Peter Pomerantsev, The Financial Times / Translated by In Factum, Drukarnia
In Putin’s version, Russia’s victory is so close that it’s almost impossible to lose. An era of neo-imperial states is approaching. Even America is joining them. Democracies, especially European ones, find themselves on the side of history’s losers.
Inside the country, the Russian president boasts that he has overcome Western sanctions and ensured economic and social stability. On the front in Ukraine, he claims to have the “strategic initiative,” and his army is advancing to fully capture the Donbas.
“We will either liberate these territories by force, or Ukrainian troops will leave them,” he warns.
According to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, Russian factories are producing ammunition four times faster than the entire Alliance. The American leadership echoes this story. J. D. Vance predicts that Russia will take the Donbas. Trump, commenting on footage of the Moscow parade, reportedly told his aides that Putin’s army looks “invincible.” The US links a possible concession by Ukraine of territories with security guarantees.
Whether Trump truly believes in this narrative of Putin’s triumph or is just pretending because he wants to force Ukraine to concede—it is sometimes hard to understand. But both Putin and Trump know that in today’s world, being able to impose your version of events is crucial. If Putin can make everyone believe that Russian victory is inevitable, he can demand better terms in negotiations or blame Ukraine and Europe for their failure.
The war in Ukraine has always had two sides: the classic 20th-century conflict, where success is measured in kilometers, and the battle in the global information space, where facts can be manipulated. Military theorists talk about the importance of dominance in escalation, but dominance in narrative is becoming increasingly important.
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According to the Kremlin, the war was never just about Ukraine—it is part of a broader geopolitical drama, in which Russia is supposedly winning in every episode. In this grand story, there is a hero—a strong, revived Russia overcoming an aggressive NATO, which poses both a military and civilizational threat. This imaginary enemy wants to dismantle Russia, so it must strike first.
Here perception is particularly important. The transatlantic alliance is built on the image of American resolve and shared values with Europeans. Both images are crumbling. Trump’s threats to annex Greenland have finally shattered the already fragile facade.
First, a clear narrative is formed—and then actions are taken to confirm it. The narrative is a strategy in the form of a story.
Russian propaganda eagerly picks up these signals. In a December article by “Komsomolskaya Pravda,” it was claimed that Trump now sees Russia as a “possible partner” and Europe as a “liberal bastion that needs to be destroyed.” In this picture, Europe embodies values that are becoming obsolete—protection of the rights of small states and individuals.
However, despite the apparent strength, Putin’s story is vulnerable. In 2026, Russia faces systemic weaknesses both domestically and internationally. Liberal democracies can turn the tide. To do this, they need to learn to dismantle the Russian narrative while making their actions part of a larger story of efficiency and determination.
This is important regardless of the outcome of the ongoing trilateral negotiations between the US, Russia, and Ukraine or any agreements regarding Ukrainian lands. What’s at stake is whether medium-sized democracies can stick together and stand up for themselves against predatory states.
“This is not about PR,” says Mark Laity, former head of strategic communications at NATO. “It’s about understanding that politics and actions shape character and weave into a larger story that you tell. First, you define a clear narrative — and then act in a way that confirms it.”
To see the fragility of the Kremlin’s story, just look at the front. At the end of 2025, Putin solemnly announced the capture of Kupiansk. Zelensky, who understands narrative politics well thanks to his television background, filmed himself in this city. Russian propaganda responded with footage of the “entry” of Russian troops — which later turned out to be retreating.
A few months later, I write this text from a freezing Kyiv, where the energy system is under devastating attacks. If Putin hopes that the lack of heat and light will provoke protests against Ukrainian leadership and a desire to surrender, the plan is not working: there are no protests, and recent polls show an increase in the willingness to continue the war.
Putin’s main internal narrative is that he is a strong hand ensuring stability after the chaos of the Soviet Union’s collapse and the economic crash of the 1990s. Putin and his circle of former security officers are obsessed with the moment the Soviet regime lost control. This sense of danger permeates his paradoxical rule — the Russian leadership constantly surveys the population to understand the risk of protests. And when something threatens Putin’s sense of control, he retreats.
The brightest example was seen during the 2022 invasion, when hundreds of thousands fled Russia out of fear of mobilization, and the economy briefly collapsed. Since then, Putin has proposed a new social contract, financially backed by oil exports and defense investments: the middle class of large cities avoids the direct impact of the war, and poorer regions receive huge payments for service.
This contract maintained stability for three years. But now it is cracking.
Cracks are visible in army recruitment. The life of a Russian soldier has always been difficult. On one hand, there’s a bonus of up to $50,000, equivalent to a lifetime salary. On the other hand, a significant part of the salary has to be given: 50-70% goes to “buy off” the commander to avoid the front and to purchase equipment, drones, uniforms, explains Ukrainian strategic communications expert Liubov Tsybulska, who monitors Russian military posts.
The Kremlin is increasingly desperate to find people willing to sign a contract. The internet is full of stories about pressure to serve: people with minor debts are “offered” to enlist to have their debts forgiven. Convicted criminals have long been offered service in exchange for pardon, but now such offers are made right in the courtroom. Putin ordered the conscription of reservists and expanded recruitment. This often affects middle-class youth undergoing mandatory training. They are not supposed to be sent to the front, but families fear they will be forced to sign a contract.
