Today’s review will be somewhat unusual.
We’ll look at the most “stable” direction — the Prydniprovsky, which we usually rarely consider due to the almost unchanging position of the sides over a long period.
However, in my opinion, it is worth looking at it at least roughly now, especially in the context of the events occurring throughout the entire Southern strategic operational zone at this moment. Below I will explain why I think so.
So, currently, the enemy (Russian troops) continues to hold advanced positions along the left bank of the Dnipro River from its mouth to the Vasylivka area, without conducting active and large-scale offensive actions.
All this, including the occupied territories of Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions of Ukraine to an operational depth, is the operational zone of the Russian military group “Dnepr,” which operates in this direction with the main forces, except for the 58th Combined Arms Army (ZVA), which is deployed on the Zaporizhzhia direction.
Currently, the enemy has likely deployed the following forces and means in the Prydniprovsky direction:
18th ZVA, formed on the base of the previously existing 22nd Army Corps (AK) and deployed within the “Dnepr” military group in 2023, having received into its composition two “new” divisions:
– 47th Motorized Rifle Division (msd) – 1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th Motorized Rifle Regiments (msp). Formed as a “mobilization” unit in the territory of the occupied Crimean Peninsula. At least one of its regiments is currently deployed in this direction, while the rest are likely operating in the 58th ZVA strip on the Zaporizhzhia direction.
– 70th msd – 24th, 26th, and 28th msp + 17th Tank Regiment (tp), 81st Self-Propelled Artillery Regiment (sap) – regrouped on the Kramatorsk direction with main forces (Eastern strategic operational zone). Currently, it operates in the general direction of Chasiv Yar – Druzhkivka. However, it is quite possible that part of its forces continues to operate on the Prydniprovsky direction (probably, we can talk about individual units of the 26th msp and 81st sap).
– 144th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (omsbr).
– 126th Separate Coastal Defense Brigade (obrbo).
– 127th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (orvbr).
– 74th Separate Artillery Brigade (oabr).
– 8th Separate Artillery Regiment (oap).
49th ZVA — this is a “regular,” “personnel” army of the “southern military district” (YuVO) of the Russian armed forces. It operates both on the Prydniprovsky direction and on the Zaporizhzhia.
– 34th omsbr.
– 205th omsbr.
– 227th abr.
– 7th military base of the Russian armed forces on occupied territory of Georgia (Gudauta), operates as part of the “Dnepr” military group as a consolidated regimental tactical group (TGr), deployed on the Zaporizhzhia direction.
In addition to the aforementioned formations, the UV “Dnepr” on the Prydniprovsky direction deployed several reinforcements from the Russian Airborne Troops (VDV), as well as district troop sets, including:
– The 104th Air Assault Division (AAD) – the 328th, 337th, and 345th Air Assault Regiments (AAR). On this direction, units from its 345th and 337th AAR, as well as separate units from the 328th AAR, are regularly recorded. It is likely that part of its forces (up to a consolidated regiment) also operates in the Zaporizhia direction.
– The 98th Airborne Division (ABD) – the 217th, 299th, and 331st Parachute Regiments (PR). It is likely that it is deployed in the Prydniprovsky direction with its main forces. At least in this direction, units from all three of its regiments are recorded.
– The 10th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SpN Brigade).
– The 439th Rocket Artillery Brigade (RABr).
– Several formations of the “regiment/battalion” level from the Territorial Troops (Tr Troops) of the Russian Armed Forces, which belong to the “mobilization reserve” category (MR). For example, the 385th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Tr Troops, the volunteer battalion BARS-8 “Vasily Margelov,” or the 1430th Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Tr Troops, etc. There may be up to 5-6 such formations in this direction.
In addition to the army units and formations, separate units from the “rosgvardiya” — “Akhmat-South,” “Akhmat-Center,” and the “Federal Service of the National Guard Troops of the Russian Federation” (FSVNG), SOBR, OMON category may perform several tasks in the operational zone of UV “Dnepr” (49th ZVA strip, the Enerhodar and ZNPP area) in the first echelon.
2. The current situation on the Prydniprovsky direction is characterized by relative stability. Both sides mainly use remote means of defeat for strikes and raids on each other’s combat formations at tactical and partly operational depth. At the same time, they practically do not conduct large-scale offensive/assault actions.
Clashes between the sides occasionally occur on the island part of the Dnipro delta, as well as down and partly up the river from the remnants of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant dam. Both sides mainly operate with small infantry (assault) groups, fighting for separate positions in the so-called “gray zone” along the riverbed, actively using various small watercraft for this purpose. All this is accompanied by quite active activity in the tactical area of various UAV groups and units of both sides.
At the same time, it should be noted that Russian forces in this direction very actively use various means of defeat not only on the combat orders of SOU units but also on civilian infrastructure, including residential buildings (in the city of Kherson and its adjacent areas), communications, civilian vehicles, groups of civilian citizens, and even individual persons, as well as objects and transport means of civilian emergency services. And sometimes even at significant distances from their own frontline positions on the left bank of the Dnipro.
Currently, both sides have managed to occupy several tactically important positions in the “gray” zone with the help of their small infantry groups and secure them there.
– It is obvious that southeast of the village of Kizomys, the AFU controls several positions on the islands up to the main riverbed.
– In turn, Russian forces have taken several positions in the area of the village of Bilohorodove on Potyomkin Island, with the ability to conduct intensive fire at the “Korabel” area in Kherson, as well as in the very delta of the Dnipro to the south of the same Kizomys.
– It is likely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine continue to control several positions in the Antonivka — Oleshky direction, in the “Dachi” area on the LEFT bank of the Dnipro.
