Timothy Ash / Translation by iPress
Senior strategist at RBC BlueBay Asset Management and Chatham House fellow Timothy Ash is convinced that as we enter the fifth year of full-scale war, it becomes increasingly clear: Putin strategically lost – despite ongoing combat. Instead of a quick victory over a “weak” Ukraine, Russia is facing a grueling war, millions in losses, economic decline, and international isolation. The invasion, intended to halt NATO expansion and return Ukraine to Russia’s orbit, achieved the opposite: unifying the West, expanding the Alliance, and strengthening the Ukrainian nation against Russia forever. Timothy Ash convincingly argues: each of Putin’s declared goals has backfired on him, and the longer this war continues, the deeper his defeat becomes.
Four years after the beginning of Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and nearly 12 years after the annexation of Crimea, it is worth looking back to see how far all this is from a victory for Putin.
Firstly, it is humiliating that Russia, once considered a superpower with overwhelming (or so we all thought) military superiority over Ukraine and expected to achieve total victory in a matter of days, is still stuck in a war it seems unable to win.
Imagine: Ukraine, which is not part of NATO, has effectively defeated the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to hide in ports in the eastern part of the sea – far from its supposed base in Sevastopol. Sevastopol itself has been subjected to Ukrainian attacks and is no longer safe for Russians, even though the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was supposed to “protect” the peninsula from a NATO invasion. Russia did not encounter a NATO invasion of Crimea, yet Ukraine’s attacks make the territory no longer safe for Russia.
The war was supposedly meant to protect the “homeland,” but Ukrainians have managed to bring the fight onto Russian territory, invading the Belgorod region and launching countless missiles and UAVs deep into Russia, as well as disabling a significant portion of Russia’s oil refineries.
Secondly, Russia’s failure to achieve a decisive and swift victory over Ukraine has lowered its global status – it is now clearly a junior partner to China and forced to request weapons and troops from Iran and North Korea to defend itself.
Third, the myth of the power of the Russian army has been debunked. The fact that Ukraine, often using second or third-generation NATO weapons, managed to hold back Russia, which uses fourth or even fifth-generation weapons, speaks for itself. Russian military technology has proved secondary, and Russian defense exports abroad have dropped from tens of billions of dollars annually to a few billion. Countries are now lining up to buy American Patriot missile systems instead of Russian S-400s. Turkey is even now trying to figure out how to get rid of the S-400 system it purchased, as it wants to return to the American F-35 supply chain. India is buying French fighter jets instead of the Russian ones it relied on for decades.
Fourth, being stuck in a war it cannot win in Ukraine, Russia has failed to provide military support to its former allies who have come under attack, including Assad in Syria, Iran, and Maduro in Venezuela. Russia has been losing allies one by one, as it cannot allocate military resources to help them in times of need. We also saw this in the recent Nagorno-Karabakh war, where Russia could not allocate military resources to fulfill security agreements with Armenia. The vulnerability of Russian weapons was again exposed by Turkish and Israeli military technologies.
Fifth, the human losses of Russia due to the war have been enormous. Western estimates suggest they exceed a million people, including hundreds of thousands of deaths. Although Putin is not concerned about human losses, they are disproportionately borne by poor regions, especially the Muslim south of Russia. Eventually, the trauma experienced by such a large part of the population will come home—in a literal sense—and haunt Putin. Millions of veterans will demand substantial pensions, social benefits, and medical care, which could lead to serious social problems and even political challenges for the Kremlin leader. Perhaps Putin is now stuck in a war he cannot end, as ending the war would force him to account for why Russia suffered such staggering losses and for what purpose?
Sixth, the economic damage to Russia has been enormous: estimates suggest it has significantly exceeded 1 trillion dollars, or perhaps even several times more. Consider the loss of 330 billion dollars in Central Bank assets, capital outflow amounting to several hundred billion since the full-scale invasion, and the imposition of sanctions. Add to this the market losses on Russian debt and equity markets. Additionally, the negative impact of sanctions on economic growth, likely starting at least 1% per year since 2021, or perhaps earlier—from the first imposition of sanctions against Russia after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. For an economy worth 2.5 trillion dollars, total losses could amount to several hundred billion. Then, the actual cost of the war: defense spending, which likely increased from 50–60 billion dollars a year to around 250 billion dollars a year or more. For a relatively small economy now limited by sanctions, this causes difficult trade-offs: guns instead of butter.