Putin has staked his reputation on seizing the rest of the Donbas. But to do this, he risks edging towards a hidden mass mobilization—a potentially dangerous moment of instability.
The economic deal Putin offered the country is also changing.
“The biggest challenge for Putin this year is budgetary,” says Olexander Kolyandr, an analyst at the Center for European Policy who writes for The Bell.
The deficit of the Russian budget for 2025 was 2.6% of GDP—five times more than planned. The government expects (probably too optimistically) 1.6% this year. With no ability to cut expenditures and no access to global capital, Russia can only borrow domestically, accumulating debt and fueling inflation.
On the international stage, Putin’s narrative is not as assured as it seems. Russian-backed regimes in Syria and Venezuela fell last year. Iran—a supplier of weapons and a partner in circumventing sanctions—is wobbling. Russia’s hybrid war in Europe is not always successful. In Moldova, Russia spent hundreds of millions of euros on cyberattacks, vote-buying, proxy parties, violent groups, and media influence to sway the 2025 parliamentary elections in its favor. Many sectors of Moldovan society resisted—law enforcement exposed vote-buying schemes, investigative journalism uncovered troll farms, and democratic media worked with audiences vulnerable to disinformation. Pro-European parties won.
If Moldova—the poorest country in Europe with a population of 2.4 million—could repel Russian hybrid attacks, why can’t the rest of the continent?
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The Russian victory narrative is vulnerable both internally and externally, but these weaknesses are rarely brought together. The first step for Ukraine and its allies is to do this systematically to show why Putin should not be granted all his desires in negotiations.
But dismantling Russian narratives is just the beginning. Ukraine’s allies must project their own strength.
“We need to identify the main character, their goals, and their path,” explains Leity.
Let’s start with “who” this actor is. Russia and the US use the word “Europe” to denote something weak and passive. Instead, Ukraine and its allies should envision a community of democracies that includes EU countries ready to constrain Russia—Ukraine, Canada, Britain, Australia, Japan, and others. Their common interest is not allowing neo-imperial predatory states to dictate their terms.
This unites both conservatives and liberals—you can hear it from a nationalist-conservative like Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni to a liberal “hawk” like Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk. It rejects the dead language of a “rules-based international order” dependent on America and offers conditions under which democracies themselves control their security and prosperity.
One of the sharpest articulations of this idea belongs to the Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yermolenko.
“Europe at the beginning of the 20th century built its identity on the question of how small republics could resist aggressive empires — then Russia and Germany,” he told me. “We have returned to this challenge. After the Second World War, Europe associated its identity with pacifism and negotiations. ‘Good’ was linked to sacrifice. But being anti-imperial also means being able to defend oneself.”
The big question for such a community is who will lead it. Russian authority is personified in Putin. Currently, the US in Trump. And here? It cannot be the President of the European Commission. The EU is designed to dilute leadership and suppress ambitious narratives in a web of negotiations. By definition, a community cannot center around one national leader.
But the lack of a single leader can become an advantage. Instead, there are a number of powerful instruments that can be used differently: the EU for economic warfare and funding defense production; NATO for deterrence; Ukraine for kinetic actions within Russia; a network of hybrid threats encompassing states and civil society.
These tools need to be employed without relying on the US as before.
“The loss of the senior partner of the last 60 years is frightening, but also freeing,” says Michael Ignatieff, former Canadian politician and professor of history at Central European University. “We are not using the opportunities we have.”
Canada’s Prime Minister, Mark Carney, clearly articulated this idea in a speech at the Davos forum last month, urging liberal-democratic “middle powers” to assert themselves. None can do it alone, so a system where each voice matters is needed. Their democratic values are not just ideals but the foundation of the power model necessary for survival.
So, what actions can change the narrative of the upcoming negotiations and, in the long term, create a free and secure space for democracies to compete with predatory states?
Consider the Russian hybrid campaign aimed at dividing Europe over support for Ukraine: sabotage, disinformation, cyberattacks. They are cheap and often executed via proxies. When unknown entities launch drones to paralyze Copenhagen Airport, or mysterious fires break out at German arms factories, Europeans can’t always identify the culprit, let alone respond effectively — making them appear even weaker.
The goal is to show that middle states can be greater than the sum of their parts and to constantly pressure Russia from unexpected directions, undermining Putin’s confidence in his narrative.
To be taken seriously, it is also necessary to demonstrate long-term intentions, especially in defense production. One way to accelerate this is to unite the capabilities of Ukraine and Europe. Europe has the money, Ukraine — technology and experience. Weapons in Ukraine are developed, tested, and produced much faster than in Europe. As former Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Oleksandra Azarkhina noted at a British Institute of Strategic Studies event in December, crucial steps include aligning Ukrainian intellectual property law with EU standards and liberalizing export controls between Ukraine and its partners.
In a world where the rule of law is weakening, Europe, often seen as sclerotic, may become an attractive safe haven—well-protected space where law and security ensure prosperity. Rather than being a symbol of impotence, as portrayed by America and Russia, medium-sized democracies can become a beacon.
The alternative is to allow oneself to be intimidated and subdued.