– And Russian units, most likely, have managed to consolidate on the bank of the main riverbed (between it and the Konka channel) in the Kozachi Lageri — Ivanivka direction. In addition, they occasionally intensively try to expand this area of their control on the left bank of the Dnipro riverbed.
In essence, from the Kinburn Spit to the remnants of the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Station dam in this direction, there is quite an active “war of small infantry groups” for control over tactically important “arms,” channels, and islands. Meanwhile, the Dnipro River serves as a kind of “natural” LBS for both sides.
3. Now regarding the future prospects for development of the situation in this direction.
It is evident that the current command of OV “Dnipro” is focusing mainly on the right flank of its operational zone, namely on the Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia direction, where it simultaneously needs to solve two opposite tasks. Namely: to restrain quite persistent counterattacks of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, essentially in the Zaporizhzhia direction itself, and to try to “break through” in their Orikhiv defense area. This is quite expressively confirmed by the fact that the most powerful army of this group, the 58th CAA, is almost fully concentrated and deployed here, with a very strong reinforcement “tail” from parts and formations of the Russian Airborne Forces, as well as from the composition of the other two armies of this group.
It is clear that under such conditions, the command of OV “Dnipro” has a kind of “temptation” to further strengthen the 58th CAA at the expense of forces and means deployed in the Dnipro direction.
Moreover, it is evidently also driven by the fact that the Dnipro direction is relatively “calm,” with battles of exclusively “local significance” taking place, and therefore it is clearly inexpedient to maintain a significant number of more or less relatively combat-ready forces and means there. Moreover, to do so at the moment when the offensive on Zaporizhzhia and Orikhiv has evidently stalled, and the parts and formations operating there are obviously ALREADY significantly “worn out,” at least in terms of personnel.
And evidently, such “temptations” encompass not only the command of OV “Dnipro” but also its “higher” command. There is no other way to explain the sudden transfer, almost in full, of the “main” division of the 18th CAA (the 70th Motorized Rifle Division) to the Chasiv Yar area this spring.
But, as always, there is a nuance…
The command of OV “Dnipro,” as well as its “senior commanders,” simply cannot afford to take forces and means from the Dnipro direction “to the brim” for the needs of various “active” operational directions. For two main reasons:
– The first reason. Yes, today in the Dnipro direction there are “local fights” for several islands covered with reeds, but what if “tomorrow” suddenly there arise more “Krynky,” moreover on a larger scale and simultaneously with “counterattacks” by the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Tokmak direction?
For those who forgot, let me remind you that the command of the Dnipro operational group needed at least 9 months (from October 20, 2023, to July 17, 2024) and the efforts of at least two full divisions (70th Motorized Rifle Division + 104th Air Assault Division) and two separate brigades (810th Separate Marine Brigade and 144th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade) to finally drive out several infantry groups of two Ukrainian Marine brigades from the left bank near the village of Krymka. Moreover, these battles were very fierce and bloody, and the surrounding “forests” were practically littered with destroyed Russian military equipment. It was there that the widely known “Madyar” first practically demonstrated to all “interested” and not so “interested” parties what “mass use of drones in a specific tactical zone” means.
– The second reason is the growing campaign of “paralyzing strikes” by the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ drones on the operational communications and logistics of Russian troops throughout their Southern strategic operational zone. Starting in such conditions, any significant regrouping of forces and equipment, especially if they have to be moved not just to a neighboring area but somewhere farther, in my opinion, is not a good idea. Especially if for these purposes you only have “diesel” and gasoline “strictly by the norm”.
Of course, you can try to do this covertly, at night, and “dispersed”. But it will be lengthy, exhausting, and not necessarily “without losses”.
It may happen that ultimately the mentioned forces and means will arrive at their new concentration location “untimely” and not in the best condition in terms of their own combat capability.
Therefore, in my opinion, the Russian command is unlikely to seek to maximally weaken its grouping in the Dnipro direction in favor of other directions. At least, in this sense, it will be cautious. After all, it may turn out that such actions will cost it “critically dearly”. However, it will still want to scrape “the bottom of the barrel” there and, accordingly, find something additional for the Zaporizhzhia direction (and possibly for other directions).
Despite a series of apocalyptic messages from the “honorable lord,” known “in peace” under the double surname “Strelkov-Girkin,” from his current “confinement” about the “almost inevitable” offensive of the “Kyiv regime” in the South, the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the moment clearly do not have enough forces and means (including multi-level reserves) for organizing and conducting any strategic offensive operation in the Southern strategic operational zone, including the Tokmak-Melitopol operational directorate. This is obvious…
However, they are already capable of gradually depleting the logistical support system (LS) at tactical and operational levels of both Russian military groupings operating in the Southern strategic operational zone (the Dnipro Group and the Vostok Group) due to the sharp increase in the intensity and scale of the impact of their strike drones on the enemy’s communications. Especially if the alternative route to the “land corridor” for the movement of Russian troops and LS items through the occupied Crimea is initially “disabled” from this scheme.
In this sense, the Russian Dnipro Group is clearly in the most vulnerable position:
– It has already moved further west than the rest of the Russian groups, consequently having the longest supply route among them for the necessary logistics, with all the consequences that arise from this fact.
– Moreover, almost all of it is located in the “active influence zone” of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (both in the case of “along Azov” and “through Crimea”), which means that it is highly likely that this group will be the first to significantly “deplete” from a logistical point of view, as it will receive only what can “break through” the M-14 road, which the AFU has already disrupted with drones, or through the nearly “cut-off” Crimea.
Thus, the current commander of the UV “Dnepr” (General Teplinsky) will very likely soon have to make a number of quite difficult decisions for himself in connection with all this.
Photo: 22 Separate Mechanized Brigade
