Orikhovo-Zaporizhzhia direction.
The enemy (Russian forces) on the left flank of its 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) within the Dnipro group of forces continues to conduct active defense to prevent further advancement of the advance units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine towards Stepnohirsk — Kamianske. They are also attempting to create conditions for a breakthrough of their forward units to the city of Orikhiv on the right flank of this army.
1. To fulfill these tasks, the Russian command has concentrated and deployed a rather powerful grouping of forces within the 58th CAA. It consists of the 58th CAA’s own troops and attached reinforcements from several airborne units, as well as the 18th CAA from the same Dnipro group. Specifically:
58th CAA:
– 19th Motor Rifle Division (MRD) — 392nd, 429th, and 503rd Motor Rifle Regiments (MRR);
– 42nd MRD — 70th, 71st, and 291st MRR + 270th MRR “Akhmat-Kavkaz”, possible presence of separate units of the 78th Motorized Special Purpose Regiment (MTP SP) “Sever-Akhmat”;
– 136th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade (SMRB), likely partly included in the operational reserve of the 58th CAA;
– 100th Separate Reconnaissance Brigade (SRB), likely operating in this direction only with part of its forces;
– Composite Regimental Tactical Group (RTG) of the 7th Military Base “RF Armed Forces” in South Ossetia (Tskhinvali).
Reinforcements:
– 18th CAA, referring to its “mobilization” 47th Motor Rifle Division, formed in the occupied Crimean Peninsula (1152nd, 1153rd, and 1154th MRR). At least one of these regiments is present in the area of the 19th Motor Rifle Division of the 58th CAA (and, most likely, there are two);
– Airborne Forces, 108th and 247th Air Assault Regiments (AAR) of the 7th Air Assault Division (AAD), several units of the 76th Air Assault Division, as well as the 45th Separate Special Purpose Brigade (SPB) of the Airborne Forces “RF Armed Forces”, possible presence of separate units of the 104th Air Assault Division and the 98th Airborne Division (AD).
Currently, since our last review, there have been no significant changes in the combat and numerical composition (CNC) of the Russian group deployed in the 58th Armored Army (58th AA) zone. However, with high probability, the enemy command in this direction, due to recent changes in the tactical situation, might be able or is planning to carry out a series of regroupings within the 58th AA and the “Dnepr” Operational Group:
– It is likely that the 247th Airborne Assault Regiment of the 7th Airborne Assault Division, previously withdrawn for combat readiness restoration, as well as the 1445th Motorized Rifle Regiment, have been returned to the zone of the 19th Motorized Rifle Division.
– Most likely, in the near future, the entire 47th Motorized Rifle Division will be concentrated in the 58th AA zone.
– It can be assumed with high probability that the 58th AA group may be reinforced with additional units of the 104th Airborne Assault Division from the Dnipro direction.
2. Current situation in this direction is characterized by several main factors:
– Almost complete cessation of the advance of main forces of forward units and subunits of the 58th AA in the Zaporizhzhia direction.
– Their forced transition on a number of sections of this direction from offense to active defense.
– Ongoing enemy attempts to break into the vicinity of Orikhiv.
In practice (in the tactical zone), this looks like:
– The Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), apparently, over the past two weeks managed to “clear” Prymorske and push back several remaining small enemy infantry groups into the former channel of the Kakhovka Reservoir, towards the Konka River, which flows there.
– The highway “junction” (the so-called “Ring”) between Prymorske and Stepnohirsk has also apparently come under the control of the AFU.
– Furthermore, apparently, a number of forward infantry groups of the AFU managed to advance through it and secure positions in the village of Plavni (towards the “Plavni-Pasazhyrsʹki” railway station) and approximately one kilometer south of it along the E-105 road towards Kamianske.
– In turn, Russian troops continue to hold the southern outskirts of Stepnohirsk (the “Vysotky” area) and several small infantry groups sheltering along Agrarna Street.
– It is evident that the AFU forward units also approached very close to the villages of Stepne and Lobkove, though the enemy attempted to counterattack east of Stepne (northward from Mira and May 9th streets). However, they managed to “penetrate” with only a few of their assault troops into two forest plantations north of the village, where they were immediately blocked.
– Intense fighting continues in the area of the villages of Shcherbaky and Mali Shcherbaky. The enemy is trying to hold out there, but as of now, it is likely that forward Russian units in this section have been forced by the main forces to retreat south of both villages, although there are still several small Russian infantry groups hiding in destroyed buildings along the road to Orikhiv and east of Shcherbaky.
