has many internal tasks, but this year is preparatory, with results needed next year when the CPC Congress occurs. Hence, the maneuverability is broader. Including in Taiwan, where a political track favorable to Beijing is not excluded.
Trump needs results already. Which motivates him to deal more quickly with distracting tasks. Therefore, it would be quite logical to simultaneously increase pressure on Ukraine and Russia.
It is publicly articulated that the only stumbling block left is the “territory issue.” It implies a piece of the Donetsk region with the Kramatorsk-Slovyansk agglomeration.
Let’s ask ourselves: Does Russia lack territories? Will they receive territories and calm down? Clearly, no.
Therefore, purely hypothetically, the problem is “territories + context to them.” That’s more accurate. Territories in the context of some further continuation.
And this continuation inevitably brings up the issue of Ukraine’s status concerning Russia (and vice versa) after a conditional freezing/peace agreement. To put it nicely, let’s call this “modalities of coexistence regime.”
Which repeatedly leads to the zoning model that China produced two years ago. Its essence: territories with different security regimes, different economic orders, and different guarantees.
This automatically alters or removes the topics of the EU, NATO, and similar.
The logic of realpolitik processes suggests that we will be pushed in this direction. Which is bad.
Therefore, the minimum task is not to falter when a negotiation window opens. Because collapse will inevitably mean zoning.
The maximum task is to demonstrate such a level of internal organization to maintain subjectivity within the entire controlled territory. And to shift the themes of “zoning” to the temporarily occupied. Which is epically difficult and needed by no one but us…
9. Returning to the “tennis” scale of evaluation.
We face facts and a whole spectrum of contexts.
The main fact is that Ukraine has not yet been forced into a situation of hopelessness.
The ideal scenario would have been to freeze the war along the line of contact yesterday and continue negotiation dances. Such an option is not available yet. And if it is, it should be taken.
The linear scenario suggests for the U.S. elections:
• approximately 200,000 killed and as many wounded Russian soldiers;
• rapid degradation of the Russian economy due to increasing problems, delaying the timeline for normalization and recovery;
• increase in infrastructure, economic, demographic, and other crises in Ukraine;
• a non-zero probability that Russia will turn into ruins and then gain control over piles of rubble in the Sloviansk and Kramatorsk area (this position was voiced by Budanov as information from foreign intelligence opinions).
Things are bad for us.
Bad for Russia.
Does not solve the tasks of the Trump administration for the USA.
Satisfactory for China.
Satisfactory for Europe. But without European help (which should physically start arriving in April) we won’t even go through a linear scenario.
We need a non-linear one that suits us, Europe, fits the current Washington administration, doesn’t upset China, and ideally, saves face for Putin so he doesn’t put up much resistance.
However, the probability of coordination between Europe and the USA is negligible, and the motivation is opposite.
The timing for developing such a scenario is until April. Otherwise, there’s a high probability of launching the next six-month cycle of war.
Providing detailed realistic suggestions online is unnecessary. But the key marker is obvious: stabilization of the LBS, likely in the form of a deep kill zone.
An unacceptable level of losses for the Russian Federation, degradation of the ability to maintain the war, escalation of postponed problems – these are the baskets into which our actions and the efforts of partners must fall.
Spring is in 4 weeks.
