Continuing the review of LBD. Today, it’s the Kostiantynivka-Kramatorsk direction.
1. The enemy (Russian forces) continues advancing in this direction with parts of its military groupings (UG) “South” and “Center,” concentrating main efforts in the sectors of the 8th Combined Arms Army (CAA) and the 3rd Army Corps (AC) respectively to the south, southeast, and east of the city of Kostiantynivka.
Russian forces operating in the Kostiantynivka direction are organized into two tactical groups (TG) — “Bakhmut” and “Dzerzhinsk.” In addition to the connections, parts, and subunits of the 8th CAA and 3rd AC, the enemy command has also included in their composition the forces and means of the 18th, 58th, and 49th CAA (UG “Dnepr”), 51st CAA (UG “Center”) and 3rd CAA (UG “South”), including:
TG “Dzerzhinsk,” advancing on both sides of the Klebanbytske reservoir, as well as in the direction of Stepanivka — Dovga Balka, consists of:
– 4th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB) of the 3rd CAA;
– 103rd Motor Rifle Regiment (MRR) of the 150th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) of the 8th CAA;
– 10th Tank Regiment (TR) of the 20th MRD of the 8th CAA;
– 78th MRR of the 42nd MRD, 58th CAA;
– 54th MRR of the 6th MRD 3rd AC;
– 1194th MRR of the 3rd CAA;
– 1219th, 1436th, and 1465th MRR of the 51st CAA;
– 20th and 155th “combined” MRR of the Navy;
– 77th Separate Motor Rifle Regiment (SMRR) from the 7th Military Base (MB) 49th CAA (Gudauta, Abkhazia).
TG “Bakhmut” (part of the forces), advancing in the directions Bila Hora — Kostiantynivka and Predtechyne — Kostiantynivka, consists of:
– 72nd SMRB 3rd AC;
– 1008th, 1307th, and 1442nd MRR of the 6th MRD 3rd AC;
– 89th TR of the 6th MRD 3rd AC.
Additionally, parts and subunits of the 70th MRD 18th CAA from the TG “Bakhmut” operate in the direction of Chasiv Yar – Viroliubivka. And in the direction Rusyn Yar — Rayske, part of the forces of the 150th and 20th MRD 8th CAA, reinforced by parts and subunits from the 120th Marine Division (MD) of the Pacific Fleet (formerly the 40th and 155th Separate Marine Brigades), are advancing along both banks of the Kazennyi Torets river in the general direction of Sofiyivka — Novopavlivka and Shakhove — Novomykolaivka.
2. It is clear that in this direction, the enemy command is implementing a plan aimed at a double operational encirclement of the entire Druzhkivka-Kostiantynivka agglomeration to gradually capture it and further advance towards the approaches close to Kramatorsk from the southeast and east.
Currently, within this plan, the main efforts of the Russian command are focused on the center and right flank of the 8th Combined Arms Army’s line of advance in the general direction of Yablunivka — Illinivka (Tactical Group “Dzerzhinsk”) and on the adjacent flank of the 3rd Army Corps’ line of advance (part of the Tactical Group “Bakhmut”), in the general direction of Bila Hora — the southeastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka and Predtechyne — Kostiantynivka.
As of 08.02.2026, enemy assault groups from its advanced units and divisions have been conducting assault operations over the past few days in the following tactical directions:
- Yablunivka — Illinivka, the forward units of the 1436th Motorized Rifle Regiment, actively supported by the 155th “reinforced” Motorized Rifle Regiment, continue their persistent attempts to “cling” to Illinivka. However, they are not doing very well yet.
- Separate small assault groups (up to 2-3 “bodies”), occasionally acting from the forest south of Illinivka, sometimes break through to individual houses on Naberezhna Street, but they do not stay long. Nevertheless, the enemy persistently tries “at all costs” to consolidate in Illinivka, acting from the roundabout southwest of Berestok through the forest south of Illinivka.
- Oleksandro-Kalynove — Berestok, assault groups from the 4th Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 10th Tank Regiment of the 20th Motorized Rifle Division of the 8th Combined Arms Army are trying to break through to Berestok from the western end of the Kleban-Byk reservoir. So far unsuccessfully, as they are forced to engage in tough battles on the northern shore of the reservoir instead of advancing toward Berestok.
- The 77th Motorized Rifle Regiment continues to gather assault infantry towards Yablunivka — Stepanivka, evidently preparing for offensive\assault actions in this direction soon, aiming to capture Stepanivka.
- Meanwhile, assault groups of the advanced units of the 103rd Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 150th Motorized Rifle Division and the 10th Tank Regiment of the 8th Combined Arms Army, evidently, have a clear order to capture Berestok through synchronized attacks from the western and eastern ends of the Kleban-Byk reservoir.
However, in this respect, it is worth noting that the enemy has not yet been able to firmly consolidate in the area of Pleshchiyivka and Ivanopillia for this purpose, although they are constantly trying to send small assault groups from the village of Kleban Byk and through Yablunivka to positions on the northern bank of the reservoir. The battles there continue with mixed results, but the enemy has not yet been able to capture the key positions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the section from Pleshchiyivka to Berestok and from Yablunivka to Berestok.