Contractions and stagnation in major sectors of the economy, hopeless debt and recession, while other sectors related to military activities thrive. Then, there are the social costs: payments of 30-50 thousand dollars per person for the recruitment and maintenance of the military, and also (if paid) in case of injury and after demobilization. Overall, economic growth is lower, inflation higher, budget deficits and borrowing larger, interest rates higher, and people generally poorer. Less consumption and more spending on military sectors of the economy, which hardly adds to the real well-being of the population.
Putin is making Russians poorer, significantly poorer, and the longer the war lasts, the worse the consequences will be.
Seventh, and this is related to the previous point, Russia has entered an arms race with the West that it simply cannot win. Russia can spend $250 billion a year on defense against perhaps $100 billion from Ukraine, but Europe is now increasing defense spending from 2% of GDP to 3.5% of GDP, and further to 5% of GDP. For a European economy of $25 trillion, this would mean about $1 trillion, or 40% of the size of the Russian economy. This is reminiscent of the late USSR and its ultimate collapse following a failed military intervention in Afghanistan and then losing the arms race with NATO.
Eighth, regarding NATO: Putin claims he invaded Ukraine to stop NATO expansion, but as a result of this invasion, he now has a larger, not smaller, North Atlantic alliance on his borders – following the accession of Sweden and Finland. In addition, NATO in Europe is at least now rearming to counteract the Russian threat. Remember that both Sweden and Finland had a steadfast non-alignment/neutrality status before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. But now they believe that the main threat to their security comes from Russia.
Similarly, the perception of risks in mainland Europe has sharply changed. Five years ago, I believe the German or Scandinavian elite and even public opinion did not consider Russia the primary and existential threat to Europe. But now in Germany, Denmark, France, or Sweden, it is absolutely clear: given the increased defense spending and support for Ukraine, they see Russia as their biggest and existential threat. Putin has united Europe against him and rallied European opinion in support of Ukraine and broader European defense.
Ninth, oddly enough, Russia attacked because it was concerned about an alleged military threat from Ukraine, even though in 2014, the country had only a few hundred poorly armed military personnel. But due to the invasion, Ukraine has rearmed and currently has an army of about 800,000 soldiers, becoming one of the most powerful military forces in Europe, capable not only of defending itself during four long years of attacks but also of carrying combat operations onto Russian territory.
Putin turned the war argument into a case against NATO expansion in Europe, but in a sense, Ukraine’s NATO membership is less important than how Ukraine has now become a pillar of European defense. It is not about European NATO coming to defend Ukraine from Russia, but about Europe realizing that the best defense against Russia is Ukraine, and ensuring that it does not lose this war. Hence, the enormous financial commitments of Europe to Ukraine, covering the full cost of funding Kyiv in this war, amounting to $100 billion a year.
Tenth, if the goal of the war was to return Ukraine to Russia’s orbit, then, in my opinion, we are further from that than ever. If opinion polls in Ukraine in 2013 did not reveal strong anti-Russian sentiments, then after a decade of brutal attacks, the Ukrainian population has clearly defined its orientation. The vast majority want deeper integration with the West, and only a small part of the population still looks towards Russia. Although in 2014 there was no clear sense of national identity in Ukraine, Russian actions have shaped it. They helped create a sense of Ukrainian identity and a clear desire for a separate course from Russia. In 2014, this was not so obvious. Putin’s actions have forged a nation in Ukraine that can still defeat Putin and Russia. There is still a possibility that the war in Ukraine could lead to Putin’s overthrow, and this is due to all the aforementioned failures. I am not sure this is still the main scenario, but it is not impossible and might be the quickest way to end this war.
Glory to Ukraine and Putin is a dickhead!
Timothy Ash is a British historian, journalist, and writer, author of numerous books and publications dedicated to politics and the ‘history of the present,’ depicting Europe’s transformation over the last quarter-century.