– In the Orikhiv direction, the enemy has already made several “incursions” in the direction of Nesteryanka — Novoandriivka, apparently aiming to reach heights west of Orikhiv and secure positions there. So far, the advance of several small assault groups of the enemy has been recorded from the area northwest of Nesteryanka towards Novoandriivka approximately 2.5 km, as well as their arrival on the road between Shcherbaky and Novoandriivka and even north of it.
– Meanwhile, to the south and southeast of Orikhiv, the enemy’s attempts to break through to the city were not as successful. They managed a few small “penetrations” north of Robotyne (600-800 meters), in the Uspenivska gully area and the T-0803 road (between Novodanylivka and Novopokrovka) by small infantry groups of 2-4 soldiers.
– In the Mala Tokmachka area, Russian troops retreated beyond the river of the same name (southeast of the village towards Novopokrovka), as well as beyond the Konka River in the Bilohirya and Luhivske areas.
Thus, it can be noted that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army has so far not managed to fulfill two main preliminary operational-tactical tasks in its sector, necessary to achieve its main goal — reaching the approaches to Zaporizhzhia from the south and southeast. Specifically:
– Currently, it cannot reach the Malokaterynivka-Hryhorivka boundary. Moreover, on this front, its forward units are even retreating in some areas, risking “falling back” to Kamianske, to the Yanchekrak River. The distance from the Russian forward positions in the Stepnohirsk area to the southern outskirts of eastern Zaporizhzhia (Kosmichny District) is actually no less than 21.5 km, despite all the loud claims from the Kremlin’s “recluse” about “9 km.”
– The 58th Combined Arms Army and its attached forces and means of reinforcement have not managed to “break through” to Orikhiv, despite all the “strict” plans, which were evidently approved by Russia’s general staff this spring.
3. Regarding future prospects for this army on the entire Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia front, in my very subjective opinion, they seem quite questionable, to say the least.
It is evident that the command of Russia’s “West” Operational Group and the 58th Combined Arms Army, in particular, will continue to “stick to their line” regarding the hypothetical assault on Orikhiv for two main reasons:
– Currently, conducting active offensive actions across its entire sector is unlikely due to a lack of forces and means with the necessary level of combat readiness. Of course, they could attempt again to advance towards Zaporizhzhia along the Dnipro and simultaneously try to storm Orikhiv with available forces, but this approach could quickly “overextend” them. Therefore, it is logical to proceed gradually, in parts, so to speak.
If we put ourselves in the place of the Russian command, the assault and elimination of the Orikhiv defense area of the Ukrainian Armed Forces looks more realistic than a “frontal charge” along the Dnipro towards Zaporizhzhia.
Moreover, advancing there without capturing Orikhiv and the adjacent territory, from an operational-tactical point of view, is a very questionable idea, primarily due to the emergence of a rather obvious flanking threat of Ukrainian counterattacks in such a case.
– The second reason is the currently fairly obvious priority in the Russian command’s strategic level of the Eastern Operational Zone over the Southern one.
It is evident that they are now in the process of implementing the so-called Slovyansk-Kramatorsk offensive operation by means of the 5th Combined Arms Army and two army corps from three of its groupings at once. Accordingly, the main part of their strategic reserves will be directed here.
Therefore, the “Dnipro” Operational Group and its 58th Combined Arms Army will clearly have to do at least two things — rely mainly on “internal reserves,” which still need to be found, and similarly reduce their appetite, at least for the near future, regarding goals and tasks on the entire Orikhiv-Zaporizhzhia front.
Or it may turn out that the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army, after unproductive and, most importantly, very costly attempts to advance, will switch to a rigid defense, focusing on holding the “land corridor” to Crimea still “on distant frontiers,” while their colleagues in the east “creep” towards the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk “Zelensky citadel” and plan to assault it.
This is even more relevant due to the likely emergence of logistical difficulties soon for the Russian 58th Combined Arms Army at the operational level, as well as for the entire Dnipro Command, and also in the Vostok Command, due to the ongoing large-scale campaign of the destruction of corresponding Russian logistical communications by Ukrainian strike drones throughout the Southern operational zone.
Photo: 93rd Mechanized Brigade Kholodny Yar