- In turn, the Russian 72nd Motorized Rifle Brigade seeks to reinforce its assault troops that have reached the southeastern outskirts of Kostiantynivka, regularly attempting to move small infantry groups in the direction of Predtechyne — Kostiantynivka for this purpose. So far, not very successfully.
- Unlike the forward units of the 6th Motorized Rifle Division of the 3rd Army Corps, which are acting through the “Dachi” area towards Oleksandro-Shultyne — Kostiantynivka and are persistently trying to break through to the “Kostiantynivka” railway station along Ostrovskoho Street. So far, the enemy has not been able to cross road T-0504 with its main forces and is forced to engage in fierce battles with its assault groups in the area of Odeska and Kyivska Streets of Kostiantynivka.
– In addition to the mentioned active actions of the enemy during the first (initial) stage of the assault on Kostyantynivka, the Russian command continues quite active offensive/assault actions in the area of Sofiivka and northwest of Chasiv Yar (towards Virolubivka), simultaneously trying to create conditions for reaching the close approaches to Druzhkivka. In this regard, the enemy has so far only managed to connect battles for Sofiivka and break through to the reservoir southeast of Virolubivka. Over more than 2.5 weeks of fierce fighting, Russian forces have managed to advance on these flanks by no more than 1 km.
3. It is likely that the Russian command plans to gradually capture the entire agglomeration of Druzhkivka-Kostyantynivka — first surrounding the flanks of Kostyantynivka, simultaneously breaking through to the close approaches to Druzhkivka, and then capturing Kostyantynivka itself by storm and forcing the Ukrainian Armed Forces out of the Druzhkivka area under the threat of encirclement.
At the same time, it is likely planned to advance forward units of Russian forces in the area of Malotaranivka – Semenivka – Bilokuzminivka – Komyshuvakha north of Druzhkivka. The ultimate operational goal of this operation is to reach the close approaches to Kramatorsk from the south and southeast, thereby creating one of the prerequisites for organizing and conducting an operational offensive operation against the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration during the summer-autumn campaign of 2026.
In this regard, it is clear that the tasks of the first stage of the assault on Kostyantynivka involve the following actions by the Russian TGr “Dzerzhinsk” and “Bakhmut”:
– TGr “Dzerzhinsk” is apparently tasked with breaking through Illinivka and Berestok into the southwestern (central) part of the city, moving along the western bank of the Kryvyi Torets River
– TGr “Bakhmut,” accordingly, acting through the southeastern part of Kostyantynivka, aims to break through to the area of the local railway station and to the northwest (along Bakhmutska and Oleksa Tykhogo Streets), as well as on both sides of the Shanghai Pond, to fully occupy the eastern part of the city on the opposite bank of the Kryvyi Torets.
However, at the moment, both Russian TGr in this direction are quite far from achieving these goals. Meanwhile, they are already conducting persistent and active preparation for battles directly in Kostyantynivka itself. For example, regular and targeted training of the personnel of the assault “armored groups” of the 10th TP for “rapid equipment breakthrough into Kostyantynivka through Berestok,” strengthening of UAV groups within the 155th composite motorized rifle regiment of the Navy, constant accumulation of assault infantry in the forward units of the 103rd MSP of the 150th MSD and the 77th OMSp, etc., is underway.
In fact, as part of the preparation for the entire Russian forces’ summer campaign of 2026, one of the main elements (and probably the most fundamental), likely to be a hypothetical operational offensive operation of the Russian forces towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration, their command in the Kostyantynivka direction, theoretically considering the time required for preliminary preparation, including the operational deployment of relevant military groups, should ALREADY be “accelerating” offensive actions. This equally applies to the Lyman direction.
However, at present, we are observing something slightly different — small but constant attempts at infiltration and penetration by small and “micro” (up to 2-3 personnel) assault groups of the enemy into the combat orders of the forward units and subunits of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Yes, this significantly reduces the one-time losses of the enemy during its offensive/assault actions, as opposed to attempts to break through tactically with larger assault groups. However, this also sharply slows the pace and time of the offensive of the Russian troops themselves. Moreover, enemy losses in this case do not decrease significantly overall but are merely stretched over time. The “conveyor of death,” where the enemy command repeatedly sends 2-3 “bodies” for a stealthy penetration and consolidation, ends fatally for them in most cases.
Currently, the battles for Kostyantynivka are essentially occurring in the suburbs, except for its southeastern outskirts. Meanwhile, the enemy’s offensive pace is minimal. This means that a rapid capture of the city by Russian forces is almost impossible at the moment.
Moreover, in this case, the enemy command risks not only disrupting all plans and schedules of its summer campaign but also not even beginning to implement its main elements. Simply because it will become bogged down in the timing and pace of conducting “preparatory measures” for it.
If by the end of spring the enemy does not capture Kostyantynivka and Druzhkivka (as well as Lyman), the Russian military command will have to come up with something “completely different” on the fly for its summer campaign, rather than capturing the much-desired Kramatorsk and Slovyansk.
Photo: 30th Separate Mechanized Brigade named after Prince Kostiantyn Ostrozkyi
